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CONTENTS

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MILITARY-POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Akhromeyev on Army's Present, Future [Yu. Safonov; <i>RABOCHAYA GAZETA</i> , 31 Jan 91]	1
Estonia's Savisaar on Relations with Armed Forces	5
Part I [E. Savisaar; <i>SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA</i> , 7 Feb 91]	5
Part II [E. Savisaar; <i>SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA</i> , 8 Feb 91]	7
Official on Compensation for Soldiers' Deaths [V. Litovkin; <i>IZVESTIYA</i> , 19 Mar 91]	9
USSR Procurator General Submits Results of Tbilisi Investigation	
[N.S. Trubin; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 20 Mar 91]	10
Delegates to All-Army CPSU Conference Interviewed [KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 Mar 91]	22
New Writers Group on Military Themes [Yu. Vinogradov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 2 Apr 91]	24
Complaints of Trade Unions at Military Installations	
[V. Grishakov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 23 Apr 91]	25
Georgian Earthquake: Military Not at Fault [V. Bocharov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 14 May 91]	27

MILITARY SCIENCE

Factors Contributing to British Troop Quality, Morale	
[V. Krysko; <i>KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL</i> No 22, Nov 90]	28

REPUBLIC MILITARY ISSUES

Small Professional Lithuanian Army Supported	
[S. Valaitis; <i>VECHERNIYE NOVOSTI</i> No 28, 15 Feb 91]	32
Military Outposts Under Attack in Transcaucasus [KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 May 91]	33
Col-Gen Makashov for RSFSR President [I. Korotkikh; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 15 May 91]	33
Azerbaijan National Security Council Created [KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 May 91]	33
Volkogonov Opposes Idea of 'Russian' Army [D. Volkogonov; <i>SOYUZ</i> No 6, Feb 91]	33

ARMED FORCES

Breakdown, Commentary on 1991 Defense Expenditures	
[M. Leontyev; <i>NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA</i> , 12 Jan 91]	35
Obituary: Major General A.A. Makarov [KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Mar 91]	36
Lt Gen Petukhov Interviewed on Military Court System	
[N. Petukhov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 27 Mar 91]	36
Response to IZVESTIYA Series on Officer Corps [N. Andreyev; <i>IZVESTIYA</i> , 5 Apr 91]	38
Presidential Ukase on Benefits for Local Conflict Veterans [IZVESTIYA, 27 Apr 91]	40

AIR FORCES, AIR DEFENSE TROOPS

Combat Utility for MiG-29, SU-27 of 'Cobra', 'Bell' Maneuvers	
[A. Smolyarov; <i>SOVETSKIY PATRIOT</i> No 4, Jan 91]	42
Moscow PVO District: 25 Percent of Personnel From Central Asia	
[M. Gorbachev; <i>SOVETSKIY PATRIOT</i> No 1, Jan 91]	42
Commission Findings on Venice SU-27 Crash [N. Modestov; <i>SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA</i> , 14 Mar 91]	43
'Chronic' Officer Shortage in SAM Subunit [D. Tandos; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 16 Apr 91]	44

NAVAL FORCES

Chernavin on Reduction in Service Terms [V. Chernavin; <i>PRAVDA</i> , 14 May 91]	46
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CIVIL DEFENSE

Call for Anti-Gas Training in Event of Civil Conflict [A. Raukas; <i>VECHERNIY TALLINN</i> , 6 Mar 91]	47
Kyrgyz Presidential Decree on Civil Defense [SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA, 4 Apr 91]	47
USSR Supreme Soviet on Service at Chernobyl [V. Urban; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , Apr 91]	47
Gen Army Govorov 1991 Victory Day Interview [N. Panyukov; <i>RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA</i> , 9 May 91]	48

REAR SERVICES, LOGISTICS

Arkhipov Heads Program To Aid Chernobyl Victims [A. Uzhegov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 30 Apr 91]	50
Snags in FRG Housing Construction in USSR [PRAVDA, 13 May 91]	50
Garrison Tries to Resolve Own Food Problem [V. Streltsov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 14 May 91]	51
Troop Housing Contract Selection Process Explained [O.D. Davydov; <i>IZVESTIYA</i> , 15 May 91]	52

MILITARY MANPOWER ISSUES

Dyakin Criticizes Lopatin on Supposed Professionalization Dividend [V. Dyakin; <i>EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN</i> No 4, Jan 91]	54
Moldovan Military Commissar on Ongoing Conscription Problems [V. Nazarov; <i>SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA</i> , 29 Jan 91]	55
Draft Evasion in Kharkov Oblast [A. Palagnyuk; <i>KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA</i> , 17 Apr 91]	56
Law Changes Service Terms [IZVESTIYA, 16 May 91]	57
Enactment of New Service Terms [IZVESTIYA, 16 May 91]	57
Resolution on Naval Recruitment Experiment [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 May 91]	57

MILITARY EDUCATION

Chief of Kharkov Aviation School on Aviation Education Reform [V. Shevtsov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 12 Mar 91]	59
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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Former Soviet 'Advisor' Describes Experiences in Iraq [S. Bezlyudnyy; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 23 Feb 91]	62
Joint Aerospatiale-MBB Attack Helicopter Noted [PRAVDA, 13 Mar 91]	63
Hungarian Military Attache on New Doctrine [Sh. Nemet; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 10 Apr 91]	64
Changes in Bundeswehr Structure, Doctrine Since Unification [V. Chistyakov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 18 Apr 91]	65

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL CONVERSION

Conversion Increasing Udmurt Unemployment [A. Gorbatov; <i>VETERAN</i> No 15, Apr 91]	67
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MAIN AND CENTRAL DIRECTORATES

Deputy Chief of Military Housing Interviewed [D. Yarmuk; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 26 Apr 91]	69
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Akhromeyev on Army's Present, Future

91UM0611A Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
31 Jan 91 p 3

[Interview with Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev by Yu. Safonov, Moscow—Kiev: "There Is a Struggle Underway for Power"; the Special *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* correspondent talks with the President's advisor on the present and future of our Armed Forces]

[Text] Let us introduce our interlocutor. Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev is an advisor to the President, a USSR people's deputy and a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet. He was born on 5 May 1923 and is a Russian. He began the Great Patriotic War as a private. He was on the front from June 1941. He fought on the Leningrad, Stalingrad, Southern and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts. Victory Day found him holding the rank of captain of tank troops.

Military roads brought him across the Ukraine. He participated in fighting in the region of Stalino (now Donetsk), Gulyay-Polya on the Molochnaya River and in Tavria and participated in the liberation of Krivoy Rog. In the words of Sergey Fedorovich himself, it was during this time that he was able to become well acquainted and befriend the Ukrainian people and learned to use Ukrainian freely. After the war fate brought S.F. Akhromeyev back to the Ukraine. In 1967-1968, he served in Zhitomir as the chief of staff of a tank army. He maintains close ties with our republic at present.

In May 1982, S.F. Akhromeyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and in 1983, he became a marshal and a member of the CPSU Central Committee. Since 1984, he has headed the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and has been the USSR first deputy Minister of Defense. At present, he takes an active part in state, political and social work.

[Safonov] Sergey Fedorovich [Akhromeyev], the present and particularly the future of our army currently concerns each of us. They are writing and speaking about this and army problems are being discussed at sessions of the national and republic Supreme Soviets. Recently a draft of a military reform was published as proposed by the USSR Ministry of Defense. An alternative plan has also appeared. Although it was signed by the USSR people's deputy and acting First Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for State Security and Interaction With the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR KGB, V. Lopatin, understandably this was the opinion of a certain group of the nation's people's deputies. Would you please comment on the main differences between these plans.

[Akhromeyev] The first fundamental difference. According to the plan of the Ministry of Defense there is the intention to establish an army where the rank-and-file and junior commanders are recruited on the basis of universal military service in accord with the

Constitution while the officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and senior specialists are regular professionals. The plan for military reform of Lopatin proposes not a professional but rather a hired army.

Our current army is a professional one. Around 40 percent of its personnel is made up of officers, warrant officers and specialists, that is, professionals. Almost all the soldiers and NCOs before becoming viable fighters for a period of 5 months undergo training in the training subunits and only after this leave to serve in the units. But Lopatin sees the army in the future as hired or mercenary, where the soldiers and NCOs conclude a contract and serve 10-20 years.

One might ask would this be so bad? Possibly, it in fact does make sense to have a hired army as, for instance, in the United States.

But certainly the system for organizing the armed forces depends upon that military-political situation in which the nation finds itself. Only three major powers have a hired army: the United States, Great Britain and Japan. All of them have special conditions. The United States is surrounded with oceans. The neighbors of Mexico and Canada are its allies and do not have strong armies. Great Britain is not only cut off from the rest of the world by seas but is also "covered" by the other Western European countries. Japan is also an insular power. But what about the Soviet Union? In the west of Europe, there still is the military organization of the NATO bloc. In the east, Japan has territorial claims against us. In the south lie Turkey, Israel and Pakistan.... All of this forces us to have a system for manning the army which would ensure a rapid conversion of it from a peacetime to a wartime status. And this can be done only in the instance that the army has prepared reserves in the national economy. You cannot create such reserves in a hired army. There the soldiers serve 10-15 years and then go into the reserves and, consequently, no one takes over for them.

It must also be considered that hired armies are expensive ones. Our soldier rather will receive 40-50 rubles. But a hired soldier, particularly if he is to be sent, for instance, to the desert or to Kamchatka, must be paid 400-500 rubles. For them in addition it is essential to build an enormous amount of housing. And where now are these funds to come from?

The second difference is the demand in the Lopatin plan to disestablish the party within the army. In this regard, we have already taken and implemented a decision. The party organizations are to be separate from the political bodies. Recently a Ukase of the USSR President was promulgated precisely on the establishing of such bodies. These bodies are to be state ones. They are to carry out educational work with the personnel on the basis of our chief values, the Constitution of the Soviet Union, the integrity of the nation and our socialist social system. All of this is reflected in the Constitution and the other laws of the Union and is not an expression of party principles

but rather the constitutional state principles adopted in our country. The officers in the military political bodies are to organize the education of the personnel on the basis of precisely these constitutional demands. The CPSU party organizations also carry out their tasks and the main one is to ensure the authority of the commanders. There are the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee which clearly state that if a commander is a member of the CPSU, in his work he is to rely on the party organization and directs its work. But Lopatin, in speaking about disestablishing the party, in essence, denies our Constitution and denies the existing social and state system provided by the Constitution. In essence, he is endeavoring in practice to realize the line of the Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet B.N. Yeltsin who himself recently has violated the USSR Constitution. He has turned to the servicemen stationed in the Baltic with an appeal not to carry out the orders of the commanders and has come out in favor of establishing a Russian army which is not provided for in the USSR Constitution. We are unable to support what in essence are his separatist actions.

[Safonov] One of the points in the Lopatin plan states literally the following:

"...To prohibit persecution (meaning of servicemen—Yu.S.) for the voluntary withdrawal from the CPSU." Is there actually such persecution now?

[Akhromeyev] In the first place, the withdrawal of an officer from the CPSU is a very rare case. Our officers are educated precisely in a spirit of respecting the Constitution and the values of our society which were mentioned above. If someone withdraws from the CPSU, this can only arouse amazement in his comrades but there has been and would not be any persecution and I state this with all responsibility. If someone has mentioned certain persecution, this for me is an outright and intentional untruth. Just as no one would persecute officers belonging to other parties although there are just a few of these in the army but there are.

[Safonov] One of the Lopatin demands is to provide the "guaranteed right for the servicemen to establish and participate in their own professional unions and in other military-social organizations...."

[Akhromeyev] The legislation provides for a trade union in the Armed Forces and this union would include the employees, that is, civilians working in the combat units, facilities and staffs. Servicemen are not to be members of this trade union. I am profoundly convinced that it would be ill-advised and even impossible to organize a trade union for servicemen. The crux of the matter is that the service of an officer is a special service. For instance, the commander of a company, battalion or regiment.... Men are serving under them, they are responsible for the training, education and safety of these men, their workday is actually unlimited in time and may last 10, 12 or more hours. An officer often arrives at reveille and leaves after taps. And there are the

exercises.... At times, these last a week or more and here an officer actually serves around the clock. These are the specific features of a military profession.

Are the rights of the warrant officer or officer as a civilian protected? Yes they are. Our officer or warrant officer receives a wage both for the position, like a civilian, as well as for military rank. Payment for rank is a sort of means of social protection and the greater the responsibility the greater the material remuneration.

Yes, in our difficult times the officers have a mass of difficulties. For this reason, the command, the Ministry of Defense and the President frequently turn to the questions of the material support for the officers, warrant officers and reenlisted personnel. In particular, during the current year, there are plans for a significant increase in wages. Pension support has also been improved. Social protection is also provided in the event of illness or injury. Construction of housing has been undertaken for them.

[Safonov] The conversion which has commenced in our nation, the abrogating of the Warsaw Pact and the ensuing mass withdrawal of troops from the Eastern European countries, the reduction in the armed forces and weapons, including unilaterally, have forced many of us to be concerned and wonder whether we have been too complacent and will we not thereby weaken our military might?

[Akhromeyev] Undoubtedly, the new foreign policy of the Soviet Union which it is carrying out, beginning since 1985, and of which I am a supporter, has introduced major changes in the international situation and in the status of our country in the world. As a result of the improved relations with the United States and the main states of Western Europe which are members of the NATO bloc, actually the military danger for the Soviet Union has been reduced as well as the threat of war in the world. This has been a major achievement of our foreign policy. This has been carried out not only by concessions on the part of the Soviet Union, as certain persons, including my colleagues and deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet assert, but as a result of mutual concessions and of movement toward one another.

But has the military danger disappeared for our country as certain persons are currently endeavoring to persuade us, particularly Academician G.A. Arbatov, the same Lopatin, the editors of the magazine OGONEK and others? Yes, I would agree, the military danger has been reduced but certainly has not disappeared. Moreover, we have state interests which we are obliged to defend. How is this danger expressed? In the contradictory nature of the policy of the United States and certain Western European states. On the one hand, they are moving toward improved relations with the Soviet Union and on the other, they are endeavoring to infringe our interests and at times endeavor to deal with us from a position of strength. For instance, the military organization of the Warsaw Pact has actually ceased to exist while the

military organization of the NATO bloc has survived and its participants have openly stated that during the 1990s this organization will exist. Why should it remain? Evidently, they are alarmed by instability in the Soviet Union. So are they intending to establish this stability by force? No answer has been given to this question.

For many years, the United States has refused to hold talks on reducing naval forces. Certainly the Americans have the strongest carrier task forces. There are 15 such formations! They carry 1,500 combat aircraft. In a short period of time these formations could be deployed around the Soviet Union. The United States is still not reducing the military bases with which it surrounded the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s. This certainly must be considered.

Japan has also made territorial claims against us. The United States supports these claims. The Americans up to the present do not recognize the incorporation of the Baltic Republics as part of the Soviet Union. Finally, both in the past and at present, the United States, let us say it frankly, has not found our socialist choice to its liking. All these facts must be taken into account. For this reason, we need modern armed forces.

[Safonov] The opponents have asserted that an army of almost 4 million men even for such an enormous power as ours is too much.... The Armed Forces should not be so burdensome for society....

[Akhromeyev] On 1 January 1991, the size of our Armed Forces, after reducing them by 500,000, was 3,760,000 men. You say that this is a lot. But certainly the military organization of the Warsaw Pact no longer exists and at present the balance of armed forces in Europe is certainly not in our favor. Both in terms of the number of personnel and the number of weapons, NATO surpasses us by 1.5-fold. For this reason, we are ready to further reduce the Armed Forces but not unilaterally. A majority of the members of the Supreme Soviet understands this well. This understanding was also apparent in discussing the 1991 budget, when 96,562,846,000 rubles were allocated for defense. This figure is known.

If one proceeds from the size of the Armed Forces, the military budget and the deliveries of modern weapons, we have the necessary minimum for maintaining the dependable defense capability of the country.

Particularly dangerous now is the fact that our defense capability is being actively undermined within the Soviet Union. For instance, the same demands for an unrestrained reduction in the army and which have been actively favored by Academician G.A. Arbatov.

We have reduced the 1989-1991 military budget by 18 percent. Such a thing is known nowhere else in the world. The United States, for example, has reduced the budget by just 2 percent a year. The Soviet Union has reduced the number of its Armed Forces by 14 percent, and weapons production has been sharply slowed down. There is nothing like this in the world. We must not

forget either that living persons stand behind all these cutbacks. How many letters has RABOCHAYA GAZETA received from officers discharged into the reserves who have remained without apartments? Certainly a lot. And in following Arbatov's advice, if this process were continued without let-up, what point would finally be reached? If we continue to reduce weapons production in large amounts (and over the last 2 years, their production has been reduced by 20 percent), in addition to the fact that our army would remain without modern weapons, we would destroy the defense industry and would make hundreds of thousands of highly skilled workers and specialists unemployed regardless of the conversion....

The second danger is separatism. The same Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin recently, let me repeat, has gone so far as to begin to urge the soldiers and NCOs stationed in the Baltic not to obey the orders from their officers. He has also stated the necessity of establishing a Russian army. But certainly there is the nation's Constitution which provides, let me emphasize, that the USSR Armed Forces in being controlled on a centralized basis are subordinate only to the Congress of People's Deputies of the nation, as well as to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the President. If the leadership of the largest republic begins to act arbitrarily, then what legality and what observance of the Constitution can we speak of? Such statements can only cause confusion....

[Safonov] Our military doctrine envisages only operations in retaliation to aggression. But let us recall 1941. Even with the weaponry at that time, Nazi Germany, in using the surprise factor, even during the first hours of the war caused us enormous losses. And what would this mean with the current level of providing the armies with modern weapons. One last example. Iraq had a well-trained and equipped army, but with the start of the war the same surprise factor was used and what losses there were.... In a word, in a modern war the side which launches the preemptive attack is in essence the victor....

[Akhromeyev] Yes, our doctrine provides that we would never and under no circumstances be the first to attack or initiate a war. We have announced this to the entire world and we teach our Armed Forces this.

Without proclaiming and carrying out our defensive doctrine, we at present would appear in the eyes of the world community as potential aggressors from whom one could always expect a threat and which would keep other peoples in fear. Previously was not this an enormous political loss for the Soviet Union? So here a choice must be made. But you are right, the military leadership under the conditions of a defensive doctrine must maintain high military readiness of the Army and Navy and be ready to repel possible aggression.

[Safonov] The alternative Lopatin plan has proposed that a civilian be appointed to the post of minister of defense. Incidentally, this idea was voiced at a session of

the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. A specific candidate was even named for the post of Ukrainian Minister of Defense. It was a woman....

[Akhromeyev] Some persons say that such proposals are the result of shortsightedness. No, this is a definite policy. The same Rukh is pursuing a definite goal of splitting up the USSR and having the Ukraine withdraw from it. Such demands in the area of military organizational development are also a part of this policy.

But let us approach an examination of this problem historically and considering the present-day demands. In the world there are two systems of military command and control. These are determined not by the social organization of a country but precisely historically. In scores of nations in the world, including our own, the ministry of defense is run by the military.

The United States has a different system. The secretary of defense is a civilian and the personnel of the Defense Department is also predominantly civilian. General staffs (staff committees) directly lead the army and here professional military operate. Both systems are valid for they have long since been tested out by time. But a system with a civilian minister and consequently with thousands of additional civilian bureaucrats responsible for the manning of the army and for supplying it with equipment and conducting scientific research, this system is more cumbersome, it has a large number of officials and costs the state very dearly.

Our system was established under Peter the Great and developed historically in precisely the same manner that the American one was organized over 150 years ago. For this reason, if we want to thus change the minister, we must also change the entire administrative system. This would be expensive and would extend in time over many years and ultimately would weaken our armed forces. The persons favoring a civilian minister are actually seeking this and they want to weaken the army which acts as the guarantor of the integrity of our nation and would create a bureaucracy which would no longer favor an integral army and would make it possible to add the license of the military to that license which is currently observable in our state.

[Safonov] Recently, a colleague and I were recalling our military service. That was a long time ago, at the end of the 1950s. Regular service was then 3 years and of course that was a lot and your best years were dedicated to the army. How we longed for home, how we longed to go back to our studies and control our own lives. But service, with all of this, still became a good school of life for us. We recalled it fondly. At that time, we did not see any of the improper relations, a spirit of comradeship and a helping hand was strong, and we were sincerely proud of the fact that we were guarding the peaceful labor and peaceful life of the nation and deared ones.... But now relatives view the departure of a draftee for the army almost with terror. The frequent death of the

fellows in peacetime, the "hazing" and other calamities—all of this certainly does exist and must be admitted. But there is also the reverse. I would term this a softening of the natural and even the necessary harshness of army life. I know many persons who heap parcels and money orders on their children and almost every month go to visit them in the military units [voinskiye chasti]. The youth press often fans the antiarmy hysteria. But certainly the army, as our sergeant said at one time, is not a kindergarten. Am I not right?

[Akhromeyev] It would be extremely dishonest to deny that negative phenomena exist in army life. They certainly do. But the so-called improper relations are chiefly found in the construction units. This is a particular problem. In order to investigate this there must be a separate discussion. Unfortunately, these also are found in certain line units. This is our common misfortune. The same "hazing" did not arise in the army. It has come to us from civilian life. We are combating it. But certainly all of this is the consequence of society's illness. The reasons giving rise to this illness, as in society, unfortunately remain.

We, the officers, feel our responsibility to the people and we are taking measures to eradicate this illness. But it is no instance can it be asserted that this malaise infects the entire army. I can assure your readers and the inhabitants of the Ukraine with all responsibility that in the enormous majority of military units there is no "hazing" and training and education of the personnel are carried out in a spirit of comradeship and in a spirit of affection for our common motherland and for one's republic, for our second homeland.

As for the concerns of parents for their children, do you feel that at one time our parents were not worried for us? They were. Or that it is wrong to complain that in army service one can see certain, as you put it, weaknesses. Society is changing. This is happening, regardless of your and my will and awareness. Simply, we must approach this rationally and act in accord with objective changes.

Finally, about the attacks on the army. At present, there is a struggle for power underway in the nation. The political forces are acting openly in this struggle. On the one hand, there are those which stand on the basis of our Constitution and the integrity of the nation. Such forces are to be found in each republic, including Lithuania, where this struggle is going on particularly acutely. I consider myself in these forces. We are in favor of socialist ideals and for building a humane, democratic socialism.

There are also other forces. These include the so-called "democratic platform" in our republic, in Russia, this is Rukh in Ukraine, Sajudis in Lithuania and so forth. Blocking the path of these separatist movements which are planning to split our nation stands precisely the CPSU, as a social organization, and the army as a state body. For this reason, the main blows are being directed against the CPSU and the Armed Forces.

I will not dwell on the struggle against the Communist Party in the Ukraine as I feel that others could do this better. As for the army, the attacks against it have been in different directions. We have already mentioned some of these. This is the demand for so-called disestablishment of the party, these same appeals of B.N. Yeltsin on the nonsubordination of soldiers to the command and the attempts to establish separatist armies....

A fierce struggle has developed around the generals. At present, colonels are also being attacked. This is no accident. The leadership of the Armed Forces is entrusted precisely to the generals and to the colonels and they defend the positions of our Constitution and this is not to the liking of the opposition. Equally fierce are the attacks on the army political bodies. It is they which educate the soldiers and NCOs in a spirit of the nation's unity and in a spirit of respect for the Constitution. Thus, the army has ended up at the very point of the political struggle for the future of our fatherland.

Estonia's Savisaar on Relations with Armed Forces

Part I

91UM0479A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 7 Feb 91 p 2

[Part One of E. Savisaar's January 30, 1991 Report to the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet: "On Relations with the Armed Forces of the USSR: E. Savisaar's January 30, 1991 Report to the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] This is being published in abridged form.

Dear Supreme Soviet!

The Government of the Estonian Republic considered it necessary to submit to the Supreme Soviet session the issue on relations with the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, while considering the attempts, especially those that have appeared recently, to expand the army's interference into the life of civilian society and at that the rights granted to the army are incompatible with the laws of the Estonian Republic and the USSR, and also with international law; while considering the problems associated with alternative service and the refusal of young people to serve in the Soviet Army; and also issues of everyday life for servicemen (residence permits, supplying them with goods, etc.).

The Government of the Estonian Republic, while manifesting its good will toward the establishment of internal political stability, has repeatedly taken steps toward achieving a mutual understanding with the Ministry of Defense, the Baltic Military District, and local military unit commanders.

During the course of half a century, the Armed Forces of the USSR have occupied nearly 90,000 hectares of

Estonian territory and in so doing they have not considered either economic, natural, or social conditions. They have been guided by political and military political considerations alone.

I must point out that during the first postwar years (1946) the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers was compelled by its own decision to transfer free of charge to the army all barracks and other military structures belonging to the Armed Forces of the Estonian Republic and also dozens of homes in Tallinn, Tartu, Pyarnu, and other cities of Estonia that were spared from destruction. Having received this property that had belonged to the Estonian Republic free of charge, today the current military leaders are demanding compensation from the Government of Estonia to return individual structures that have become excess to the needs of the army. You will agree that logic is lacking here. For 50 years, Estonian Republic construction organizations have built and local self-government organs have transferred tens of thousands of square meters of living space to the army. If this living space had been rationally used by the military departments, today we would not have the problem with the resettlement of hundreds of officers and the members of their families.

USSR President M. Gorbachev's November 27, 1990 telegram, addressed to the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Chairman and to the Chairman of the Government of the Estonian Republic, reports that recently there have been massive refusals to issue residence permits to officers and naval and army warrant officers who are arriving along with members of their families to serve in military units.

To our request for appropriate maintenance, the majority of city and province [uyezd] administrations answered that until the present no insurmountable problems have arisen with residence permits for servicemen and members of their families, including military units that do not have any other housing. Joint commissions with representatives of the army have been created to better solve these problems in some local self-governments, for example, in Tallinn and Tartu.

At the same time, the leadership of some military units are ignoring local government organs. (In Tallinn, the local self-government prohibited a military parade on Svoboda [Freedom] Square but the garrison conducted it anyway). Naturally, local government organs also cannot fulfill all military unit requests for residence permits if they are not treated as being in total control of this territory.

A Baltic Republic Supreme Soviet appeal that was adopted on December 1, 1990 in Vilnius stresses that, while demanding in principle the withdrawal of Soviet Armed Forces, the Baltic States at the same time do not in the least want to degrade the dignity or to infringe upon the human rights of servicemen and members of their families.

Proceeding based on this, henceforth we consider it necessary, in the procedure prescribed in the Estonian Republic, to provide to officers and army and navy warrant officers and to members of their families who arrive for service in military units temporary permits for housing that belongs to the military unit or that is under its jurisdiction or direct them to the military unit if there is no other housing.

Servicemen and members of their families who are residing here temporarily are granted the right to a buyer's card, to food coupons, compensation and other services on an equal basis with local residents.

The situation has changed with housing that is being built for military units. In accordance with a decision adopted in the middle 1980's by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, the union republics have been tasked to allocate housing to the army. They are also attempting to expand the force of these decisions to current conditions and according to them Estonia must annually allocate at least 4,600 square meters of housing to the USSR Ministry of Defense and to the border troops which was done until 1987. Up to 10 percent of the housing that was constructed using capital investment was transferred to the army. As a result of the transition of enterprises to cost accounting in accordance with the law on state enterprises, housing is being constructed using one's own assets and its seizure for the needs of the army contradicts the law on enterprises.

We need to recognize that in the event that we totally transition to individual cooperative construction, the housing situation for servicemen will become even more critical.

According to USSR Ministry of Defense data, there are a total of 1,400 servicemen's families in Estonia who do not have housing and 2,100 families need improved housing conditions. We need to seek the solution of these problems through improved ties with military unit commanders and local self-governing organs and a desire to better understand each other's problems.

This concerns the resolution of such problems as the allocation of housing sectors under construction to military units, recruitment of civilian construction organizations, military unit participation in the construction of housing by enterprises and organizations with the transfer of the appropriate monetary and material assets to the builder, leasing housing from local self-governing organs, etc.

I must inform you that next Monday government representatives along with self-governing organ leaders and military unit commanders will examine all proposals associated with regulating social and everyday life problems of servicemen and members of their families. Further, according to our plans, on February 18, this subject will be discussed at a republic government session. I am certain that if we desire we can find a solution on these problems that suits both sides. Province and

city administrations have submitted proposals on temporary residence permits for servicemen in barracks, on leasing housing, on granting construction authorizations, on department advertising of housing that is in the hands of military units, on permanent and temporary buyer's cards, etc.

Now about conscription for active military service in the Soviet Army. First of all, permit me to inform the Supreme Soviet about what the situation is like in various regions.

They have succeeded in sending a large portion of conscripts for active service in Ukraine, other than Lvov and Ivano-Frankovsk Oblasts where the majority of young men have evaded the draft. The draft evaders are frightened that they will be caught and sent to serve in areas that have been affected by the Chernobyl accident. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has not developed any conscript protection mechanism whatsoever.

In the Republic of Moldova, young men have been promised that they will be kept in Odessa Military District to perform service if they present themselves to the conscription commissions. Thus far, no special repressive measures have been employed with regard to those who are evading army service. The population of Moldova has a negative attitude toward the conscription of young men into the Armed Forces of the USSR and they are demanding the creation of their own army.

In Latvia, they have begun forcibly directing young men into the army who are performing alternative service, thus violating the procedure generally accepted in the Soviet Union, that is, without a decision of medical and conscription commissions. A military patrol is simply arriving at a work place and taking young men with them to a unit, then sending them outside the borders of the Latvian Republic. For the time being, massive actions against conscripts have not yet been conducted but they are very aggressively seeking persons who have run away from military units.

The most difficult situation has developed in the Lithuanian Republic where a total of 1,300 conscripts, 403 of them Lithuanians, have voluntarily appeared for active service. Assault troops are systematically verifying documents of young men of the appropriate age groups and all of those who have not performed active service are detained and sent to the commandant's headquarters and from there to military units, primarily outside the Lithuanian Republic. A massive search for deserters is also taking place.

In Estonia, the Supreme Soviet, through its decisions and the law on work service, has taken a primarily negative position with regard to service in the Soviet Army. The USSR views these decisions of ours as contradicting human rights. Recently all USSR ambassadors abroad were sent out for use in propaganda-oriented material under the title "How much do laws and resolutions adopted in the Baltic republics correspond to international human rights principles?"

This material warns that Estonian legislation on the issue reviewed does not correspond to the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation and also to the Constitution of the USSR. This contradiction of union and republic laws could result in the fact that citizens must fulfill their military obligation twice. The motivation to avoid service is viewed as a violation of the law and confused citizens of the listed republics are committing deeds that are punishable by the criminal code (evasion of military service is punished by five years imprisonment).

The material also points out that refusal to serve in the Armed Forces and incitement to do this is punishable in accordance with the laws of many countries. For example, according to U.S. law, a \$10,000 maximum fine or 10 years in prison is stipulated for U.S. servicemen who violate loyalty to the U.S. Armed Forces or undermine their morale or order.

The government of the Estonian Republic has persistently and with reflection strived to solve the problems associated with Estonian youth serving in the Soviet Armed Forces. The overwhelming majority of the Estonian population lack the ideological motivation to serve in the Armed Forces of the USSR. The attitude of the Estonian people has been manifested in the failure of last year's draft into the army. In the Spring, 42 percent of those conscripted for military service appeared at military commissariats and 22 percent appeared in the Fall. At the same time, no obstacles whatsoever were made for those who voluntarily wanted to serve in the army.

(To be continued.)

Part II

91UM0479B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 8 Feb 91 p 2

[Conclusion of E. Savisaar's January 30, 1991 Report to the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet: "On Relations with the Armed Forces of the USSR: E. Savisaar's January 30, 1991 Report to the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] (Conclusion. First part published in the February 7th issue).

Reforms in the Soviet Army have become bogged down or, more correctly, have generally not begun and army manning is being conducted according to obsolete laws that nevertheless remain in force. Work service is not being recognized as an alternative and conscripts who refuse service in the Soviet Army are threatened with the use of force and with strict sanctions. So, at the beginning of January, the threat arose to use assault troops to recruit people into the army and then the republic government was compelled to issue the order on granting winter leave to young men who are performing work service. Furthermore, in eastern Virumaa, the Kokhtla-Yarve Militia sent 10 young men from Sillamya, who had performed work service at Estonia Mine, to the

military commissariat for their further assignment into the army. Right now, as a result of a certain decline of tension and considering practical needs, an order has been prepared on the rapid termination of winter leave for lads who are performing work service.

Work service being practiced in the Estonian Republic and the law "On Work Service in the ESSR" in principle are not distinguishable from the draft of the appropriate law of the USSR that was published on December 26, 1990 in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. There are only several inconsequential differences. For example, in our country, receipt of statements and organization of work service is assigned to work service and work employment commissions and in the union draft—to Councils of Ministers and to rayon and city Soviet ispolkoms. In the union draft, a single three-year work service period is prescribed for everyone when in our country it has been reduced to 12 months for conscripts with a higher education. That draft states that a uniform will be used for work service that is different than a military uniform and our law has no such provision. There are also several other differences. But it is still a draft. And our young men are being compelled right now to execute existing obsolete Soviet legislation.

As we all know, on January 14 a meeting with a group of high-ranking military commanders, headed by Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Colonel General G. Krivosheyev, took place in Tallinn in accordance with a previously achieved agreement with USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov. Primary attention at the meeting was devoted precisely to conscription into the Armed Forces of the USSR on the territory of the Estonian Republic. We all know that this is precisely what explained the need to bring assault troops into Estonia. In accordance with the proposal made during the negotiations by the General Staff delegation, USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov's directive to Baltic Military District Commander Kuzmin and to Military Commissar of Estonia Pyder appeared according to which changes are being made to the 1990 conscript allocation plan which guides the military commissariats of Estonia. Conscripts are being sent to units located on Estonian territory—air defense—200 men, air force—200 men, construction troops—800 men, and navy—240 men. The remaining conscripts are being sent to a training center located on the territory of the Latvian Republic with subsequent performance of service in military units located on the territory of the Estonian Republic when possible.

The directive states that the allocation of personnel will be made to military units that are known beforehand and strict control is being established over their return to Estonia.

In so doing, each conscript may select his service location outside the boundaries of the Estonian Republic if he so desires.

The General Staff delegation also promised that young men who have willfully left military units prior to completion of the term of service will be left to complete service in military units located on the territory of the Estonian Republic and specifically to the motorized rifle division located in Tondi if they appeal to the military commissariat.

The Supreme Soviet has to determine its position on this issue in its further activities.

What should our point of departure be here? First of all, we do not have any grounds to change the laws of the Estonian Republic. The legal protection of young men is provided by these laws but I must add that 1) this legal protection is unilateral since the Soviet Union does not recognize the appropriate laws, and 2) legal protection does not signify physical protection. The roundup of lads using special military subunits has already been announced several times and we only succeeded in postponing this action with great difficulty and only through negotiations but the scales are not tipping in our favor. They will most probably begin with searches for deserters which will be understood in international society since deserters are caught everywhere. The experience of Lithuania and Latvia demonstrates that the special subunits at the same time assume greater powers than the search for lads, in other words, their activities affect a large circle of people. The fact that in so doing they detain young men of any age can be essentially assessed as a provocation to quibbling which someone will react to sooner or later and they anticipate this.

During the course of the negotiations, we have until now managed to expand the possibility of a choice for our young men. We have simultaneously sought fundamental solutions to military problems. For the first time, the other side has understood the need for this type of negotiations, has recognized us as a partner, and has begun to seek compromises. Of course, it is still early to say that the guarantees given to our lads will be completely reliable. Therefore, additional proposals to the Ministry of Defense are necessary (not to redeploy military units where our boys are serving; to transfer those boys now serving in the USSR to Estonia).

I must add that, according to the most recent data, 31 percent of conscripted young men have entered the army from Estonia and this is precisely 1,276 young men. Of them, there were 276 in January. Everyone who wanted to has remained to serve in Estonia.

Recently we made a new attempt to obtain recognition of work service from the union government. During a meeting with Valentin Pavlov last week, we arrived at an agreement that the Estonian law on work service and the draft union law on alternative service will be subjected to comparative examination both in Tallinn and in Moscow. And then we will meet once again on this issue. I do not harbor any great hopes since the military are very inflexible on this issue but in any event an attempt is not torture.

And in conclusion. In recent days additional tension has arisen as a result of union government plans to use military personnel and military equipment to insure public order.

The government of the Estonian Republic has issued an order to the Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs to not accept for execution the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and USSR Ministry of Defense general order on joint patrolling of internal affairs workers organs and Soviet Army and Navy servicemen since this order contradicts the agreement concluded on August 1, 1990 between the Government of the Estonian Republic and the USSR MVD on cooperation in the sphere of activities of internal affairs organs. There are no massive violations of the law in our country. And in general the number of crimes on the streets and in public places has not substantially increased in our country but it has first of all increased in apartments and here patrolling along the streets in armored personnel carriers will not yield any particular benefit. The Supreme Soviet Presidium in its statement also supported the government's point of view—to prohibit application of this law.

These rights which are not stipulated by laws of the USSR for military subunits are being granted through a joint army order. In our view, this is an unconstitutional act which, especially after the bloody events in Vilnius and Riga, is being perceived as a step in the direction toward a military dictatorship. All the more so since activities to maintain order are being removed from under Supreme Soviet control since the army is not subordinate to the parliament.

If it was the militia or the police, it would swear an oath and assume obligations with regard to the civilian population. It is not at all clear how they propose overcoming problems in the event of disagreements since army and civilian population interrelations are not juridically regulated on many issues.

The decline of discipline in the army is also one of the causes of the appearance of this order. I need to say that we have not had any serious complaints against the leadership of local garrison military units in our country. Of course, problems have previously occurred and we will not get by without them henceforth but it was always possible to find a mutually acceptable solution of these problems within the framework of existing contacts.

Assignment of police functions to the army is a factor of moral responsibility for it. (The army is structured to defend national security against an external enemy). In any event, this order will inflict harm on the USSR's defense capability. It may entail worsening the contradictions between the civilian population and the army.

While meeting on January 24 with the new USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, I informed him about the Republic Government decision and made a suggestion to annul the December 29, 1990 joint order of USSR Ministers B. Pugo and D. Yazov or for the government of the USSR to at least suspend it on the territory of the

Estonian Republic since its execution by the army will entail increased tension in Estonia. In other words, this order needs to be made to conform with the agreements between Estonia and the Soviet Union (first of all, of course, with the agreement concluded with Bakatin which none of the other republics have).

Naturally, it also may occur in our country that we need the assistance of local military units (large fires, clearing mines, etc.) but then we ourselves will be able to come to an agreement as we have done previously. We do not oppose the Ministry of Defense granting the right to local garrisons to render support to legal authorities in extraordinary situations.

Nine months of work under conditions of a transition period today permits us to make the first generalizations on those principles on which our relations with the army must be structured.

1. In relations with the army, we can proceed based only on the laws of the Estonian Republic while considering USSR legislation insofar as it does not contradict the normative acts developed in the Estonian Republic.

2. We need to maintain contact with the army since, when the army is isolated—this is very dangerous. Then the army will not understand our problems and we will not understand the army's problems. Rejection of contacts with the army only restricts our political capabilities.

3. We need to differentiate army problems as such from personal problems of servicemen as citizens. The problem of the army's presence is first of all a political problem and it is being resolved through negotiations between the Estonian Republic and the USSR. Issues of an economic nature are mainly servicemen's problems as citizens and their resolution rests primarily with local self-government. If we differentiate these two levels, then from this it follows that the army cannot make complaints that local garrisons are not equipped to resolve if only because the army's structure is based on the principle of centralism.

4. The army's activities in Estonia must be under society's control. If the army recognizes the presence of certain obligations to the civilian population, this means that the civilian population also has certain rights with regard to the army. And realization of these rights is the government's task as the executor and businesslike institution of civilian life.

Official on Compensation for Soldiers' Deaths

91UM0521B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Mar 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by V. Litovkin: "Three Billion for the Deceased"]

[Text] TASS has released information which states that in line with the appeal of the Committee of Soldiers'

Mothers and other public organizations on the questions of violating the rights of USSR citizens during military service by them as well as the instances of death and injury to servicemen and military construction workers in peacetime, on 15 November 1990 the USSR President issued the Ukase on Measures to Realize the Proposals of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers.

This Ukase orders a revision of the procedure for registering the death of servicemen and military construction workers.

Pursuant to the instructions of the USSR Ministry of Justice and with the approval of the USSR Ministry of Defense, in January 1991, instructions were issued to the nation's ZAGS [civil registry] bodies on the procedure for drawing up death certificates for this category of persons as well as the procedure for reissuing the previously issued documents. In accord with these instructions, the ZAGS body, in registering a death, on the basis of a medical death certificate and with an entry on it that death occurred during the period of peacetime military service, is obliged to enter the appropriate note in the official entry and on the death certificate.

In the event that death has already been registered with the ZAGS bodies, the existing death notice, regardless of the time it was drawn up (that is, the time of recording the death) can be amended. The basis for amending it and the reissuing of the death certificate is a notification from the rayon or city military commissariat.

The USSR Ministry of Finances has recommended that the Union republic ministries of finances release the citizens from paying the state fee for providing death certificates which have been reissued on these grounds to the citizens.

How should this text be understood? Why should such sad documents have to be reissued? The questions of our correspondent were answered by an officer from the Legal Department of the Directorate of Affairs of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Col V. Zyubin:

"As you know, the Decision of the USSR Government of 30 December 1990 No 1393, as of 1 January of the current year introduced state compulsory personal insurance for servicemen and reservists in the event of their death and wounding as well as illnesses sustained in the period of service or assemblies. Your newspaper told about this in issue No 48.

"In accord with this decree, the state social security bodies will pay the heirs of the insured person a sum of 25,000 rubles. A mechanism has been worked out for implementing this decree. These are the joint instructions of Gosstrakh [State Insurance Administration] and the Ministry of Defense of 29 January. But the given governmental decision, as is usually the case in legal documents, unfortunately, is not retroactive. That is, it does not extend to the relatives of a person who died prior to January 1991.

"As you realize, this is unjust. At present, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers has been given draft documents which should be reviewed by the nation's Supreme Soviet. These set out the standards of material compensation to families for losses related to the death of servicemen and military construction workers and occurring prior to January of this year. While previously the parents of a deceased received the death certificate of their son without stating that death occurred during the period of active military service, at present such a notation is becoming obligatory and will be made by the ZAGS bodies, as was pointed out in the TASS release.

"It is to be hoped that in the near future social justice will triumph."

"What amounts would be needed for this?"

"Large ones. If one takes even the last 15 years, this would be around R3 billion."

USSR Procurator General Submits Results of Tbilisi Investigation

91UM0487A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Mar 91 First Edition pp 3-4

[Article by USSR Procurator General N.S. Trubin dated 2 Mar 91: "From the Standpoint of Law"]

[Text] *An informational note on the results of the criminal investigation of the case against officials and servicemen of the internal security troops of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the Soviet Army who took part in breaking up the unsanctioned mass meeting in Tbilisi on 9 Apr 89.*

A considerable number of civilians and servicemen suffered injury, and 19 of those at the meeting were killed, on 9 Apr 89 in Tbilisi during the break-up of unsanctioned mass meetings.

The procuracy of the Georgian SSR instituted criminal proceedings for the organization of, and active participation in, group activities that violate public order under the criteria of the crime stipulated in Article 206¹ of the Criminal Code of the GSSR in connection with the events that transpired on 9 Apr 89.

The procuracy of the Georgian SSR instituted criminal proceedings against officials of the internal security troops of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the Soviet Army under the criteria of the crime stipulated in Paragraph A of Article 278 of the GSSR Criminal Code (abuse of authority or official position) on 17 Apr 89, which was allocated for separate prosecution and transferred to the investigative jurisdiction of the Main Military Procuracy.

A commission to investigate the events of 9 Apr 89 was created by decree of the 1st USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

The 2nd USSR Congress of People's Deputies heard the conclusions of the commission and the report of the Main Military Procuracy in the course of the investigation of the criminal case.

The Procuracy of the USSR created an inquiry group that included staff members of the central apparatus and the procuracies of the RSFSR, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Kazakh and Georgian republics and the Main Military Procuracy to execute the proposals of the commission of the Congress of People's Deputies regarding the need to strengthen the work to investigate the events that took place on 9 Apr 89 in Tbilisi.

The following work has been done since the acceptance of the criminal case for prosecution: some 140 volumes of case materials were studied, and a detailed investigation plan was composed; a team of 10 investigators made three trips to Tbilisi, where they questioned 32 people, including civil officials, on the circumstances of the injuries and poisonings with the participation of legal medical experts; conducted 48 legal medical expert evaluations on the scene; questioned another 100 witnesses and medical specialists; and, inspected the scene of the events and the material evidence.

Oblast, city and kray bureaus of legal medical experts from the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov, Krasnodar and Stavropol, as well as leading toxicologists from various medical institutions, were also brought in for the purpose of speeding up the execution of the expert evaluations, aside from the NII [Scientific-Research Institute] of Legal Medicine of the USSR Minzdrav [Ministry of Health]. Expert opinions and clinical cards were prepared and submitted for over 1,000 cases of illness along with 50 inquiry protocols for those stricken. Some 2,500 expert evaluations were completed as a result.

The questioning of witnesses and those stricken was conducted at the same time, and 80 individual authorizations were prepared on various issues. Materials were studied from the commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies headed by comrades Tarazevich and Sobchak. Materials from the KGB, the USSR MVD and the International Red Cross were also analyzed.

The investigation established that the events of 9 Apr 89 in the city of Tbilisi were a consequence of the complex and contradictory processes that have developed in recent years in Georgia and other regions of the country. The activity of the nationalistically inclined elements that unite a number of informal associations had become sharply more active in 1988, including those headed by Z.K. Gamsakhurdia, I.S. Tsereteli, I.D. Batiashvili, M.I. Kostava (Society of St. Ilya the Righteous), T.R. Chkhendze, G.S. Mamulia and Z.N. Chavchavadze, among others (Society of Ilya Chavchavadze; G.A. Chaturiya, I.G. Saryashvili and I.V. Georgadze, among others (National Democratic Party of Georgia), I.G.

Shengelaya, Z.R. Kutaliya and A.P. Imnadze, among others (Union of National Justice of Georgia).

The leaders of these informal associations began their energetic activity, aimed at creating and developing an opposition political movement to the CPSU and the existing order, in 1988.

The leaders of the informal associations, gradually inflaming tensions, replaced their slogans with nationalistic ones, openly propagating ideas of chauvinism and national exclusivity, and advanced demands to grant Georgia complete independence with its departure from the "Russo-Soviet empire, which is today continuing the course of great-power chauvinism of the Romanovs," and posed as its final aim the task of "overthrowing the existing republic authorities that are under the thumb of Moscow."

The mass meetings organized in November of 1988 in front of the government hall, in the course of which the state flag of the Georgian SSR was torn on November 25, were a failure, since they did not find support among the working people, as well as among the majority of the representatives of the intelligentsia, which rendered aid and support to the authorities.

The passive stance of the bodies of law and order, which did not take steps to curtail the illegal activity of the leaders of the informals, the lack of a political assessment of the events in party organizations and labor collectives and the failure to take the necessary steps to maintain law and order and discipline, however, made it possible for all of the informal associations to become more active once again in the beginning of 1989, making skilled use of the so-called "Abkhazian question" that they themselves had provoked. This spilled over into a host of unsanctioned meetings with an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist and nationalistic hue. Meetings began to be held in front of the government hall in Tbilisi starting April 4. A group of about 30 youths, in accordance with the calls of the leaders, announced a hunger strike on April 5, which about another 120 people later joined. Tsereteli announced the creation of a central strike committee composed of representatives of virtually all of the informal associations and the majority of the higher educational institutions on April 6. An appeal to the U.S. Congress and the NATO member nations to assist Georgia in leaving the USSR, recognize 25 Feb 21 as the "day of occupation of Georgia by Bolshevik forces of Russia" and devote a session of the United Nations to a day for sovereign Georgia was made public. The speeches of Tsereteli and the other leaders began sounding threats, along with attacks and calls insulting to communists and the CPSU, on the "...immediate abrogation of the power of the puppet Georgian government..."

These circumstances, as well as a host of instances of gross violations of public order by the organized groups of extremists from April 4 through 8 of 1989 as expressed in disruptions of the normal life of the capital

and other cities and the picketing of higher educational institutions, the cessation of the teaching process at schools and universities, the blocking of movements of transport in Tbilisi, disruptions of the work of cultural institutions, attempts at the violent stoppage of work at industrial enterprises in Rustavi, among other cities, the paralysis of work of the central party and state organs, verbal and physical assaults, intentional resistance to police officials, the violent seizure of several dozen state vehicles to set up barricades and blockade the streets adjoining Prospekt Rustaveli and the like, made it necessary to break up the unsanctioned mass meeting. The leadership of the republic and the USSR MVD justifiably appealed to all-union bodies for assistance, since a considerable portion of the manpower of the Georgian MVD had been redeployed to Abkhazia, where the danger of new clashes had arisen on the fertile ground of ethnic strife. A police battalion and a training regiment of a division of internal security troops numbering some 600 men, along with 250 policemen from other regions of the republic, in particular had been sent to the Abkhazian ASSR from Tbilisi alone to maintain public order.

The decision was made at a session of the Buro of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party on 7 Apr 89 "to institute a state of emergency in the event of necessity in the city of Tbilisi" (a curfew), while coded telegram No. 14/sh was sent to the CPSU Central Committee which, aside from an objective assessment of the sharply worsened situation, reported the adoption of a resolution whose realization would require bringing in additional forces from the MVD and the Transcaucasus Military District.

These issues were discussed that same day at a meeting at the CPSU Central Committee, at which the leaders of the USSR MVD and the USSR MO [Ministry of Defense] were ordered to assist Georgia and make the necessary decisions within the limits of their authority in connection with the worsening of the political climate in Georgia and the appeals of the leadership of the republic for assistance. An opinion was sent to the leadership of the Georgian SSR regarding the need to display extreme circumspection in the use of the forces being allotted, taking every step to normalize the situation by political means, and the recommendation was made to institute a state of emergency in the city of Tbilisi at the present time. Operational units of the internal security troops were dispatched to Tbilisi by order of the deputy minister of internal affairs of the USSR, I.F. Shilov, after the meeting at the CPSU Central Committee, under the command of the chief of the administrative staff of the internal security troops of the USSR MVD, Maj Gen Yu.T. Yefimov.

The chief of the General Staff, in order to take party and government institutions and other important facilities under safekeeping, as well as to organize the monitoring of the principal roads of entry into and departure from Tbilisi, issued an order to redeploy an airborne regiment from the city of Kirovabad to the command of the troop

commander of the Transcaucasus Military District [ZakVO], Col Gen I.N. Rodionov.

Meanwhile, the situation in the city of Tbilisi continued to worsen. Columns of demonstrators began arriving on the morning of April 8, and began approaching the government hall in organized fashion along with the students and teachers from the secondary and senior classes of the general schools. Demands for "complete independence" in ultimatum form were advanced in speeches as before, along with calls for "national disobedience," while insulting attacks were sounded against the Communist Party of Georgia with demands for its "self-dissolution." The flag of the Georgian SSR was demonstratively torn from the facade of the Artists' Hall, and a flag of the Menshevik republic was put up instead. The GSSR MVD and the ZakVO that day undertook yet another attempt, without resorting to extreme measures, to affect the critical development of events and caution those meeting and their leaders against further actions in defiance of law and order—a demonstration of military hardware (helicopters and combat vehicles)—was made in accordance with the decision of the leadership of the republic. This did not make those at the meeting see reason, however. The combat vehicles were pelted with stones and various objects and the drivers were blinded by covering their viewing ports, as the result of which seven servicemen were injured along with five police officers, while three GAI [Main Automobile Inspectorate] vehicles were damaged.

A multitude of materials, documents and depositions testified to the extremely heated passions and aggressive state of those at the meeting, due to which the decision made by the Bureau of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the GSSR Council of Ministers of 8 Apr 89 to break up the unsanctioned mass meeting in Tbilisi was well-founded and necessary.

It was envisaged that forces from the operational units of the MVD internal security troops (Moscow regiment) disperse those meeting and free the square in front of the government hall via a frontal advance along Prospekt Rustaveli from a start line at Lenin Square on 9 Apr 89 at 4:00 in accordance with the plan of operations to break up the meeting developed by Yefimov and the minister of internal affairs for the GSSR, Sh.V. Gorgodze, and approved by Col Gen I.N. Rodionov. Subunits of the airborne regiment were to take the government institutions under safekeeping to the extent of the expulsion and to cover the streets adjoining the prospect to avert the infiltration of extremists into the rear of the subunits of internal security troops. Two battalions of the internal troops of the Tbilisi regiment were to approach the square along the side streets adjoining the government hall and cut off the leaders, located on the stairs, from the main body of the meeting participants. The officials of the GAI of the republic MVD were charged with breaking down the barricades on the streets adjoining the square. The MVD forces of the republic were also given other tasks, not one of which they fulfilled.

The latter circumstances greatly complicated the operation, while the resistance paralyzed the actions of the subunits from the Tbilisi regiment, which were unable to advance along the side streets to the square. Officials of the ministry moreover received orders from the minister of internal affairs of the GSSR not long before the operation that canceled the detention of the leaders and activists of the meeting that had been envisaged earlier, and it was namely they who organized the active resistance to the servicemen in the course of the expulsion.

The damaging of transport by the meeting participants led to the fact that by the start of the operation, the special subunits of the police (OMONs) and the cadets from the higher police school that were to be in reserve were an hour late.

The participants in the meeting ignored the calls of Lt Col Gventsadze, who spoke at 8:00 on April 9 and warned that in the event the meeting continued it would be broken up by troops, as well as the Patriarch Catholics of All Georgia, Ilia II. After repeated warnings on the application of force, when it became completely obvious that the troops and equipment located 200 meters from the mass meeting were setting about the fulfillment of their mission, music and songs were coming from the loudspeakers on the square up until 3:50 (ten minutes before the start of the operation), and small groups of demonstrators began to dance in certain places on the prospect.

The dances that were organized in several places were an unnatural gaiety for the sake of show in the minutes of impending danger, while the presence of representatives of the mass media with photographic and video equipment on the square, including some that had come specially from Moscow, testify to the fact that the leaders of the informal organizations, operating according to a scenario developed in advance, were striving to impart the look of an inoffensive and peaceful demonstration to the meeting.

The expulsion operation began as envisaged by the plan at 4:00 on April 9. Two airborne battalions were pelted with stones, bottles and other objects even before the combat ranks reached contact with the meeting participants, from which six people received bodily injuries of varying severity. The troop files of the internal security troops, after repeated stops and appeals by Lt Col Baklanov through a megaphone, came into contact with the demonstrators, trying to squeeze them along the prospect. Organized resistance was offered along the front, and especially on the left flank at the government hall, however, forcing the soldiers to use their rubber clubs. Instances of organized resistance by the demonstrators, among whom were physically strong men and athletes, are objectively confirmed by the materials of the case.

In the course of the expulsion, resistance groups penetrated the troop lines on the left flank and fell upon the servicemen from the rear, inflicting bodily harm to them.

The situation, threatening a sharp increase in losses of personnel and the disruption of the operation, along with the absence of the reserve MVD forces, forced the commander to allot an airborne company of 59 men to aid the expulsion group, which restored the situation. Those soldiers, protecting themselves against the men who had attacked them and acting within the limits of necessary self-defense, employed small infantry shovels in a number of instances. After a brief contact with the demonstrators (about ten minutes), the assault personnel performed only protective functions and did not take part in the later expulsion.

The demonstrators employed stones, bottles, wooden sticks, metal rods and pieces of metal pipe in their resistance.

Resistance did not cease after the liberation of the square. About 60 servicemen were incapacitated due to injuries. Special Chermukha equipment (27 units) and four K-51 units with CS gas were employed on Prospekt Rustaveli in front of the government hall for this reason in order to avert injuries to servicemen or more severe consequences. This facilitated the dispersal of those resisting.

A powerful crush arose in the area of the government hall during the operation for several reasons:

- the retreat of those resisting in the direction of the hunger strikers;
- the influx of large groups of youth in this sector toward the government hall from the direction of Republic Square to aid the resisters; and
- difficulties for citizens who proved to be at the center of the crush to get out due to this, as well as the disobedience of a portion of the meeting participants, who gave themselves up to the calls of the meeting leaders and activists and, remaining in place, sat on the ground and asphalt in front of the government hall.

It was namely in that area that 16 meeting participants were killed, while eight people died later at treatment facilities from injuries they had received.

The situation in Tbilisi continued to remain tense after the break-up of the unsanctioned mass meeting at the government hall on April 9. Rumors of a multitude of casualties and missing spread through the city. Extremists called for vengeance, stole the corpses of the deceased from the morgue and hid them so as to hinder establishment of the true causes of their deaths, and actively opposed the military units in stabilizing the situation and breaking up the actions in defiance of law and order on the part of extremists and hooliganistic elements. That same day a decree of the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet instituted a curfew in the city of Tbilisi, replaced by the corresponding ukaz of 17 Apr 89 starting at 5:00 on April 18.

According to the sense of Paragraph 14 of Article 119 of the Constitution of the USSR, the authority of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet pertains only to the declaration of martial law or a state of emergency with the institution of special forms of administration in specified cases as necessary, and not to the institution of a curfew. Legislation in force also does not define the substance of the "Special Forms of Administration," and no mention is made of a curfew itself (including in the ukaz of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 22 Jan 41, "The Military Situation").

The ukaz of the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet "The Institution of a Curfew in the City of Tbilisi" was thus not an anti-constitutional or unlawful act, since it does not contradict prevailing legal norms. The issue in this case can only be the gaps in the legislation regulating the substance and procedure for the institution of various types of special legal regimens.

Consequences of the Operation to Break Up the Meeting

1. Nineteen people were killed in the course of breaking up the mass meeting, of which three were men and 16 were women. Two of the women were 15 and 16 years old. Eighteen people died from mechanical asphyxiation arising from crushing of the chest, two of whom died at the hospital after April 9, and one person (Kvasrohashvili) died of severe trauma to the skull and brain sustained in a blow from a hard blunt object as the result of falling during active resistance to the servicemen using karate methods.

The conclusions of the NI for Legal Medicine of USSR Minzdrav on the causes of death of the demonstrators as a consequence of mechanical asphyxiation conform to other proof, including the conclusions of legal chemical, physical and toxicological expert analysis.

No traces of contact with the gases chloroacetophenone, CS or any other toxic substance were detected according to the results of research of samples of fabric taken from the clothing of the deceased, as well as control objects taken from the places where the people were killed. Concentrations of gases dangerous to human life were not created with regard to the weather conditions and the number of special substances employed.

2. Bodily harm was caused to four men—participants in the resistance—by engineer's shovels, light bodily injuries that entailed short-term disruptions to health.

Information on a larger number of people suffering from trauma caused by shovels does not correspond to reality.

3. The information of the GSSR Minzdrav on the injury of 282 participants in the mass meeting was checked. It was established that 69 of them suffered injuries at times other than the events of April 9, since the data indicated in the medical documents were fictitious.

Some 141 participants in the meeting objectively suffered injuries, of whom 74 were injured by the actions of

servicemen, and the rest from the actions of the demonstrators themselves and other causes.

4. According to the information of GSSR Minzdrav, more than 4,000 people sought medical assistance due to poisoning from chemical substances.

It was established that the poisoning of only 13 people was connected with the use of special agents by the troops. Of those, one person had slight bodily injury with disruptions to health, one had no disruption at all, and 11 had no evaluation of the extent of severity.

The causes for the substantial discrepancies with the data of the GSSR Minzdrav are as follows:

—There were a number of visits of healthy people to medical institutions (the so-called "catastrophe-reaction syndrome"), while the medical workers made unsubstantiated diagnoses on the presence of "poisonings." The ranks of the "poisonings" moreover included pregnant women, individuals with food and other everyday poisonings, fictitious individuals (272 people) and repeat counting of one and the same people, as well as individuals with nervous or psychological disorders, with injuries to the central nervous system, cardiovascular illness and illnesses that could occur from any toxic agent but were not connected with the events of April 9.

It was established as a consequence that there were a number of cases of "seedings" with mixtures of chloroacetophenone and CS, as well as various other local chemical substances, by unknown individuals after the events of April 9 in the area of Prospekt Rustaveli. Research of scrapings from the walls of the Theatrical Institute thus detected traces of mixtures such as Karbofos and Dikhlofos, while School No. 1 had a content of phenols in the classroom for labor studies that exceeded the maximum allowable dose by 122 times etc.

The materials on the individual instances of poisonings after 9 April 89 were relegated for separate prosecution.

5. Injuries to 37 policemen were announced during the course of events. Objective confirmation exists in relation to just 13 people:

- less severe, four people;
- light with health disturbances, five people; and
- light without health disturbances, four people

Some policemen not only did nothing in the area of greatest resistance in the area of the government hall, but even impeded the expulsion. Some of the servicemen who observed such behavior by the policemen were angered and struck them on the body with rubber clubs. The actions of the policemen clearly did not conform to their duties.

6. The fact that there proved to be more injured servicemen protected by vests, helmets and shields than

civilians, who had no such protective gear, testifies to the degree of physical resistance.

Some 189 servicemen in all were injured, of whom 13 were officers.

All of the injured servicemen were part of subunits that were taking part in breaking up the mass meeting...

They are subdivided by the severity of the bodily injuries into:

- less severe, nine;
- light with disruptions to health, 17; and
- light without disruptions to health, 163.

They are categorized by the nature of the injuries into:

- head or skull trauma, 10;
- stab or cut wounds, 12;
- broken bones in the face or extremities, etc., 4;
- lacerations and contusions, 67; and
- contusions, hematomas etc., 96.

The circumstances of the case that were established are confirmed by a host of depositions by witnesses, photographic, film and video materials, coded telegrams and other documents.

Analysis and Legal Assessment of the Actions of the Participants in the Events of 9 April 1990 [as published]

Based on the evidence assembled on the case, the investigation comes to the following conclusions:

1. The political climate in the Georgian SSR was largely determined by the activity of a number of informal organizations, whose program, aims and activity contradicted prevailing legislation.

Having chosen the tactic of outstripping the authorities in the postulation of the problems that had accumulated in the republic, the leaders of the opposition public formations of Georgia made use of the spontaneous manifestations of public energy caused by the processes of democratization that had occurred in the country, transforming the awakening of national self-awareness into a public political trend with an extremist thrust.

The energetic and purposeful propaganda of nationalistic ideas manipulating the emotions of the masses made it possible to drag chiefly the representatives of the intelligentsia, office workers, pupils and virtually all the student youth—which had shown itself an energetic and large force in the April events—into the orbit of illegal activities.

2. The leaders of the republic and the state bodies of the Georgian SSR, under the unusual conditions that had taken shape, were unable to regulate the situation using political methods, did not expose the true aims of the

extremist associations, and did not give proper repulse to the growing nationalism and anti-Russian and anti-Soviet calls. The lack of a clear-cut and consistent stance by the leaders of the republic and their waiting tactics led to the consolidation of the liberal, radical and extremist opposition forces and their open opposition to state bodies.

As opposed to the events of November 1988, a significant portion of the scientific and creative intelligentsia, which had solidified with the ideas and slogans of the informal associations of an extremist bent, proved in turn to have a substantial influence on the formation of nationalistic and anti-Soviet sentiments and views among the population.

3. The law-and-order bodies of the Georgian SSR displayed inaction in the exercise of the authority granted them by law.

Violations of public order, which took on more and more of a mass nature, were not always broken up. The steps envisaged by law were not employed against law-breakers.

The minister of internal affairs of the GSSR, Sh.V. Gorgodze, was not able to handle the duties entrusted to him by union and republic legislation to safeguard the public order.

The procurator of the Georgian SSR, V.A. Razmadze, and later N.Kh. Shoshiashvili, acting procurator of the Georgian SSR as of March 1989, did not take all of the steps envisaged by law in reaction to instances of violations of legality, as well as the unsuitable execution of functions to safeguard the public order by the GSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

4. The passivity of party, soviet and law-and-order bodies of Georgia and their lack of decisiveness, the weakness of ideological work and the ineffectiveness of the steps undertaken to stabilize the situation made it possible for the leaders of the informal associations to seize the initiative, reject dialogue with the leaders of the republic and categorically reject the possibility of a mutually acceptable solution. The unsanctioned mass meetings disintegrated from political actions into mass violations of the public order and other unlawful actions, as the result of which the situation in the city of Tbilisi began to get out of control, threatening to entail grave consequences.

5. The leaders of the Georgian SSR informed the CPSU Central Committee and the all-union state bodies of the situation in Georgia.

The issue of the situation in the Georgian SSR and the rendering of assistance in the assurance of public safety and law and order was the topic of consideration on 7 Apr 89 at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, at the initiative of the leaders of the republic and in reply to their request.

Based on an evaluation made at the meeting of the situation and the information coming to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR Ministry of Defense, the appropriate instructions were issued to guide the troop subunits in Georgia. The allocation of additional (reserve) subunits was actually implemented therein.

The internal security troops, at the time a constituent element of the armed forces of the USSR, were specially designated to perform official and armed tasks to protect the public order. Article 8 Paragraph C of the ukaz of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "The Duties and Rights of the Internal Security Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in Protecting the Public Order" (28 Jul 88 edition), indicates that they "take part in breaking up violations of public order if those violations are of a mass nature, pose a threat to the life and health of citizens and disorganize the work of enterprises, organizations and institutions or are directed toward the destruction or annihilation of state, public or personal property."

This ukaz grants the USSR minister of internal affairs the right to decide to bring in internal security troops to fulfill those duties.

The redeployment of the airborne regiment was executed by decision of the USSR Ministry of Defense from the city of Kirovabad (now Gyandzha) to Tbilisi with the specially assigned mission of safeguarding the most important state facilities.

The decisions to send operational units of the internal security troops and special police subunits and to redeploy the airborne regiment were thus made by the corresponding all-union ministries, and did not require any consent by party organs. The steps taken by the USSR MVD and the USSR Ministry of Defense aimed at maintaining public order in the capital of Georgia were not of a strict legal nature and did not restrict the rights of citizens, and the aforementioned officials therefore did not exceed their authority and their decisions did not contradict prevailing legislation.

6.1. As established by the investigation, the question of taking steps to break up the meeting and free the square in front of the government hall was considered by the republic *aktiv*, the Buro of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, the GSSR Defense Council and the Council of Ministers of the republic.

All of these bodies, as the result of discussion, came to an unequivocal conclusion of the necessity of employing force for the purpose of breaking up the unsanctioned mass meeting and safeguarding government institutions. The use of internal affairs bodies of the republic and subunits of the internal security troops and the Soviet Army was envisaged in order to carry out the mission. Leadership of the execution of this operation was entrusted to a member of the Buro, the troop commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, Col Gen I.N. Rodionov, by decision of the Buro of the Central

Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, CPSU Central Committee Secretary Razumovskiy, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs V.V. Bakatin and USSR Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov were informed of this decision.

The right to make such decisions belongs to state rather than party organs. The fact that the decisions of party bodies are of a directive nature by virtue of Article 6 of the Constitution of the USSR that was in force, codifying the priority role of the CPSU in society, must be taken into account at the same time. The ordering of state bodies to take steps to restore public order was well-founded in this regard.

Subunits of different branches of the armed forces were thus concentrated in the city of Tbilisi due to events—internal security troops, police detachments from the USSR MVD and units of the Soviet Army—i.e. formations of varying subordination.

In accordance with the USSR Law "The Duties and Rights of the Internal Security Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in Protecting the Public Order" (28 Jul 88 edition), the leader of the internal security troops is the minister of internal affairs of the USSR, and not the immediate directorate, the internal security troops command (Article 1 of the law).

Article 3 of the law codifies the obligation of the internal security troops to take part in breaking up any violations of the public order.

The procedure for employing the internal security troops is specially regulated by that legislation, as well as a charter and a manual.

According to Paragraph 1.3 of the manual, responsibility for ensuring public order is placed on the leader of the territorial body of internal affairs or "on some other authorized official of a higher body of internal affairs."

The leadership of the operations to break up the violations of public order, with a regard for this, as well as in accordance with articles 60, 597 and 598 of the charter, should have been exercised by the minister of internal affairs of the republic.

At the same time, Paragraph 1.5 of the manual envisages that "the leadership of the forces and equipment of the bodies of internal security troops may be entrusted to a representative of the USSR MVD." He is in that case entrusted with all of the responsibility for the assurance of public order in the holding of mass functions.

That representative of the USSR MVD was Maj Gen Yu.T. Yefimov.

Col Gen I.N. Rodionov, as the commander of the troops in the military district, had the rights of superior officer (commander) in relation to all of the troops located on the territory of the district only on issues of guard and garrison service (Article 4 of the Charter of Garrison and Guard Service of the Armed Forces of the USSR).

Other instances of the subordination of internal security troops of the USSR MVD to representatives of the Soviet Army are not envisaged by legislation.

As can be seen from the materials of the case, after the concentration of troops of the USSR MVD and the Soviet Army in the city of Tbilisi, a situation arose wherein the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was being represented by Maj Gen Yefimov, the superior officer of the operational directorate of the USSR MVD GUVV [Internal Security Troops Chief Directorate], while the Ministry of Defense was represented by Deputy Minister Gen Army Kochetov, i.e. senior officers differing in rank.

The troop commander of the ZakVO, Col Gen Rodionov, also held a higher official position in rank and job than Maj Gen Yefimov and USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Lt Gen Gorgodze.

Gen Army Kochetov was not vested with any special authority in the Tbilisi sector.

At the same time he, as deputy minister of defense of the USSR and senior in military rank, was the senior officer in relation to Col Gen Rodionov. Kochetov took part in devising and adopting the decision to break up the unsanctioned mass meetings, and discussed its intent at the Buro.

Rodionov was thus named head of the operation by decision of the Central Committee Buro of the Georgian Communist Party by recommendation of the superior officer Kochetov, with whom he was in regulation mutual relations, and in accordance with the Charter for Internal Service of the Armed Forces of the USSR was obliged "to obey unquestioningly" (articles 10, 11, 14 and 15 of the charter).

The actions of Kochetov, as expressed in the duties entrusted to Rodionov as head of the operation, do not contradict the law due to the absence of legal norms regulating the procedure for interaction among various branches of the armed forces of the USSR under extraordinary circumstances within the country.

6.2. After the adoption of the resolution to break up the meeting, none of the officials of the party or state *aktiv* of the republic at the meeting spoke, by which the decision of the *aktiv* itself of 8 Apr 89 was ignored.

The last opportunity to explain to people the unlawfulness of their actions and the decision made in connection with it, as well as to convince those assembled on the square not to follow the calls of the extremists and to disperse peacefully, was thus not utilized.

When the tragic consequences of the operation became known, many of the senior officials of the republic began condemning the actions of the internal security troops and the Soviet Army in their speeches and later in their depositions and statements, although they themselves

took part in devising and adopting the resolution to break up the meeting, themselves asking for help from all-union bodies therein.

This testifies to the attempts to shift responsibility onto the armed forces of the USSR and the central authorities and directorates.

First Secretary Gumbaridze of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, without motive, refused to give a witness' deposition to the investigative group created in accordance with the resolution of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

The inquiry believes that the leaders of the republic party and state bodies should bear moral and disciplinary responsibility for their activity, as the result of which the crisis climate in Georgia became possible, as well as for the unprincipled nature of their assessments of the events of 9 Apr 89.

7. Directive No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR of 8 Apr 89 is the legal document for the break-up of the unsanctioned mass meeting.

The GSSR Council of Ministers, being the supreme executive and directive body of state power in the republic under Article 125 of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR, takes steps in particular to protect the interests of the state, protect public order and ensure and protect the rights and freedoms of citizens; its decrees and directives, under Article 127 of the constitution, are mandatory for execution over the whole territory of the Georgian SSR.

Insofar as the operational units of the internal security troops of the USSR MVD and the subunits of the Soviet Army were allotted by the corresponding all-union ministries namely to render assistance to the government of the republic in maintaining public order and protecting especially important sites, and the question of their utilization was specially coordinated with representatives of the USSR MVD and the military command, the instructions in Directive No. 24r on bringing in servicemen from the internal security troops and the Soviet Army and the performance of such missions are legal. The Council of Ministers of the republic, in issuing that directive, acted within the limits of the authority granted to it by the Constitution of the Georgian SSR.

8. GSSR Minister of Internal Affairs Sh. V. Gorgodze did not properly execute the duties entrusted to him and evaded the fulfillment of Directive No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR of 8 Apr 89, giving the bodies of the republic MVD missions of an auxiliary nature, and displayed a passive attitude toward the events that transpired.

At a meeting of the party *aktiv* on 7 Apr 89, Sh. V. Gorgodze, along with republic acting procurator N. Kh. Shoshiashvili, submitted a proposal for the immediate

arrest and institution of proceedings against the organizers of the meeting, declaring that sufficient legal grounds existed for it.

This proposal was included in the "Plan of Paramount Political and Organizational Measures to Normalize the Situation" and Instruction No. 18 to the MVD organs of Georgia of 8 Apr 89 that was signed by Gorgodze.

Gorgodze and Shoshiashvili, however, evaded the adoption of urgent measures.

This circumstance played a very negative role in that the organizers of the meeting, continuing their unlawful actions with impunity, incited those at the meeting toward disobedience and resistance against the bodies of law and order.

Gorgodze's improper execution of his official duties, although a causal link in the events under consideration, could not be classified as criminal negligence overall due to the fact that he did not foresee, and could not have foreseen, the consequences that ensued.

The passive activity of the procuracy of Georgia is not a direct causal link with the consequences that ensued, due to the fact that the inquiry regards the actions of Razmadze and Shoshiashvili during the events of April 9 as omissions in their work, which entail disciplinary responsibility.

9. The tragic events that transpired in the city of Tbilisi on 9 Apr 89 are in direct causal link with the unlawful activity of the organizers and active participants in the unsanctioned meetings (Tsereteli, Gamsakhurdia, Chanturiya and Kostava, among others), which sharply destabilized the situation in the capital of the republic and other cities and led to organized mass violations of public order, strikes, the seizing of transport, the barricading of streets and active opposition and resistance to bodies safeguarding public safety and order.

The uncompromising stance of the leaders of the informal organizations, ruling out dialogue with the authorities, led directly to the clash of those at the mass meeting with the bodies called upon to protect public order.

When the actual legitimate use of force and the danger of people being hurt in the event of a failure to obey the bodies of law and order became known, the organizers of the meeting, knowing that there was a significant number of women and adolescents on the square, not only did not try to impede the tragic development of events or take steps to curtail the violations of public order and disperse the meeting, but rather called upon those assembled not to fulfill the legal demands of the authorities. They moreover incited many people to sit on the ground in front of the approaching military units fulfilling their orders to free the square and Prospekt Rustaveli of the meeting participants, under conditions of great density and congestion of the people.

Organized groups of youth offered fierce resistance to the troops. This substantially affected the course of the operation and made it impossible to pursue non-violent methods, i.e. caused the servicemen to force, including the use of special agents.

Groups of aggressively inclined participants at the meeting employed items of attack prepared in advance in the course of their resistance—sticks, stones, metal dowels, brass knuckles, knives, bottles, homemade explosive devices and the like—as a consequence of which 189 servicemen were injured.

The unlawful actions of the organizers and participants at the meeting were also the principal reason for the crush in front of the government hall. Some 19 people died and 167 were injured among the meeting participants as the result of the events that transpired on 9 Apr 89 in the city of Tbilisi.

The investigation conducted by the procuracy of the Georgian SSR categorized the actions of the meeting organizers as "the organization and active participation in group actions that grossly violated public order and were accompanied by clear disobedience of the legal demands of representatives of the authorities that entailed the destruction of transport operations and state and public enterprises, institutions and organizations," i.e. a crime as envisaged by Article 206¹ of the GSSR Criminal Code.

The leaders of the informal groups, Gamsakhurdia, Tsereteli, Kostava and Chanturiya, were charged with the indicated crime. The other active participants in the unlawful actions were not charged by the organs of the GSSR procuracy.

The criminal case against Gamsakhurdia, Tsereteli and Chanturiya was dropped on 5 Feb 90 according to Article 6 of the GSSR UPK "in view of changes in the situation." The prosecution of Kostava was dropped in view of his death.

10. The troop commander of the ZakVO, Col Gen Rodionov, who had exercised general supervision of the operation to break up the meeting at the government hall and the task of expulsion, had entrusted the internal security troops to the leadership of Maj Gen Yefimov, which corresponds to the requirements of law.

The plan for the operation did not envisage the participation of the airborne regiment in the expulsion of the meeting participants.

In the course of carrying it out, however, when groups of actively resisting meeting participants armed with sticks, stones and other objects of attack penetrated behind the troop subunits and fell upon the servicemen from the rear, Rodionov issued the order to halt that action using the forces of the airborne company of 39 [as published] men.

The participation of the airborne troops in the operation was not prolonged and was of a local nature.

The airborne soldiers, protecting themselves against the attackers, used the small infantry shovels that are part of their gear against four people (men). Some of the soldiers inflicted blows on the arms and legs of those attacking them for the purpose of self-defense, using belts and other objects. They did not use force, including the shovels, against women or adolescents.

There were no grave consequences from the actions of the airborne soldiers. No one from the Soviet Army was in direct contact with any of those who were killed, and their deaths have no causal link to the actions of the airborne company.

This gives grounds to conclude that the airborne servicemen were subjected to unlawful encroachments on the part of a large group of demonstrators and had the right, in a difficult situation, to resort to defense via active opposition to the attack. The means of defense they chose—the inflicting of blows using small infantry shovels, arms, legs and other methods against the attacking men—corresponded to the nature of the attack and were commensurate with the means employed by the attackers.

The airborne servicemen were acting under these circumstances in a state of necessary defense and, based on Article 15 of Part 1 of the GSSR Criminal Code, the criminal case in this area was dropped due to the lack of elements constituting a crime.

The actions of I.N. Rodionov in introducing the airborne troops are not a crime, since they were caused by the altered situation that threatened the collapse of the operation and harm to the life and health of servicemen and citizens.

11. Maj Gen Yu.T. Yefimov, designated the deputy supervisor of the operation, was the senior officer of the military operational group of the USSR MVD GU'VV and supervised all of the manpower and equipment of the internal security troops carrying out the expulsion of those taking part in the meeting.

He was responsible, in accordance with Article 625 of the Charter of Combat Service of the Internal Security Troops of the USSR MVD, for the organization of the operation, including the methods of action, the quantities of manpower and equipment, the missions of the units, the procedure for interaction, the use of special agents and the like.

Rodionov, the supervisor of the operation, as the investigation established, gave Yefimov the overall mission without going into his functions and without defining the operational and tactical methods for carrying it out.

Actions in special operations are defined by the Charter for Combat Service of the Internal Security Troops and the "Manual for Organizing the Organs of Internal Affairs for the Protection of Public Order When Holding

Assemblies, Meetings, Street Processions and Demonstrations," confirmed by orders of the USSR minister of internal affairs.

Article 597 of the charter gives the definition, "A special operation is the set of operational, legal, troop and other measures and actions being implemented by the organs of internal affairs and other forces interacting with them within a limited time frame, according to a general intent and under unified supervision."

The Chief Directorate of the Internal Security Troops of USSR MVD has conducted an official verification and prepared a conclusion that gives an analysis of the organization and performance of the operation on 9 Apr 89.

The conclusion indicates that "the method selected for carrying out the operation was 'expulsion of the crowd without preliminary dispersion,'" in which connection "it would have been expedient:

"—not to put the APCs in front of the troop files, but rather to bring them up behind the dispersion group for support.

"—the subunits of the local organs of internal affairs were excluded from the operation, specific missions were not defined for them, and the police personnel were lacking in elements of the groupings (groups for withdrawal and dispersal).

"The plan that was developed did not fully reflect:

"—the operational, legal and other measures being carried out by the interacting bodies (forces) and the missions of the subunits from the local bodies of internal affairs.

"—the procedure for concentrating and augmenting the efforts of elements of the group of forces in the course of the operation in the face of the worsening situation and in the event of the active opposition of the crowd."

The following conclusions may be drawn from analyzing the organization and planning of the operation:

Maj Gen Yefimov and Lt Gen Gorgodze make operational and tactical mistakes in developing the plan of operations.

The evaluation of the organization of the operation provided by the USSR MVD GUVV contains an investigation of the actions of the officials with a regard for certain consequences and specific features of the implementation of the expulsion that could not have been known to the developers of the operation during the period of its preparation.

The tactics for the actions of the troops that were selected were devised and implemented under specific conditions in a stipulated and limited time frame.

The opinions contained in the departmental conclusion on how it had to have been more expedient to conduct

the operation are conjectural, since such an operation was being conducted for the first time and its leaders had no objective possibility of forecasting all of the variables in the development of the situation.

The inquiry feels that the conclusion contained in the report of the USSR MVD GUVV, in light of the aforementioned, to be objective: "The time for planning the operation and its organization and preparation were limited. The solution devised, notwithstanding this, was basically an expedient one and made it possible to achieve the aims of the operation with the manpower on hand."

The inquiry, in assessing the organization of the operation, proceeds from the fact that the plan for the operation corresponded in general to the requirements of existing standard documents, and the individuals responsible for its development did not exceed their authority.

The means of achieving the aims indicated in the plan do not contradict legislation in force.

11.2. The USSR MVD commission that conducted the official verification also provided an analysis of the actions of the internal security troops in breaking up the meeting.

The conclusion pointed out organizational and tactical mistakes in the execution of the special operation:

—the personnel of the Soviet Army who took part in the operation were not equipped with a sufficient quantity of individual protective gear and did not have means of active defense;

—not all of the manpower was utilized with adequate effectiveness;

—fire trucks were not used to direct streams of water onto the crowd; and

—personnel from the republic police were absent from the groups for dispersal (expulsion) and withdrawal.

The inquiry, with a regard for all of the materials gathered for the case, concludes that Yefimov committed the indicated organizational and tactical mistakes in the course of the operation, which did not, however, impede the fulfillment of the assigned mission.

In the opinion of the inquiry, the corrections that were made to the plan of action by Maj Gen Yu.T. Yefimov during the course of the operation were well-founded and essential.

The conclusion of the USSR MVD commission came to the general conclusion that "an analysis of the organization and actions of the troops in the operation, as well as the conditions and procedure for the use of individual protective gear and active defense by the personnel, including the Cheremukha special agent, makes it possible to conclude that the activity of the commanders in

managing the manpower and equipment, as well as the actions of personnel, were accomplished within the framework of the Charter of Combat Service of the Internal Security Troops. The troops did not exceed their authority in the course of fulfilling their assigned missions."

The inquiry, with a regard for all available evidence, feels that the given conclusion is objective and substantiated based on the established actual circumstances of the case.

11.3. The inquiry has established that the immediate cause of the deaths was the crush, in which bodily injuries incompatible with life were suffered. The crush occurred as a result of the fierce resistance of a portion of those at the meeting to the servicemen, the influx of meeting participants onto the square, the passive disobedience of other meeting participants, and the inappropriate execution of their duties by the organs of the MVD of the Georgian SSR and other circumstances set forth in the decree, i.e. as the result of an aggregate of causes.

The unpredictability of the actions of the groups of people at the mass meeting that offered resistance and the impossibility of establishing the specific individuals from whose actions the mortal bodily injuries directly occurred, as well as the presence of several causes at once for the appearance of the crush, rule out the criminal liability of the servicemen, who did not enter into direct contact with those who were killed.

The servicemen, for the same reason, cannot bear responsibility for the grave injuries sustained by those meeting as the result of the crush in the square in front of the government hall and at Gostelradio.

11.4. The use of rubber clubs (PR-73) by subunits of the internal security troops in the course of the operation is a special means that was caused by the unlawful actions of the participants in the meeting. The servicemen acted therein in accordance with the Combat Charter and the ukaz of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 28 Jul 88, "The Duties and Rights of the Internal Security Troops of the USSR MVD in Safeguarding Public Order." Elements constituting a crime are thus absent from actions of the servicemen that entailed bodily injuries to those at the meeting for that reason.

The fact that the greater portion of those who were injured directly from the actions of the servicemen were male testifies to the fact that the rubber clubs were employed principally against men who were offering active resistance. The death of Kvasroliazhvili, who sustained blows in response to his unlawful actions, ensued as the result of his falling to the asphalt and hitting protruding items. There is thus no cause to institute criminal proceedings against anyone for the death of Kvasroliazhvili.

The presence of women among those injured, of whom 21 declared that they receive blows from clubs (12 have

objective confirmation of slight bodily injury) testifies to the fact that clubs were also used against women.

None of the servicemen questioned confirmed the use of force against women. The depositions of those injured were not specific on this and were insufficient to establish the motives and circumstances of the use of rubber clubs.

It does not currently seem possible to establish the specific individuals who inflicted the bodily injury (beatings) to women or the circumstances of the injuries.

Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that in the great crush of people and the rapidly developing events, the injuries to the women could have occurred through negligence, and criminal liability is not envisaged for the negligent infliction of slight bodily injury.

There are thus no grounds to deem the actions of the servicemen in relation to women to be unlawful.

11.5. Maj Gen Yu.T. Yefimov issued the order to employ the Cheremukha special agent in substantiated fashion and in accordance with the law and the charter (Articles 56 and 633 of the Charter for Combat Service of the Internal Security Troops), due to the fact that groups of people at the mass meeting were actually threatening the life and health of the servicemen by their actions.

The Cheremukha special agent was employed with a regard for its tactical and technical features.

The use of the special agent, in accordance with the requirements of Article 58 of the Charter for Combat Service of the Internal Security Troops of the USSR MVD, was preceded by an announcement of that fact by megaphone.

Special chemical agents were not employed against women, minors, invalids and the elderly at schools or children's and treatment institutions. Thirteen civilians were actually stricken from the use of chemical agents in the course of breaking up the mass meeting.

The following violations were committed at the same time in the use of the special agents.

Maj Gen Yu.T. Yefimov did not inform the procurator of the use of special agents as required by Article 57 of the Charter of the Internal Security Troops of the USSR MVD.

Maj Gen Yu.T. Yefimov and Lt Col A.M. Baklanov were obligated, in accordance with Paragraph 23 of the manual for the employment of special agents, to notify residents not taking part in the violation of public order of the use of toxic smoke substances and, where necessary, take steps to evacuate them.

The failure to report to the procurator did not have the aim of concealing the indicated factors, but was caused by the extreme situation.

GSSR Minister of Internal Affairs Sh. V. Gorgodze furthermore sent USSR Minister of Internal Affairs V. V. Bakatin a coded telegram which reported the use of special agents immediately after the operation of 9 Apr 89.

Yefimov reported this to television viewers of the republic in a speech recorded at GSSR Gostelradio, which was not immediately broadcast for reasons not dependent on him.

The notification or evacuation of residents living on Prospekt Rustaveli was unrealistic in the given situation. Many of the residents were moreover pelting the combat formations of the troops with various objects from windows, balconies and roofs.

The inquiry thus feels that the use of the Cheremukha special agent by the servicemen was valid.

11.6. The use of K-51 is not envisaged by any standard documents, including the Charter for Combat Service of the Internal Security Troops of the USSR MVD and the manual for the use of special agents.

The decision to employ that type of special agent was made individually by Lt Col Baklanov, who in violation of Article 57 of the Charter for Combat Service of the Internal Security Troops did not report to the senior officer or the procurator the use of four units of K-51.

The inquiry proceeded from the following in assessing the violations committed by Baklanov.

The use of special agents in the concluding stage of the operation made it possible to break up the active resistance of the crowd that was committing excesses, complete the performance of the expulsion of those meeting from Prospekt Rustaveli and avert additional injuries to the servicemen.

Analysis of the medical documents, the conclusions of court medical experts and the depositions of those at the meeting on the location of the use of the irritants, on the other hand, shows that none of them were stricken in the concluding stage of the operation (Republic Square).

The report of the commission of the USSR Ministry of Defense, relying on a multitude of sources by domestic and foreign authors, indicates that the chemical substance contained in the K-51 is used in service to arm the police of many countries as a replacement for chloroacetophenone.

It must also be noted that Article 5h of the ukaz of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 28 Jul 88, "The Duties and Rights of the Internal Security Troops of the USSR MVD in Safeguarding Public Order" discusses the use of special agents in general, without indication of the specific types. The list of special agents and the rules for using them, as prescribed in the indicated charter, should be defined by the USSR MVD in coordination with the USSR Ministry of Justice.

A standard document regulating the procedure for the use of K-51 along with Cheremukha, however, was not adopted in timely fashion.

Proceeding from the extant situation, 10,000 units of the K-51 were sent to be at the disposal of the senior chemical officer of the USSR Ministry of Defense on 29 Nov 88. These agents were distributed among the military units of the Soviet Army and the internal security troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Some 600 of these hand grenades in particular were transferred to the military unit.

The K-51s, according to the conclusions of physiochemical and chemical-safety expert analysis, contain no physiologically active substances except CS.

Taking into account the fact that the use of the K-51 special agents in the course of the operation was conditioned by the exceptional situation that had taken shape in the course of the operation, when the life and health of the soldiers in the military unit were threatened by real danger, had the aim of averting additional injuries both to the personnel of the unit and to the demonstrators and facilitated to a considerable extent the fulfillment of the assigned mission to expel those at the mass meeting from Prospekt Rustaveli, as well as taking into account that this substance was employed after repeated warnings about it to those violating public order and did not cause their poisonings, it should be concluded that the actions of Baklanov did not constitute the elements of a crime.

As for the timely reporting of Baklanov to senior officers on the use of the K-51 units in the course of the operation, this fact also does not constitute any crime, but could entail the application of measures of disciplinary action.

12. Proceeding from an analysis of all of the materials of the criminal case, the inquiry concludes that the officials who made the decision to break up the mass meeting and the leaders of the operation did not take into account and did not foresee that the servicemen would encounter such stubborn and fierce resistance. They were also objectively unable to foresee the onset of those consequences.

The servicemen are not to blame for the ensuing grave consequences due to the fact that they did not exceed their authority and acted lawfully.

The reports of the central and republic mass media, which reported on the cruelty of the servicemen, the use of toxic substances and the like, were checked in the course of the investigation.

It was established as a consequence that these data did not correspond to reality, and were founded on rumors and false testimony by witnesses.

The case materials include a film by director E. Shengelaya that reports the events of 9 Apr 89 in a biased fashion.

The conclusions contained in the materials of the press and the film were analyzed during the course of the inquiry, and the appropriate evaluation was made of them.

The criminal case against the officials and servicemen of the internal security troops of the USSR MVD and the Soviet Army that was brought under the criteria of a crime as stipulated by Paragraph A of Article 278 of the GSSR Criminal Code has thus been dropped for lack of actions that constitute the elements of a crime.

The substantiation for dropping the case was verified under the procedures of prosecutorial oversight. No grounds for reaching a different decision were found.

Delegates to All-Army CPSU Conference Interviewed

91UM0521A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Mar 91 First Edition pp 1-2

[Unattributed interviews with delegates to the First All-Army Party Conference; the conference crowns the work of establishing new party structures in the USSR Armed Forces]

[Text] At the request of the newspaper's correspondents, the following questions were replied to:

1. What hopes do you place on the All-Army Party Conference?
2. As a delegate, what problem which particularly concerns you would you like to raise at the rostrum of the party conference?

Maj Gen V. Nelyubin, directorate deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense:

1. I am hoping that one of the main results from the work of the conference will be decisions which will make it possible to unify the army communists. Incidentally, an important role here will be played by the members of the All-Army Party Committee. This should involve energetic persons for whom of prime concern is deeds and not words. As of now, we must not be afraid to admit it, in the actions of individual comrades there has been more disassociation.

Secondly, it is essential to raise the responsibility of each communist for the fate of the army and the party. Let me emphasize, this is everyone! And no matter what position he might hold. We must get rid of our habit of waiting for instructions from above on every question.

2. Should I be able to have the floor at the conference, I would take up what, in my view, is the main thing: the preserving of the USSR. This, I feel, is the crucial problem. If there is a renewed Union of sovereign republics, if there is calm in interethnic relations, it will be much easier to improve the economy all working together. Personally, I simply cannot conceive of myself outside the Union.

I would also mention the necessity of a balanced approach in the decisions related to the nation's military-industrial potential. Certainly this is the guarantee of the motherland's security. We must not permit a rush either in cutting back the Armed Forces or in converting a number of enterprises of the military-industrial complex. I am concerned when there are such facts as plants with the most advanced technology and production facilities beginning to produce, for instance, pots, pans and irons.... Let me be correctly understood, I am not against such consumer goods all the more as such ordinary items in our country are now ranked among the shortages. But, to put it figuratively, we must not drive nails with a microscope....

Col G. Fesenko, Chief of the Military Political Department of the Construction Directorate of the Kiev Military District:

1. I feel that the All-Army Party Conference will primarily enrich us in the experience of party work under the present-day, difficult and often sharply conflicting sociopolitical conditions. I realize that for the moment we must not expect any systematized scientific view of the actions in the new structures. This is simply too early. But I am counting on some hints.

I am hopeful that the party conference will put an end to the organizational maneuvers. It will approve the establishments of the party structures and the problems will be discussed arising in our new party committees....

There are already many such problems. There are both old and new ones related to the reorganization of the political bodies and the separating of the party organizations from them. Here is one of these: in the construction directorate, along with the political body, a party committee has now been organized and this is to work among the communists. On what will it rely? Previously this was clear: it would rely on the party committees of the UNR [office of work supervisor]. But now what are these to be? Let me illustrate this from an example. The UNR-70 which is led by the experienced organizer and honored construction worker of the Ukraine, Col M. Makerov. The UNR employs 800 persons who are workers and white collar personnel of the Soviet Army. There are more than 110 communists but the party committee secretary no longer is full time. This is the case in each UNR. And what is the party committee of a construction directorate? This is just two full-time workers, the secretary, Lt Col E. Ternovskiy, and one full-time accountant. Can one get anything done with such forces? It seems to me that little can be accomplished. As it is, you do not need to be a Solomon to predict what the party work will be like. Our only hope is the conference. Possibly it will suggest some optimum version and correctly assess the situation. Certainly collective wisdom means a great deal.

The problem of problems is organizational work. The impression has been created that some have been very desirous to take this function away from the party

organizations. It has been said that you, the party members, should be concerned with the educating of persons but not interfere into production. This is a question for the economic workers. But certainly all our previous experience shows that without such "intervention" there will be no progress.

A little more than a year ago, one of the lagging UNR was headed, upon our recommendation, by the communist, Lt Col Yu. Borisenko. How did he get started? With the closest contact in work with the party committee secretary, A. Merkulov, and the commander of the military construction detachment, Lt Col A. Martynenko. At a session of the party committee they established the bottlenecks in the party organizations and organized the training of specialists. The communists organized a lease contract in the most complicated area, finishing work. Now this UNR is one of the best. Had we stood on the sidelines and had we influenced things from the position of pure "theory," would there have been such a result?

The situation in certain military construction detachments has grown sharply acute with 63 percent of all crimes made up of absence without leave. If the efforts of the administration were not reinforced by party organizational work, many tasks would be on the brink of failure. We are even thinking about a proposal to introduce a position of assistant chief of the UNR for educational work and he could be elected by the party committee secretary. Aside from the chief and the chief engineer, there is no one to carry out educational work.

This is what I would like to bring up. The times are difficult and certainly individual politicians and statements have little notion of what problems our society and army are encountering in the stage of perestroika. But our party organization, some 1,500 communists strong, will keep its monolithic unity. Over the two years, it has been left by several-score members. But there has not been a single serviceman among them. There is the unanimous conclusion that the people believe in the party. And this is no insignificant matter. It allows us to look at the future with optimism.

Capt 2d Rank S. Chizhikov, Party Committee Secretary of the Nuclear Submarine Fleet:

1. At present, I feel it very important to set our views on the most fundamental questions in party work, that is, to understand what degree of responsibility we are assuming, in what areas we will have an influence in the troop collectives, how we will interact with the military political bodies and public institutions and organizations, what our place is to be in carrying out the military reform and so forth. The main thing, in my view, is not to allow a weakening of the influence of the CPSU on the spot. For this we need new approaches and a new methodology and, naturally, a qualitative regrouping of our forces. For a long time, we have been bringing up the rear in events, we have been distracted by secondary matters and allowed ourselves to become entangled in overly theoretical discussions. I am hopeful that the new

party structures which have now been organized in the troops will help us find our place.

From the conference I am expecting primarily concreteness in elaborating a general, coordinated line on the basis of new ideas.

2. If I were to have the floor at the conference, I would say without fail that many of us are concerned by the slowness and indecisiveness of the central CPSU bodies particularly on the question of party policy in the Armed Forces. The Army and Navy at present are being subjected to the most effective ideological expansion by our political opponents. They have focused attention on an extremely painful point, the unstable situation of the servicemen and their families. This is actually the case. It is clearly apparent, even from the example of our nuclear submarine garrison. The men are unstintingly carrying out their duty to the motherland but they live in a world of numerous limitations, often denying themselves elementary terrestrial joys and at the limit of physical and mental stresses. And where at present, please tell me, is the certainty that the state and society will be concerned with their problems?

For a long time changes for the better were seen by military personnel as being linked with the CPSU and to the fact that the party of communists was the guarantor of justice and purity. It would be a terrible mistake to let this trust dissipate. Yes, the nation is in crisis and difficult times have arrived. This is being felt by all. But the party at least should be armed with a clear program of actions to quickly emerge from the crisis and defend this program on a state level. The nationwide referendum has shown that the interests of the nation and the CPSU coincide. At present, the Armed Forces must be supported with all the party's intellectual potential. We must do this if we do not want a raise in passivity and alienation among the Army and Navy communists. And such phenomena have appeared. But how can the party committees of the formations oppose these when there has been complete abandonment in social questions? Certainly this is the chief aspect of our policy. I am certain that the First All-Army Conference will thoroughly discuss the concerns and hopes of the men of the remote garrisons with complete frankness. It must deal with what we, the communists, must do for the persons performing their great duty to the fatherland.

Col A. Vozov, Party Committee Secretary of the Air Forces:

1. Why do I support the founding of an all-Army party organization? The political bodies which have existed up to now carried out their job. Merged together with the party organizations, they conformed to the then existing system, to their times. (Whether this was good or bad is a matter of separate discussion.) Perestroika and the urgent tasks of today have raised the issue of establishing democratic structures in the army which would make it possible to raise the level of party work. Certainly I expect from the party conference not only concrete,

business-like decisions. A mass of these could be adopted but an executive body, the party committee, will carry out what has been planned. For this reason, I feel that there will be positive results only in the instance that we choose an enterprising, capable party committee which is able to look at party work in a modern light under the current difficult conditions, when the authority of the party has declined, including in the army, and when, finally, we are to move from passivity, from a dozing state to active, offensive actions.

2. There are many urgent problems. As they say, wherever you look there is more than enough to do. If I were given the floor at the party conference, I would focus attention on three issues. First, the attitude toward the person in uniform. That is on the part of the state, the government and the people. An example. Yesterday I was walking to work and on the side of a bus I saw an announcement: Drivers wanted with a salary of 800-1,000 rubles. In the army in order to obtain this amount of money you would have to serve a minimum of 25 years, have two higher educational degrees and a very high position. But it is not merely a matter of material support. There is the issue of the entire range of social problems. For a number of factors in the army this has been so neglected (the housing question, the problems of food in remote garrisons, residential registration, job placement for the wives of servicemen, kindergartens, cultural-educational institutions and so forth) that this will require particular and closest attention from the communists.

Secondly, at present in our nation aviation is perhaps the only thing of which we can be proud. The SU-27 and MiG-29 aircraft are the best in the world. The war in the Persian Gulf has shown that we can also lose these advantages. No matter what the pacifists might say that no one threatens us, we cannot lose our leading positions in aircraft building. And there are such alarming symptoms. The proportional amount of allocations is declining for research and design work and many scientific programs are being curtailed....

Thirdly, I, as the Air Forces party committee secretary, am concerned by the fact that up to now we still do not have any nationwide party program of action. For a long time now they have been talking about a new CPSU Program. In our worrisome and unstable times, this is as essential as the air we breathe. We, the communists, should have a clear view of the future and the more distant future. Only then will the people trust us.

New Writers Group on Military Themes

91UM0548A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Yu.A. Vinogradov, president of the All-Union Association of Military Writers, secretary of the board of the RSFSR Union of Writers, by Major I.

Yadykin: "The Poetry of Exploits and Duty. All-Union Association of Military Writers Created"; place and date not given]

[Text] The various groups, associations, and movements will not surprise anybody today. Many of them, having begun their activity with a great stir, have somehow disappeared unnoticed from the arena of public attention. But still the creation of the all-Union association of writers on the subjects of ground and sea battles, whose charter has been registered in the USSR Ministry of Justice, could not but draw our attention. What brought about the creation of such an association, what are its main goals and program, and will it survive? With these questions I began a conversation with the association's president, retired Colonel Yu.A. Vinogradov, secretary of the board of the RSFSR Union of writers, honored cultural worker of the RSFSR, candidate of historical sciences.

[Vinogradov] Domestic literature beginning with the "The Song of Igor's Campaign" has always and still does engender in people, especially young people, a love for their native land and people and fidelity to the cause of serving their homeland. But recently the attitude toward the military in official literary organizations and press organs has become, shall we say, cool. Writers who take up the subject of feats of arms are considered almost reactionary and it is not easy for talented young writers of books on the Army and Navy to get into the Union of Writers. The USSR Union of Writers has no special publications which will publish works of a heroic patriotic orientation such as, say, ZNAMYA was in the prewar years. It was the publication established by LOKAF—the Literary Association of the Red Army and Navy.

Under these conditions there was an objective need to create in the system of the USSR Union of Writers a unified center with a heroic-patriotic orientation in literature. Our association is intended to be such a center. Its founders are the USSR Union of Writers and the Unions of Writers of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan in conjunction with the Ministry of Defense and the Main Military and Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, the USSR KGB, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministries of the Maritime Fleet and the Fishing Industry of the USSR, the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee, the DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the USSR Army, Navy, and Air Force], the Soviet Committee of War Veterans, and a number of other organizations. The founders included also the USSR Ministry of Defense Publishing House, the Patriot and Granitsa publishing houses, and the magazines SOVETSKIY VOIN, POGRANICHNIK, and NA BOY-EVOM POSTU.

[Yadykin] What specific work will be done by the association in order to achieve its proclaimed goals?

[Vinogradov] We will strive to provide normal conditions for creative work for all members of the association, to protect their authorial rights, to create the most favorable conditions for them when publishing artistic works, and to publish the best of them in our literary and artistic publications.

Creative competitions will occupy an important place in the work. We are establishing an annual bonus in the amount of 8,000 rubles [R] for especially significant works with heroic-patriotic themes. We will send writers on creative trips to military units and ships.

The association considers its most immediate task to be the creation of its own press organs—a monthly literary-artistic journal (in conjunction with the USSR Union of Writers) and a sociopolitical weekly (in conjunction with the USSR Ministry of Defense).

All this requires the creation of our own publishing and printing complex, which will work in close interaction with the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Patriot and Granitsa publishing houses, the autonomously financed creative associations Otechestvo, Muzhestvo, Veteran, KIML (Commercial Publishing House of Moscow Literature), and others. First of all we intend to publish jointly the most popular series "Military Adventures" and "Naval Adventures" and we will publish a series of books that have been awarded the medal imeni A. Fadeyev and the prize imeni K. Simonov and that have earned the literary prize of the association itself. Special attention will be devoted to creating, in conjunction with the USSR Ministry of Defense, a new and modern "Officer's Library" analogous to the publications of prewar years.

It is also planned to restore the Modern Military Drama Studio and to create the Patriot studio of artistic and documentary films, which could operate on the basis of the movie studio of the USSR Ministry of Defense. There are concrete plans to create literary, cultural-educational, social, and entertainment programs for radio and television.

[Yadykin] In light of such rich prospects one automatically wonders: Who may become a member of this association?

[Vinogradov] In keeping with the association's charter, its members may be professional writers and young literary people and also workers of literary and artistic publishing houses and journals that are among the founders of the association. Admissions will be made by the board with subsequent approval by the association's council.

A most important area of the association's activity will be work with young literary people, especially those serving in the military. Permanent creative seminars conducted once every two years will be created for them. Participants will be selected for these seminars through a

network of literary associations of military and departmental newspapers and cultural and educational institutions. The leaders of the creative seminars may recommend the most gifted and promising young students of literature for acceptance as members of the USSR Union of Writers. Stipends will be established for the periods during which they are working and one-time monetary grants will be paid. Finally, taking into account the special difficulties young poets have in publishing under market conditions, we plan to publish small collections of poetry.

[Yadykin] And the last question. In the first paragraph of your association's charter it says that it is being created as "...a public association that is independent of political parties." Is this a concession to the currently fashionable trend toward de-party-ization or is it an expression of a desire for freedom of creativity?

[Vinogradov] I will answer briefly. With all the differences in views that undoubtedly exist in any creative organization, we are united by one thing. Our ideology—patriotism and true internationalism, and our policy is to serve the homeland.

Complaints of Trade Unions at Military Installations

91UM0597A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by V. Grishakov, chairman of the Ussuriysk Garrison soviet of representatives of trade union committees: "Trade Unions in the Army and Navy—A Long Time Coming"]

[Text] Fate would have it that after discharge from military service I was to remain in Primorskiy Kray. I got a job at an auto repair enterprise. After some time there, I was nominated for trade union work.

It cannot be said that I was not familiar with it. I served in military construction and other units where there were a lot of workers and office employees. But a more thorough study of my rights and duties in accordance with the USSR law "On Professional Unions, Rights, and Guarantees of Their Activities," and other normative documents, compelled me to view the position of trade union members under Army conditions in a different way. And it became clear why consolidation of trade union forces in the Ground Forces was moving with such difficulty. In my opinion, there are several reasons.

I will start with the fact that nothing has changed since the formation of the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Office Employees of the Armed Forces and of the Central Committee of the Trade Unions of the Ground Forces. Is that not why many trade union organizations of military establishments that are in branch trade unions are not hastening to transfer to us? If we do that, they say, we will lose the scanty rights we have now.

V. Gorovaya, chairman of the trade union committee of the auto repair shop, declared on this subject in a far from official interview:

"But why should we transfer when we have already received in the first half of this year from the Trade Union of Workers of Auto Repair Shops, Transport, and Highways more than 60 permits to sanatoriums, rest homes, and preventive clinics. In the summer, we will receive 40-50 Pioneer camp permits for the children. The trade union is helping us with a sports complex. But all you have are promises."

And it is difficult not to agree with this. In one of the garrisons, L. Kozlovskaya, chairman of the trade union committee, related how local military chiefs had reported to Moscow for a long time that the bath-laundry enterprise had been repaired, and that work conditions for the female workers had improved. Actually, nothing had been done there. And only the persistence of activist trade union members forced them to find the resources to repair this enterprise. But there was a lot of extreme nervousness and humiliation.

Further. Some of the commanders simply ignore the opinion of trade unions. Recently, for example, the entire staff of the trade union committee put in for early retirement, inasmuch as once again a young and energetic unit commander was assigned, Lieutenant V. Tkachenko, who conducted himself as if no trade union organization existed. It was necessary to send to him a whole delegation with a petition from the labor collective that he deign to attend a trade union conference, where, incidentally, the workers spoke bitterly about the fact that the unit command had for a long time opposed the conclusion of a collective agreement. Meanwhile, because it is so cold in the shops people are working in quilted jackets and felt boots, and questions are not being resolved about the provision of working clothes and special fatty food supplements. The commander, not paying attention to the commission for social control, personally distributes the goods that come to the military store. A month passed after this extraordinary conference. After not receiving the proper support and understanding from the command, O. Korchmar, the new chairman, announced his resignation.

In a number of other military units and establishments, local and even district commanders are absolutely not responding to repeated requests from chairmen of trade union committees about the allocation of apartments to critically needy workers and employees who have worked 10-20 years in one job. Apparently, the time has come to establish trade union participation in the resolution of questions on the distribution of housing for workers and employees and in the review of conflicts that arise through some kind of normative act.

At a meeting of representatives of trade union committees of our garrison, which occurred last December, an appeal was approved in which a number of demands are

put forth to the federation for speedy resolution, jointly with the USSR Ministry of Defense, of the following top priority problems:

- determine basic criteria for a standard of living, and compensation scales depending on changes in the index of prices;
- taking weak development in the social sphere in the Far East into account, provide for the allocation of up to 35 percent of the permits to military sanatoriums and rest homes for workers and employees in the federation's budget planning;
- examine the question of construction in Primorsky Kray and maintenance of a Pioneer camp for children of servicemen, workers, and office employees with 1,500-2,000 places at the expense of the centralized resources of the Ministry of Defense, with its subsequent use as a preventive clinic.

I would also like to note this. There is a need for at least elementary working conditions for elected trade union organs and active workers. I will talk about myself. It is already three months since I was elected chairman of the soviet of representatives of the trade union committee of our garrison, and all of this time I have been going to offices and departments in search of a premises in which to work. Proposals to accommodate us in the garrison officers' club, in empty premises of the military trade administration, and to rent two offices that were to become available in the Ussuriysk House of Trade Unions were turned down... True, executing the instructions of the chief of the military political directorate of the district, political officer Colonel Ye. Zablotskiy offered us one of the rooms in an establishment located on the outskirts of the city, more than an hour's drive away.

Therefore, even today, as the old men used to say, "I have everything I own with me."

Briefly, there are still a lot of unresolved problems. But I am an optimist, and I believe that the period of disorder and vacillation will soon come to an end. Nevertheless, we are not twiddling our thumbs and we ourselves are opening the way. We are standing on our own and we are adhering to principles. As the chairman of the soviet of representatives of the garrison trade union committees, my work contacts and mutual understanding with the command element are being strengthened more and more. Collective agreements have been concluded in a majority of the military units.

It is possible that my judgments will seem debatable or not very convincing to some. Therefore, I would like to invite all of those to exchange opinions and to discuss problems of trade union work who are not indifferent to the fate and formation of trade union organs in the Armed Forces.

Georgian Earthquake: Military Not at Fault

91UM0646A Moscow KASNAJA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 May 91 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Major General V. Bocharov, seismologist of the USSR Defense Ministry, by Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev; place and date not given: "Earthquake To Order—Nonsense!"]

[Text] Among the first to come to the assistance of the victims of the earthquake in Georgia were, as is known, the military. They freed injured people from the rubble and shared their bread and, sometimes, their blood also. But, astonishingly, it is they at whom some people in the republic have leveled the absurd, monstrous charge of having initiated the blind impulse.

Our correspondent met with Major General V. Bocharov, leading seismological expert of the USSR Defense Ministry, doctor of technical sciences, professor, and USSR State Prize winner.

[Falichev] Vladimir Semenovich, rumors concerning the fact that the earthquake was caused by the military are being whipped up in Georgia. What is the nature of these dreadful phenomena?

[Bocharov] Earthquakes are a form of the pulsed release of the energy of elastic deformations arising during tectonic processes within the earth. The earth is a living planet. The processes of mountain folding are continuing inside it, but we frequently do not notice them. The majority of earthquakes are, I stress, the consequence of a sudden shift along a fault line of individual blocks of the earth's core. An even release of seismic energy, which has not changed with the start of underground nuclear testing, has been observed in the 80 years of regular instrument observations. That is, it can be said that the number of earthquakes and the nature of them are independent of man's technogenic activity....

[Falichev] And there is no connection between underground nuclear testing and earthquakes?

[Bocharov] The observations not only of Soviet scientists but of scientists of the United States, with many of whom I am acquainted, do not confirm this connection. There is not a single scientist who adheres to a different viewpoint. Why? Because this is an experimentally confirmed fact. After all, earthquake density was monitored prior to the testing of nuclear weapons and during our 18-month moratorium and after it. The earthquake flow density, as scientists say, has remained as before. Nor has there been any change in the number of major earthquakes. I would remind you of just one detail. The last nuclear tests were conducted in our country as

follows: on 19 October of last year in Semipalatinsk and on 24 October of last year on Novaya Zemlya. As you can see, a fair amount of time has elapsed since then.

Nor could there have been any accidental explosions. I have worked in underground nuclear test monitoring groups and I know how sensitive the equipment is, both that of the Americans and ours, recording the slightest tremors in the earth. Concealing this is simply impossible. It is said that the Soviet military has the technology for triggering earthquakes; this is simply absurd. Neither the seismic department of the USSR Defense Ministry nor the USSR Academy of Sciences recorded any seismic sources in the area of the Caucasus on the threshold of this earthquake. Yet we pick up explosions even of kilotons in Nevada, that is, at the other end of the earth.

[Falichev] Speaking on television, the president of Georgia said that the military could have used a super-powerful "geophysical" weapon. What can you say in this connection?

[Bocharov] I have only come across talk about geophysical weapons in science fiction publications. No work involving geophysical weapons is being performed in the Defense Ministry, to my knowledge. We do not recognize them as corresponding to morality inasmuch as they impact not the army of the enemy or his equipment but whole regions of the earth. Their creation is altogether pointless. The entire territory of the earth, of our country included, has been zoned as a subject of the strength of earthquakes. Thus there will be no earthquake registering more than five on level land. But in the region of Georgia the heightened seismic danger constitutes up to seven or eight points.

Zoning, incidentally, is a part of the SNIP—construction norms and rules. Had they been observed in our country at the time of construction, there might not have been such consequences. We recall the earthquake of similar strength in San Francisco. The skyscrapers were not hit. That is, the added pointlessness of geophysical weapons is that they are easily countered by normal construction.

Nor can earthquakes be induced from space or by any other methods.

[Falichev] What, then, in your view, was the purpose of such groundless accusations against the army?

[Bocharov] Many illogical statements, which are connected with purely political motives, are being made today, from my viewpoint. This statement also, evidently, was politically beneficial for exacerbating relations with the center even further. I, as a scientist, am amazed at the airiness with which such statements are being made today.

Factors Contributing to British Troop Quality, Morale

91UM04574 Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 22, Nov 90 p 79-83

[Article, published under the heading "The World Today," by Col V. Krysko, doctor of psychological sciences: "Are the 'Tommies' Steadfast in Battle?"]

[Text] When in August 1990 announcements appeared in Great Britain on the deployment of several thousand servicemen to the Persian Gulf Area to aid their ally, the United States, the nation showed a sharply increased interest in the events which seemingly were already past history. It was the question of the large-scale transporting and combat operations of tens of thousands of Tommies (a nickname of English soldiers,—Editors) to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in the course of the 1982 Anglo-Argentine conflict.

This largest British troop operation since World War II has undergone a critical reassessment. The time of the victorious drum beating is over, the wave of ultrapatriotism and chauvinism on which certain circles in London were wagering has declined and the English more and more often are asking the question: what sort of army do they now need in light of the positive changes on the European Continent?

These ideas have involuntarily been brought to mind by the recent screening of the play "Destruction" on the military conflict over the Falklands. The then British Secretary of State for Defense J. Nott has stated: "The actions of the soldiers and officers on the Falklands are an honor to the professionalism of the English Army and confirm the high degree of readiness of its personnel." And the Prime Minister, M. Thatcher, subsequently stated repeatedly: "The English Army is one of the strongest in the world."

At present, in line with the movie version of "Destruction," more and more frequently one hears skeptical views of the Tommies and particularly about their moral and psychological stability. The foreign press has concluded that the film brings out all the negative aspects of the military conflict and itself contains "an enormous negative psychological charge."

The specialists consider such critical analysis extremely important in light of the escalation of the presence of the Tommies in the Persian Gulf Zone. Although Prime Minister M. Thatcher, in her words, would have preferred a peaceful resolution to the problem using economic sanctions, she has defended the legitimacy of the possible involvement of the British Armed Forces in a joint military action with the United States against Iraq. London has announced not only an increase of its financial contribution but also the direct involvement in the multinational forces in the region where around 30 countries have sent their subunits.

Recently, London made the decision to shift to the conflict area its armored and infantry subunits. They are armed with 120 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, helicopters, artillery weapons and air defense weapons. The mood of the superior military command in London can be seen from the statement of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Air Force P. Hine who "did not see any reasons why, in addition to the sea blockade of Iraq, an air blockade could also not be organized." Soon thereafter it was organized...

By the end of September, three squadrons of English fighter bombers and several electronic surveillance aircraft had been relocated to the Persian Gulf Zone. It was decided to send to Saudi Arabia one other squadron of Tornado fighter bombers. In the opinion of specialists, the total number of British troops in the region could exceed 20,000 men. This was the largest concentration of English expeditionary forces in the Near East since World War II.

But let us return to the above-mentioned film. It describes the first days of the fighting in the Falklands, when under combat conditions the Tommies, when confronted with the threat of death, tried to avoid combat. Many viewed surrendering as a method of remaining alive and did not consider such an action shameful.

The ending of the film debunks the high views of the British Army. The viewers involuntarily conclude that in a difficult combat situation the Tommies, regardless of strong positive national-psychological features, are inclined to give way to rumors and negative psychological factors, they are capable of panic and despair, to experience serious mental depressions and surrender.

Has it not been for this reason that recently particular attention in the British Armed Forces has been given to intensifying combat training? Here with an emphasis on shaping stronger moral-psychological qualities.

High salaries also contribute, without any doubt, to the psychological stability of the Tommies and the readiness to endure fatiguing drills. A beginning soldier or sailor receives 400 pounds sterling (in the ruble equivalent, 5,000 rubles) a month and women receive 50 pounds less, as they are not trained for serving in combat formations. Sergeants receive the same benefits as officers and these are very extensive. After three or four years of service, an officer is capable of purchasing or building his own free-standing home and completely furnish it. In the event of being discharged into the reserves or retiring, he without fail is given help in finding the proper job.

Lowering the Fear Threshold

Initially in the course of moral and psychological training, a "psychotherapy" is employed for the personnel in creating conditions which cause negative psychological states. Being in a situation close to actual combat, a soldier frequently loses his confidence and

caused by chemical weapons.... This entire story seemed medieval to me but the servicemen looked without any particular discomfort at black and white pictures of blistered arms and shapeless extremities." Such a procedure is called "gradual habituation."

That was in the classroom. And in the field? "A village, or rather the ruins of it, with the bodies of killed persons piled up all around and giving off a nauseating stench. Among the fragments of furniture one could see a child's doll with an arm torn off and on a window frame there fluttered a woman's stocking. Broken dishes were everywhere. On the threshold of the destroyed house lay the body of the mistress of the house with a fractured skull covered in flies and her legs stuck out from under fragments. A fire raged all around, there was thick smoke and explosions rang out." Drills for psychological strength are conducted in specially equipped quarters.

...Upon the command of an instructor, a soldier with his rifle at the ready and fixed bayonet enters a darkened room. In following a beam of light, he moves into the interior. Suddenly, from various sides with a savage shout mechanical dummies simulating the enemy fall on him. The trainee in a few seconds should defeat the "enemy" with his bayonet. There are groans, din and heart-rending cries.... It is felt that in this manner endurance is developed along with the ability, regardless of the fear, to always be ready psychologically for combat and maintain battleworthiness in a stress situation.

These qualities are also developed in various army competitions widely practiced not only in Great Britain but also in NATO as a whole.

Individualists or Collectivists?

How should the soldier collective be formed? English psychologists feel that this is achieved when each person realizes that a soldier who has shown cowardice in combat becomes a "alien in his own squad, he is deprived of its moral and psychological support and inevitably perishes."

Without excluding the possibility of the involvement of the Tommies from the British Expeditionary Corps in hostilities in the Persian Gulf Zone (certainly a war can also start by accident!), the English again and again are analyzing the results of the Falkland Operation. The sociologists and psychologists are particularly interested in the sociopsychological processes which arose at that time in the subunits. Conclusions? On the one hand, the British servicemen showed a rather strong group cohesiveness and mutual aid developed on the basis of military traditions and national character. Also important is the fact that in the Royal Army, the period of service in one subunit is rather long.

This, of course, tells on the desire of the Tommies not to disgrace themselves in combat in front of their fellow servicemen. The fear of being in moral isolation because of cowardice is developed, as a rule, continuously just as is the faith in the obligatory aid of a mate developed by

age-old traditions. With good reason in speaking about the solidarity of the British, the magazine *SOLDIER* emphasizes that they go into battle "for their comrades and go with them. They are not thinking about strategy or policy but are concerned for their comrades."

On the other hand, it is usually felt that as a whole a feeling of collectivism is not inherent to the English servicemen. In our days, the Englishman is "the least social person" in comparison with the sociable Frenchman or the calculating but friendly German. Is the Tommie actually a hundred-percent individualist? No! The same Falklands, the experience of which is now being so closely studied, have shown that the English possess an internal collective "cohesion" of significant strength. Particularly in critical situations. This quality of national character can be manifested in the form of stubborn and steadfast actions by the subunits and this to a significant degree compensates for the weak communicative qualities of the individual servicemen.

It has also been pointed out that the ability of the English to act together to a definite degree has been aided by the tradition of participating in collective types of sports. This is their favorite pastime at home, in college and in the military units.

Considering these factors, the British Command has paid attention to developing "group integration," and has endeavored to prevent the development of conflicts and improper relations in the troop collectives and shows a careful approach to their manning and unity.

The extended service of the rank-and-file (6 years and more), the rotating of entire units and subunits (this applies primarily to the British Rhine Army stationed in West Germany and is one of the largest and most battleworthy English troop contingents), manning along national lines (there are units and subunits in which only English, only Welsh or only Scots serve) and the presence of steady ties following the principle of ties among persons from the same region.... These factors, in the opinion of the command, help to develop among the personnel such moral and psychological qualities as a corporative spirit, mutual aid and a collective strength and make it possible to develop their national tendency for order, discipline and organization.

National Features

From history it is known that the innate habit of the English for obedience and the firm will of the command brought about successful combat. Hence the special demands made on officers. They are taught to be an example of firmness of spirit in the exercise and in combat and not to lose their heads in a critical situation. In line with this, innovations particular to only the Royal Army are being introduced. Thus, not so long ago on the TOE of the subunits the "sisters of charity" appeared and these should not be confused with medical nurses. These are women who are specially trained or have experience in pedagogical work and who should introduce "calmness in the actions of the men and stimulate their courage."

Nor have nationalistic attitudes been discarded. Incidentally, the English are not fond of admitting that these exist. Relying on such a trait of English national character as the veneration of history, the army leadership has endeavored to introduce into the awareness of the personnel a belief in the superiority of the "English way of life" and the British nation as a whole. For this purpose, they extol in every possible way the idea of the former "greatness of England," and efforts are made to link up the romance of the colonial campaigns of the past with future service in overseas territories in our days. In the English barracks, there is the saying: "The army is maintained on regimental traditions and discipline."

The traditions of the troops of the former colonial empire are propagandized very actively. In the press military historical traditions are termed the "cementing basis of the English Army." Education in traditions, the forming of a so-called "regimental spirit" and the desire to imitate the "heroic predecessors" make a profound impression on the ideology and actions of the servicemen. They have a good knowledge of the history of their unit and respect it earnestly. They are convinced of the exceptional importance of their military profession and their purpose.

A vivid feature in the life of the troops and the population points where they are stationed are the military ritualistic measures honoring the commemorative dates of military history. These help to strengthen among the personnel confidence in the permanency of the traditional foundations of the Armed Forces. Military symbols also serve this purpose. On the military emblems, as before, one can see the army crests and insignias which glorified the colonial campaigns of the Royal Army. For example, the sphinx recalls the colonization of Egypt. The tiger is in memory of the conquests in India.

At the basis of an absolute majority of the traditions lies the cult of the monarch and the oath obliges the soldiers and officers to serve him loyally. Loyalty to the Queen is considered the main criterion for not only the "reliability" of the serviceman, but also his moral makeup.

"Serve in Order to Lead"

One of the manuals for future English officers states: "In serving others, you win respect for yourself; do everything possible to understand how you command; spare no effort in defending the interests of subordinates; be ready to sacrifice your life for the sake of this; only in this manner can one become a real commander."

The military schools use special tests for determining the abilities to be a leader and win the confidence of subordinates. Thus, the officer school at Sandhurst has adopted the motto "serve in order to lead." The future officers are taught to establish contact with the sergeants and soldiers and how to analyze their problems. It is felt that a commander should always be informed about family life, problems and so forth. In exercises they model possible conflict situations in the troop collectives and the ways to resolve them are examined.

All of this makes it possible to teach the officer the habits of practical activity to unify the subunits assigned to them and helps to maintain a normal moral and psychological climate in the collectives of English servicemen. Ultimately the rank-and-file develop a respect for their officer who has communicative and organizational qualities.

Along with trust in their commander the English servicemen steadily develop a confidence in their weapons. The press regularly publishes statements by servicemen of various categories that the British military equipment is the "best." On the pages of the journal *SOLDIER*, Maj Gen G. Swinburne has written: "When previously I looked at our tanks, I wanted to cry as they were so slow and awkward. In contrast to them, the Challenger is like a good boxer who quickly moves in and hits you in the nose before you can do anything."

The "realistic training" program also holds an important place in the system of psychological training. In the course of this, the British servicemen receive detailed information on the particular features of the moral and political state of the personnel and the combat potential of the Eastern European countries. Under the current conditions of the change in the military-political situation in Eastern Europe, the intensity of the exercises for the purpose of "intimidating" the soldiers and officers has in no way declined. They constantly organize mobile exhibits of examples of Soviet military equipment and weapons and explain their performance. A journal is published entitled *THREAT* and this serves as an educational aid for the program of "realistic training."

In the moral and psychological training of the British Armed Forces there is a prevailing preference for conservative, old methods, although more progressive forms are being introduced as adopted in the other NATO countries. The widespread national trait of conservatism is clearly making itself felt.

The forming of a readiness to fight, a moral and psychological endurance as well as high pay and diverse benefits for the servicemen—all of this pursues a clear aim of having a professional army which is capable of carrying out any tasks in the military-political interests of the ruling circles of the nation and NATO.

...From the shores of "foggy Albion" C-130 transport aircraft are taking off delivering new subunits of British soldiers across a gigantic air bridge to the burning sands of Arabia. What awaits these fellows in the near future? Time will tell.

For now, the army psychologists are quickly making corrections in their recommendations on overcoming the possible stresses and psychological discomfort where at times shimmering mirages arise on the horizon in the stifling heat. But the prospect of the involvement of the English Tommies, like the American GIs, in fighting is in no way a mirage.

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Small Professional Lithuanian Army Supported

91UM06321 Vilnius *VECHERNIYE NOVOSTI*
in Russian No. 28, 15 Feb 91 p. 3

[Article by lawyer and Captain of the Reserves S. Valaitis "Does Lithuania Need an Army?"]

[Text] This question can be answered with another question: what kind of army? A large (relative to the numerical size of the population) well-armed (particularly with heavy offensive weapons) army based on universal mandatory military service is probably not needed. A small volunteer national guard, well trained, mobile, and lightly armed is another matter.

Any independent state has its own army at its disposal. Even in tiny Liechtenstein there are 12 guardsmen and about 200 policemen. The purpose of an army is to guard the state border, protect the country against foreign attack, and safeguard the Constitution and government. Change of government is a normal process if it is done peacefully and constitutionally.

I think that the independent Lithuanian Republic also needs a small professional army formed on a voluntary hiring basis. Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers are strapping, solid people in a modern-looking uniform. A man must be at least 175 centimeters tall to be accepted into the army. This kind of army would not be expensive to maintain and would always be ready to carry out sensible and legal orders.

Anyone interested only in general's epaulets and broad stripes rather than the fate of the people and state will show that the army should be large, regular, recruited, because it is less costly and moreover we are surrounded by strong states that are hostile toward us. But in such circumstances it would be much wiser to maintain a policy of neutrality, and it would mean that a large army would be more dangerous. If the state leaders really do want peace and are not eager for foreign territory. No matter how many politicians may stand on high tribunes and talk about peace and agreement, they will not be believed if the country is bristling with weapons. A large army entails costs that are beyond our budget. For it is maintained at someone else's expense. Usually it is necessary to cut spending on science, culture, public health and other spheres that the generals regard as "secondary." Moreover, soldiers make up the healthiest and most able-bodied section of the population. So why have them killing time playing at soldiers on training sites and in barracks? It would be a pity to throw the money in the treasury to the wind to support physically strong men. Better that they work at the factories and fill the stores shelves with goods.

In short, a cultural and rich but small state also needs a small army, but one that is well trained. As a rule, large but poor and culturally impoverished countries maintain enormous armies. They are aggressive because they envy rich neighbors and want to live at their expense. And

enormous masses of the population are diverted from creative labor, not to mention the expenses associated with this.

So often the spending on an army in no way justifies the hopes placed in it.

People of the older generation remember what a large (relative to size of population) and, for the times, well-equipped army brought for Lithuania. It in no way justified what was spent on it. During the war of 1919-1920 the Poles took Vilnius and the surrounding area without too much resistance, and in 1939-1940 it surrendered the entire country to the Soviet Union without a shot being fired. You may say that it was the government and short-sighted diplomats who were to blame for that. In part it was. But that is a subject for another article. It was the bickering and envy and ambition and concern for their own warm bailiwick that led to the collapse not only of the erstwhile might of the Lithuania of the Middle Ages but also subsequently of independent Lithuania between the wars.

In 1940 the Lithuanian army seemed solid enough: 24,000 men, 1,500 noncommissioned officers, 1,000 officers and generals. Add to that 3,500 border troops and 4,000 police, not to mention the 100,000 *Sauliai* [riflemen]. This was the force that was called on to defend the homeland. Truly excessive amounts were being spent to maintain the army: 49,699,000 litai [Lithuanian currency] in 1925 (19.5 percent of national income), 49,089,000 litai in 1928 (17.5 percent of national income), 55,919,000 litai in 1930 (17.44 percent), 48,987,000 in 1933 (19.62 percent), 65,450,000 litai in 1935 (23.65 percent), 76,853,000 litai in 1936 (25.57 percent), 81,374,000 litai in 1937 (25.37 percent), 85,183,000 litai in 1938 (23.26 percent), and 85,880,000 litai in 1939 (24.08 percent). To judge from those figures Lithuania was one of the most militarized countries in Europe. In those times spending for the war departments in Hitler's Germany was only 21 percent of national income, even though it was precisely at that time that preparations were being made for a colossal war. So that great spending does not always signify great achievements.

It is essential to learn the lessons of history. Whoever fails to do that is doomed to make mistakes again and again, and repeated mistakes cost more.

It costs the state at least R2,500 annually to maintain one soldier undergoing compulsory military duty (not counting spending on weapons). It is easy to calculate what it costs to maintain an army of 10,000, 20,000, or 30,000 men. Add to this the base cost of modern weapons. One tank costs about \$20 million (dollars, not rubles).

But the maintenance of a small volunteer army is much less costly. Moreover, instead of real service a recruited force of soldiers only counts the days until demobilization and breaks the equipment that it cannot properly

handle. For a volunteer, army service is a worthy profession and a source of subsistence. Therefore he seriously studies the equipment and weapons and takes care of them.

I think that Lithuania needs a hired, volunteer army made up of no more than 5,000 servicemen. It could include border posts, a service to guard places of detention, and a national guard deployed in the major cities.

Military Outposts Under Attack in Transcaucasus

91UM0632B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian / May 91 First Edition p 1

["Own correspondent" report: "They Have Not Grown Tired of Killing Each Other"]

[Text] Transcaucasus—On 3 March an army outpost in the area of Malyy Agdam in the Azerbaijan SSR was defended against a group of bandits from the territory of the neighboring republic. Automatic grenade launchers were used during the fighting. Troops seized a home-made 82-millimeter mortar and shells for it at the place where the bandits had taken up their position.

During the night of 4 May another outpost came under fire, this time in the area of the Azerbaijan populated point of Ashagy-askipar. The gang was dispersed with answering fire. On 5 May unknown assailants opened fire on personnel going to do their shift on guard. This occurred in the area of Echmiadzik city. We see that this is on Armenian territory. Junior Sergeant O. Nuriyev and Private Z. Arutunyan were wounded.

The operational situation in the Kazakhskiy, Tauzskiy, and a number of other rayons in various regions of Azerbaijan is becoming more complicated.

Meanwhile, the Armenian Council of Ministers Presidium has issued instructions to the directors of major industrial enterprises, scientific research institutes, and design institutes to hold themselves in readiness to dispatch self-defense detachments to border areas. Local newspapers are spattered with materials on Azerbaijan's "aggression" against Armenia with the support of troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Soviet Army.

What is this, preparing public opinion for the need for wide-ranging combat actions? But then, how are we to understand the report carried on television stating that the chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, V. Makunyan, has appealed to the chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, B. Yeltsin, asking him to use his influence to halt the conflict between the two republics? The conflict has already moved into a spiral of escalation, but the seats at the negotiating table are alas still empty.

Col-Gen Makashov for RSFSR President

91UM0656A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by Major I. Korotkikh: "From Sverdlovsk—Colonel General A. Makashov Is Nominated as a Candidate for President"]

[Text] A meeting of representatives of military units has taken place at the Sverdlovsk Garrison. The servicemen nominated a number of candidates to make up an initiative group to collect signatures in support of a candidate for the post of president of Russia—the commander of the Volga-Ural Military District, Colonel General A. Makashov.

Azerbaijan National Security Council Created

91UM0656B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 May 91 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed AZERINFORM-TASS report: "From Baku—A National Security Council Is Created"]

[Text] A national security council has been set up under the President of Azerbaijan.

According to the ukase issued by the head of the Azerbaijani state and published in the republic newspapers, this consultative body has been assigned the task of drawing up recommendations in the field of the republic's defense, protection of its state and territorial integrity, maintaining economic and ecological security, and dealing with the consequences of emergency situations.

The council includes the prime minister, the chairman of the organizing committee for the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], and leaders of the public health organs, military commissariat and republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Volkogonov Opposes Idea of 'Russian' Army

91UM0656C Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 6,
Feb 91 p 5

[Interview with Col. Gen. Dmitriy Volkogonov, RSFSR people's deputy, by SOYUZ special correspondent Andrey Tugay; place and date not given: "B. Yeltsin's New Adviser"]

[Text] Some days ago Dmitriy Volkogonov, Colonel General of the Soviet Army and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] people's deputy, was offered the post of defense and security adviser to the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet. SOYUZ special correspondent Andrey Tugay met with Yeltsin's new adviser.

[Tugay] Among the "stumbling blocks" in relations between the Russian and central leaderships a special place is occupied by the idea of creating a Russian army. What is your attitude toward such plans?

[Volkogonov] I have no doubt that it is essential to guarantee the security and sovereignty of Russia. But to achieve this by creating our own armed formations is wrong from both the political and the economic standpoint.

If we are seriously thinking of creating a Russian armed force then this is the question that will inevitably arise: Against whom will they be directed? Against America, against NATO? Their only purpose would be to oppose the Union, and that would really bring us closer to civil war. This cannot be permitted. Also, from the economic standpoint we cannot create our own army. The minimum figure that we would need to create a republic armed force would be 35 billion rubles [R] to R40 billion. We would simply be burdening Russia with even greater poverty.

The army should remain unified, under a single Union command. However, Russia, whose citizens make up almost three-fourths of army personnel and on whose territory the greater part of armed objects are located, does have a right to claim a greater role in building the Union Armed Forces and in influencing them. In particular I believe that it is advisable for the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to be a member of the country's Defense Council. Perhaps it would also be quite logical to include in the Defense Council the leaders of other Union republics. This step would immediately give new status to the Soviet Armed Forces: their task would be not only to defend the Union but also to guarantee the security of each individual republic. Similar steps should also be taken with respect to the military councils of armies, fleets, and districts. In each of them one place today is reserved for the first secretary of the oblast committee or kray committee on whose territory the troops are stationed. It is essential that instead of them, the leaders of the corresponding soviets of people's deputies be members of the military councils.

[Tugay] Does it not worry you to hear the accusations made against Russia that it is "pulling too much" of the army blanket over to its own side?

[Volkogonov] The role of Russia and the Russian parliament with respect to the army has been depicted recently in an increasingly distorted light. The measures to which I referred would promote better cooperation between state and military organs.

Few people are aware that several pieces of legislation are now being debated in the Russian parliament that would enable some social problems of servicemen to be resolved and the most painful results of the cutbacks in the USSR Armed Forces to be mitigated. We plan to support an initiative from a number of officers to offer a union of reserve officers, and we are prepared to set up land and certain resources to those who want to set up agricultural cooperatives and farms after they have been demobilized. I personally receive many letters from

servicemen who, given certain guarantees, are prepared to take part in the rebirth of the Russian countryside.

[Tugay] In these last months the question of transferring the oblast administrations of the USSR KGB on republic territory to the jurisdiction of the republic has been constantly raised...

[Volkogonov] This problem is still being examined but I think that some decision like that will be reached. In accordance with the decisions of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the security organs will evidently be reformed in proper fashion and will constitute a second important element in the republic's security system. It is possible that within the framework of Russia's new Committee for Defense and Security, perhaps even outside its framework, a special service will also be created to do cleanup work after natural calamities and technological and ecological catastrophes. We are obliged to resolve interethnic conflicts only by political means. In an extreme case we would use specially trained subunits set up exclusively on a volunteer basis and be able to operate during the course of civil disorders. But they must be professionals, not the 18-year-old kids who are now being thrown into the hell of interethnic conflicts.

[Tugay] Have you presented your own ideas to the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet?

[Volkogonov] Naturally Boris Nikolayevich is aware of my concept of security, and he largely shares it. However, the new chairman of the State Committee for Defense and Security, Colonel General Konstantin Kobets, has yet to present it to the parliament. In general terms the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the republic prime minister also support it.

[Tugay] Now that you have become adviser to the Supreme Soviet chairman do you plan to step down from parliamentary activity?

[Volkogonov] No, I will continue to work in the Supreme Soviet, and not only as a deputy but also as one of the leaders of the Left Center. My convictions are democratic in nature and I consider it my main task to participate as strongly as possible in "switching" the activity of the parliament from the sphere of political confrontation to the plane of constructive dialogue.

I have no doubt that in the event of a direct confrontation in society one of the sides may even gain a "victory," but it will be a Pyrrhic one, and afterwards there will be nothing left but ashes. Let me remind you that in our history most of the Russian reforms have failed because the policies at those times were dominated by extreme positions and extreme programs. For the success of any transformation in Russia what is needed is a liberal-democratic center that would be able to help everyone move step by step toward mutual agreement. I think that both the Russian parliament and the Russian leadership are ready for this.

Breakdown, Commentary on 1991 Defense Expenditures

91UM0561A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Jan 91 p 4

[Article, published under the heading "The Economy," by Mikhail Leontyev: "The New USSR Budget, or the Old Method of Ridiculing the Deputies"]

[Text] For the first time the new draft of the 1991 USSR Budget submitted for approval to the Supreme Soviet has been drawn up in a spirit of glasnost, and it sets out in detail the specific expenditure items and, what is particularly noticeable, the expenditures on defense and foreign aid.

A mere glance at the published masterpiece of glasnost (Appendix 8) is sufficient to finally and officially confirm the fact about which the CIA has been talking for so many years: these are not the defense expenditures of the Soviet nation but rather the estimate of the Ministry of Defense. In the United States it is possible to simply calculate the expenditures on the purchase of weapons and have done with it. While the private firms carrying out military orders, as a rule, are not financed from the state budget, it is hardly necessary to explain to anyone that in the USSR military expenditures the investments into the defense industry (the so-called "nine") producing over two-thirds of the value of the gross product comprise a large portion of not only the defense expenditures but also the total expenditures of the state. These

expenditures, as is clear, are concealed in the "off-budget" stabilization fund formed by presidential ukase.

Also set out in the draft is the aid to foreign states.

The happy deputy can learn that our aid to Poland and Benin is 10,000 (ten thousand) rubles. In the column of the total aid, two lines stand out: 55 million rubles for Cuba (everything is in the column "Special Aid") and 280 million rubles for Afghanistan (everything in the column "Economic Aid"). The natural question arises: how is it that we have no economic aid for Cuba? Or special aid for Afghanistan? In what entries are these funds concealed?

Supervision over the expenditure of state funds is the chief function of any parliament from the moment it appears in the world as a political institution. The Soviet Parliament, as was pointed out by Deputy Konstantin Lubchenko, has never supervised these expenditures. Clearly, it will not do so now.

We live in a world of realities roughly copied in pencil from the shiny cover of a foreign magazine. In the USSR, where there have been no direct, equal and multiparty elections, we are informed that we have a popularly elected parliament. The Minister of Finances Valentin Popov has shown this parliament in the American manner a detailed financial document where there is not more than one-half of the expenditure portion and a significant share of the income is not realistically depicted. And this is called a state budget. In actuality, we have neither a budget nor finances. And what Minister Popov administers is termed not finances but by some other word.

Appendix to USSR Law on 1991 Union Budget

Military Expenditures

Purchase of weapons and military equipment	R 39,650,000,000
Purchasing of defense-end scientific-technical products	R 12,403,000,000
Support of Army and Navy	R 31,034,000,000
Including:	
Pay of servicemen and wages of workers and white collar personnel employed in organizations of USSR Ministry of Defense	R 8,300,000,000
Food supply	R 4,300,000,000
Purchase of uniforms	R 1,900,000,000
Repair and manufacturing of weapons and military equipment at self-financing enterprises of USSR Ministry of Defense	R 3,300,000,000
Transport costs	R 1,500,000,000
Leasing of electrical communications equipment	R 800,000,000
Ruble cover for expenditures in foreign exchange	R 3,200,000,000
Other expenditures (military and operational training, routine repairs and upkeep of weapons and military equipment in the troops, billeting expenditures, medical and sanatorium-resort support, support of scientific research organizations, routine repair and upkeep of special purpose facilities, command posts, rocket launching facilities and so forth)	R 4,700,000,000
Serviceman insurance	R 300,000,000
Capital construction	R 6,243,000,000
Including:	

Appendix to USSR Law on 1991 Union Budget (Continued)

Housing and dormitories	R2,600,000,000
Social and cultural-service buildings	R900,000,000
Production-, special- and general-troop-end buildings and structures	R1,400,000,000
Including	
Production construction facilities	R200,000,000
Purchase of construction equipment	R200,000,000
Special-purpose and general troop facilities	R1,000,000,000
Major overhaul	R400,000,000
Serviceman pensions	R4,064,000,000
Program of social support for servicemen	R3,265,846,000
Including	
For increasing pay of all categories of servicemen	R3,165,846,000
For improving food support of regular servicemen	R100,000,000
Expenditures on nuclear weapons for all combat arms	R1,903,000,000
Total	R98,562,846,000
Total reduction expenditures	R2,000,000,000
Considering reduction	R96,562,846,000

Note: The USSR Ministry of Defense together with the USSR Ministry of Finances is to determine what types of military expenditures are to be reduced by 2 billion rubles.

Obituary: Major General A.A. Makarov

91UM04994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Mar 91 First Edition p 4

[Obituary: "A.A. Makarov"]

[Text] Participant in the Great Patriotic War, Major General Aleksandr Alekseyevich Makarov (retired) has died suddenly at the age of 74. He devoted his entire conscious life to selfless service of the socialist Motherland and the cause of the Communist Party, of which he was a member from 1940.

A.A. Makarov was born on 23 April 1917 in the village of Chernovskaya in Pestyakovskiy Rayon, Ivanovo Oblast. From 1938 he served in the Armed Forces, within whose ranks he rose from trainee in a regimental school to the rank of major-general.

When the Great Patriotic War broke out A.A. Makarov was in the army in the field. He fought on the Northwest, Voronezh, first Ukrainian, third Baltic, and second Belorussian fronts. In the complex conditions of combat he displayed courage and bravery and the ability to inspire people by his personal example. He ended the war carrying out the duties of deputy chief of the political directorate in a rifle division.

During the postwar years A.A. Makarov graduated from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and later held the posts of deputy chief of the cadre section in the Baltic Military District, chief of the cadre section in the Leningrad Military District, and chief of the cadre administration in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Moscow Military District.

In all areas of work A.A. Makarov devoted all his strength and knowledge to enhancing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. He was distinguished by his elevated sense of responsibility for his assignments, his exceptional love of work, competence, and his responsiveness and closeness to people.

For his services to the Motherland A.A. Makarov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, the Labor Red Banner, the Order of the Great Patriotic War First Degree (twice), the Order of the Red Star (three times), and the Order of the "Mark of Honor," and he also received a number of awards from foreign states.

The bright memory of Aleksandr Alekseyevich will live forever in our hearts.

[Signed] D.T. Yazov, V.F. Yermakov, V.F. Arapov, O.A. Komarov, A.K. Mironov, A.P. Khanin, N.V. Kalinin, A.I. Makunin, A.A. Golovnev, L.S. Zolotov, A.K. Burtzen, V.N. Pivovarov, V.S. Kurnyshov, G.F. Samoylovich, V.V. Volkov.

Lt Gen Petukhov Interviewed on Military Court System

91UM04998 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Mar 91 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Lieutenant General of Legal Services N. Petukhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel R. Makushin: "The Military Court Today", place and date not given]

[Text]

[Makushin] Nikolay Aleksandrovich, in the mail to the editor we have recently been seeing quite a lot of letters showing readers' interest in what the military courts are. Some even say that the military courts are something uncommon, almost special tribunals. Is this so?

[Petukhov] Of course not. The fact is that people are uninformed: In general, little is written about us. The military courts function fully in accordance with the USSR Constitution and are guided by the same laws as the general courts, including the laws of the Union republics. The USSR Supreme Court, the highest judicial body of the state, oversees their activity and any case in the military courts, whether it is complaints or a protest from the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, can be reviewed by a plenum of the USSR Supreme Court. And this is one of the main guarantees of legality in the activity of the military courts. The only difference between military and civil courts is that the military courts function within the USSR Armed Forces.

[Makushin] Today, the situation in the country with respect to crime is well known. Unfortunately, the problem of eradicating crime in the Armed Forces also remains acute. In this connection, how do you see the tasks for the military courts and the USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium today?

[Petukhov] Well, in any event the tasks that we face are the same: insuring compliance with the law and restoring justice. We are most worried by cases involving the deaths of servicemen and crimes committed in the area of non-regulation relations, of which the most notorious is "dedovshchina," the hazing of new conscripts by the old hands.

In my opinion, the majority of the military courts deal properly with cases connected with these categories of crime. Indeed, the Military Collegium pays great attention to these matters. Last year alone our judges attended military tribunals at the local level 16 times to familiarize themselves with legal practice in this category of cases. And if we talk about the complaints we receive, in one out of every four cases the collegium demands that the criminal case be sent to them for review. And all cases connected with the deaths of servicemen are called in on a mandatory basis. You will agree that this is serious work. For us one very important task is to correct legal errors. In 1990 the Military Collegium altered court decisions with respect to 162 defendants.

[Makushin] Obviously the work of the Military Collegium and the military courts is not merely to punish crime but also to prevent it, is it not?

[Petukhov] A priority, I would say. We demand that while exercising undeviating compliance with the law, the courts take all steps in every case to establish as fully as possible the reasons and conditions which furthered the commission of the crime, and that they respond in a principled manner to each violation by submitting it to particular determination and trying to eliminate the causes. Pardon me, but I am again forced to resort to dry

figures. About 30 percent of verdicts are announced in command orders. Some 60 percent of criminal cases are disposed of in military units and aboard ships in the presence of personnel. But figures are figures, and we still have many problems. But of course, in principle the causes of crime in the Armed Forces are the same as in the country. But crime in the Army and Navy has its own internal causes. For example, violations by officials of the demands of the regulations in the organization of service or maintaining order in the everyday life of servicemen, or lack of concern for subordinates and control over them, or indecisiveness in cutting short violations of military discipline, and many other things. But the most worrisome thing here is that according to research data, in only two percent of cases (imagine it) do the victims offer resistance to violators of the law, and in only eight percent of cases do they report what has happened to the command.

[Makushin] Nikolay Aleksandrovich, which crimes today are what we might call the most widespread?

[Petukhov] In general, from 1983 convictions declined steadily. Unfortunately, in 1989-1990 there was an upsurge. And so, in answer to your question, the great increase in convictions has occurred on evasion of military service. Crime connected with this phenomenon has increased even more. Last year it doubled. Moreover, those who evaded military service committed about another 2,000 crimes of various kinds. But if we talk about the reasons for evasion, then they are quite well known.

[Makushin] Nikolay Aleksandrovich, what you are talking about are trends in the activity of the military courts associated with today's realities. But surely the Military Collegium is also dealing with the rehabilitation of victims of the Stalinist repressions, is it not?

[Petukhov] Yes. And this is one of the most important directions in our activity. The collegium started this work way back in 1953, and has been constantly engaged in it. For example, in 1989 alone the Military Collegium reviewed more than 1,000 cases involving 1,118 persons. This work is very complicated and painstaking. Indeed, what could be more important than restoring a person's good name? Unfortunately, not everyone has a proper attitude toward this work, and claims are often lodged against the Military Collegium, particularly in those cases—and there are quite a few of them—in which rehabilitation is refused. Alas! when talking about this aspect of the Military Collegium's activity even your newspaper permitted what was a vexing inaccuracy for you in publishing the piece entitled "I Did Not Betray the Motherland. The Story of One Rehabilitation" on 30 January this year. The piece stated that an official from the secretariat of the USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium should have passed his materials on a rehabilitation to the military tribunal in the district in order for the collegium to make a ruling, but he did not do so. And it was for this reason, you said, that the man suffered. That is not so. That same "official" did do his

job efficiently, and a report was received to the effect that the materials had arrived at their destination. Thus, if discrepancy did occur, it had nothing to do with the Military Collegium. It does no good to insult people.

[Makushin] Nikolay Aleksandrovich, the editorial office apologizes to you and to the associates of the Military Collegium and hopes that this will clear up the misunderstanding. And since we are talking about the press, I would like to ask this. The Army is being subjected to sharp and often unjustified criticism in the mass media. This and many other things sometimes generate in servicemen and members of their families a feeling of confusion and vulnerability. In your opinion, is there any real justification for this feeling?

[Petukhov] Alas! yes. It must be stated candidly that social and legal safeguards for servicemen do not now correspond with the demands being made by life. Well, for example, the procedure for complaints by servicemen about the actions of officials in the Armed Forces is laid down in the standards of the Disciplinary Regulations, according to which a serviceman submits his complaints about unlawful actions by commanders (chiefs) to the command, that is, an administrative procedure for dealing with complaints is provided for a given range of mutual relations. This situation infringes on the right of servicemen to legal defense. In order to eliminate this injustice, in his well-known ukase "On Certain Measures To Strengthen Social and Legal Safeguards for Servicemen" the USSR President proposed that the USSR Supreme Soviet review the question of giving servicemen the right to complain to military tribunals about the unlawful actions of military officials and organs of military control that go beyond statutory relationships and infringe on the rights and personal dignity of servicemen, in accordance with the 2 November 1989 law "On Procedure for Complaining to the Courts About Unlawful Actions by Organs of State Control and Officials Infringing on the Rights of Citizens." Essentially, every condition now exists to create and confirm legal authorities in the Armed Forces, when a majority of the violations of the law taking place in the Army will be placed under reliable legal protection.

[Makushin] That is, this is in the field of legal reform...

[Petukhov] Undoubtedly. Reform of the military courts is already under way in many directions, and naturally there are many problems here. One of the main directions of the reform is to provide complete legal defense for servicemen, which, incidentally, is provided for in the law "On the Status of Servicemen."

In conclusion I would like to note that a draft law "On the Military Courts" has now been drawn up and submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Its basic idea is make the military courts independent and autonomous organs to safeguard legality and justice in the USSR Armed Forces.

Response to IZVESTIYA Series on Officer Corps

91UM0560A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Apr 91
Union Edition p 3

[Article by N. Andreyev: "The Officer Corps: A Postscript to 'Three Letters From the Army'"]

[Text] "Three Letters From the Army" appeared in issues Nos 38, 39 and 40 of IZVESTIYA this year. Their authors, N. Andreyev and V. Litovkin, from the example of one tank division, endeavored to analyze the attitudes and political views of officers in today's Army, their life, routine, service prospects and their notions of the role and place of the Armed Forces in society. The editors received numerous responses to the articles. The letters are now being studied and inevitably will appear on the pages of our newspaper. At the same time, it is essential to continue the discussion about the problems of the Army commenced in the "Three Letters...." Joining in this were the students and instructors at the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze where there was a discussion of the journalist research. We offer to our readers a report on the discussion of the IZVESTIYA articles which has developed into a broad discussion about army problems.

The discussion at the academy occurred several days after the events in Moscow on 28 March. The Army also participated in these. It was with good reason that this question became one of the leading ones in the discussion. Major A. Mineyev voiced the opinion: "The army should not become involved in various sorts of adventures. I have in mind the events in the Baltic and the recent opposition in Moscow." "Currently, the question is being decided who will be victorious: the old forces or the new views. And generally where our country is going," said Capt I. Kozel. "Twenty-eight March showed how harsh is the confrontation in society. And again they endeavored to involve the army in this. The minister of defense announced that around a thousand motor vehicles, drivers and officers had been brought into the city. But I myself saw the military in bulletproof vests and helmets. Where is the truth, where is the lie?" "You know it is an unpleasant feeling how the civilians look at you during such measures," added A. Mineyev. "My wife related what the attitude at work was to these instances. It is becoming disgraceful." "The army is about one percent of the entire population," said I. Kozel. "One percent of the people with weapons which have been made by the people and using funds of the people. This percent does not have the right to determine the fate of 290 million."

"I feel that if we had moved out into the streets of Moscow on 28 March, this could not be viewed as the use of the army against their people," opined Maj Ye. Umanskiy. "In the first place, those 200,000 which participated in the demonstrations are not the people. Secondly, we might have stood there for 24 hours but we would have prevented a second Khodynka. I am not certain that the boy who was caught with a pistol would

Ye. Umanskiy asked the question of those present: "Has the CPSU even given the army antipopular tasks?" They immediately recalled Novocherkassk in 1962 and Karaganda in 1972, when the army was thrown against the people. The Afghan adventure also came to mind. But the opinion was voiced that the communist party was not to blame for this since the decisions were taken by the "upper leaders" without its participation and approval.

The main thing which concerns the officers is the drop in the authority of the army in the eyes of the population. "It is shameful and bitter to feel," said I. Kozel, "how the participation of troops in domestic conflicts causes hostility toward a person in uniform. All the more because the army is being involved in political events and the prestige of our country is undermined." A. Mineyev added: "Gavril Popov put it correctly: the attitude toward the army in our society has recently come down to the mockery of it."

Virtually all the officers asserted that recently the Army had become an instrument of the struggle for power. This can lead to tragedy. Here are the reflections of A. Mineyev on this question: "The army is coming under enormous pressure both from the right and from the left. Certain forces which are losing their positions in our society are doing everything to hang onto them. And since the army is the only firm structure in our society, they are endeavoring to involve it in various political conflicts. These forces are endeavoring to isolate the army from the people and discredit it. For this reason, various provocations are being carried out in the nation. The first provocation was Tbilisi. At that time, the people for the first time realized that the army could fire on them. The next provocation was the Baltic. Everything is being done to snare the army in the crucible of political clashes."

Major Ye. Umanskiy felt: "The army has always been and will be a political scalpel in the hands of the state. If there is no army there is no state. Even such a country as Luxembourg has an army of 660 men. The army carries out the political will of that state which supports it." I. Kozel added: "If the Soviet Army collapses, then our state will cease to exist. Events in Iraq have shown this again. The army after the defeat collapsed and an internecine civil war broke out."

There were sharp statements over the question of the disorderly withdrawal of our troops from the nations of Eastern Europe and the lack of thought given to the reduction of the army. "Take, for instance, the reduction of the army in the former GDR," said V. Terenko, "from 350,000 to 50,000. Chancellor Kohl has stated that around five years would be required for this purpose in order to house the former servicemen, find jobs for them and retrain them. But in our country in a single sweep we cut back a half-million men. I feel that this is an absolutely irresponsible action by the government."

Mention was also made of the professionalization of the army. Among all the officers the attitude toward this was the most affirmative, however they are clearly aware of all the difficulties of converting to professional lines. Domestic problems were also touched upon. Incidentally, nothing new was said in comparison with what was described in the "Three Letters From the Army" on lack of housing or the low standard of living of an officer family. There is also the question of increased prices. Generally, the discussion of this matter was an unhappy one. Lastly, I have intentionally minimized my own commentaries. The army should have its own say about its problems. And its voice should be heard.

Presidential Ukase on Benefits for Local Conflict Veterans

91UM06304 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Apr 92 Union Edition p 3

[Ukase of the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics "On Measures for the Social Rehabilitation and Improvement of the Living Conditions and Standard of Living of Individuals Who Performed Their International Obligations in the Republic of Afghanistan, Members of Their Families, and Other Participants in Local Conflicts Outside the USSR"]

[Text] Measures being taken by state organs with a view to solving problems vital to individuals who performed their international obligations in the Republic of Afghanistan, members of their families, and other participants in local conflicts outside the USSR, are clearly inadequate. Their needs for housing, skilled medical care, and high-quality prostheses are not being fully met. These people experience serious difficulties with job placement, professional training, and improvement of their skills.

The development of a state program aimed at resolving issues associated with improving the life and standard of living of the former servicemen and other individuals who belonged to the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, as well as the families of the fallen soldiers, which was envisaged by a decision of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, has been unjustifiably delayed.

The urgent resolution of these issues will promote the active involvement of individuals who performed their international duty in socio-political and economic transformations in our country.

Taking the above into account, I resolve:

1. To note that the USSR Government has unjustifiably delayed the development of a state program aimed at resolving issues associated with organizing the life and everyday activities of participants in the Afghan events. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers shall complete the development of the program by 1 June 1991.

Comrade V.S. Pavlov shall monitor this issue personally.

2. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers, in cooperation with the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Affairs of Soldier-Internationalists, shall consider the following issues as priority measures prior to the adoption of the state program:

- organization of a scientific-methodological center for the socio-political problems, and medical and psychological rehabilitation of individuals who were members of the contingent of troops in the Republic of Afghanistan, as well as family members of the fallen servicemen;
- development of a system of measures for the professional training, retraining, and improvement of the skills of individuals who performed their international obligations, as well as training in the fundamentals of entrepreneurship in the environment of a transition to a market economy, including practical training in major scientific centers in the country and abroad;
- provision of high-standard prostheses and orthopedic assistance so as to provide, by 1993, means of movement for all handicapped from among the former soldier-internationalists, envisaging the allocation of necessary hard-currency funds to this end;
- creation of an assistance fund for individuals who performed their international obligations outside the USSR, with monies allocated by state organs, public organizations, and citizens with a view to improving the lives and standard of living of the persons indicated;
- creation of conditions for effective economic operations by enterprises organized with the assistance of state organs, or by unions and other voluntary associations of participants in the Afghan events, priority allocation of material resources to them, placement of state orders, provision of long-term credits, and assistance in foreign-economic operations;
- formation of a state organ for the affairs of persons performing their international obligations outside the USSR in order to ensure the coordination of the

efforts of state and public organizations aimed at improving the conditions of life and the standard of living of these individuals; creation of arrangements for the implementation of state and public assistance programs and the involvement of such persons in useful socio-political and economic activities.

3. The USSR Security Council shall take measures to coordinate the efforts of interested ministries and other organs and organizations to locate, liberate, and return to the Motherland Soviet citizens who were taken prisoner or are missing in action in the Republic of Afghanistan.

4. To consider it necessary to give the right to a retirement benefit to one of the parents, spouse, or another person continuously attending to a handicapped individual, regardless of age, when the necessary tenure of employment is present, with a view to improving medical aid and care for former servicemen who became Category I invalids as a result of a wound, concussion, injury, or disease which occurred during the performance of their international obligations.

The USSR Cabinet of Ministers shall prepare proposals for corresponding changes in the legislation on retirement benefits for submission to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

5. To recommend that the governments of the republics, local soviets of people's deputies, ministries and other state organs, public organizations, and charity foundations take additional measures to improve the conditions of life and the standard of living of Soviet citizens who performed their international obligations in the Republic of Afghanistan, members of their families, and other participants in local conflicts outside the USSR.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Moscow, the Kremlin, 25 April 1991

Combat Utility for MiG-29, Su-27 of 'Cobra', 'Bell' Maneuvers

91UM05041 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 4, Jan 91 p 4

[Article by A. Smolyarov: "Why Are 'Cobra' and 'Bell' Needed?"]

[Text] New generation Soviet fighter aircraft, the MiG-29 and Su-27, recently participated in a number of international air shows. The Western press paid the most attention to demonstration flights of these Soviet fighters, whose program included a number of complicated maneuvers, new for jet aircraft, and requiring a high degree of flying skills. Paying due tribute to the superb mastery of the test pilots, Western observers devoted most of their attention to the high maneuverability of the Soviet aircraft.

The demonstration flights of the MiG-29 includes a guided slip to the tail—a "bell." After a vertical climb to 800 - 1,000m, the pilot decreases the thrust of the engines. For a certain time the aircraft continues to climb, but at a decreased rate, and for a second it hangs in the air. Then, a short—around two seconds—tail slide with a vertical speed of 15m/sec. After this the aircraft lowers its nose, goes into a dive, and then pulls out.

The "bell" maneuver demonstrates the high quality of handling and flying performance characteristics of the aircraft and its engines. Even in this situation the turbines continue to work, with "the air inside, as always, entering from the front and exiting from the rear."

Somewhat unexpected for Western observers was the statement by A. Kvochura, the test pilot, that the guided slip to the tail is not only an effective flight maneuver requiring the highest piloting skills, but is also a tactical technique. He said that the "bell" is "a means of creating the appearance that the aircraft has stopped for several seconds, that is, it is a tactical technique to get away from being tracked by a Doppler radar."

No less interest was shown in the first demonstration of a dynamic deceleration of the Su-27 fighter aircraft by test pilot V. Pugachev. Flying horizontally at a speed of 400 - 500 km/hr, the angle of attack is sharply increased to 110 - 120 degrees while the aircraft continues to fly "tail first," reminding one of a cobra preparing to strike. Some three seconds later the aircraft lowers its nose and goes into a normal flight at a considerably lesser speed. This maneuver, called "Pugachev's cobra" by the press, made an indelible impression on experts and fighter pilots of Western countries who were demonstrating their aircraft. As the journal "Aviation Week" wrote, all Western observers were surprised to learn that this same aircraft which performed this maneuver in Paris was taken out of a combat squadron of the Soviet Air Force.

Opinions of Western experts differed, however, on the question of using the "cobra" and "bell" in air combat. One of the American test pilots remarked that

"Pugachev's cobra" can impress people only at an air show, but not from a tactical standpoint. His English colleague retorted that "if the ability to fly at great angles of attack is meaningless, why are American experts establishing a large scientific-research program to try to understand how to achieve what has already been achieved by regular production-model Soviet aircraft?" His view was supported by another Western test pilot who noted that the "cobra" could be used, for example, in close air combat, forcing the enemy to change his pursuit trajectory. "Western fighter aircraft, the F-15, F-16, F-18, 'Mirage-2,000,' and 'Rafael,'" noted the pilot, "are not capable of executing this kind of maneuver, to the dismay of their builders."

There were also more careful pronouncements. Richard Ward, the authoritative specialist on aviation technology, whose opinions appear in the journal "Aerospace America," considers the "cobra" maneuver to be very effective. At the same time he thinks that this maneuver was executed in a "controlled" environment with a light flying weight and without external hardpoints. Regarding the execution of this maneuver in order to escape radar detection, Ward believes that there are other methods of tracking targets in addition to Doppler radar.

As we can see, opinions of Western experts vary with regard to the "cobra" and "bell." They all agree, however, in giving a high evaluation to the exceptionally high maneuverability characteristics of new Soviet fighter aircraft. The French journal "Science et Vie" has an article with the distinctive title, "The High Maneuverability of the Su-27 Fighter Aircraft is Frightening the General Staffs of Western Nations." The article states directly that the problem of super-maneuverability, which is being worked on intensively in the West, has already been resolved by the Su-27 aircraft. In the USA, a high priority research program is devoted to this problem of flying at great angles of attack. Six million dollars were earmarked for this program in fiscal year 1989 and even more in the 1990 fiscal year.

The American journal "Military Technology" notes that some observers thoughtlessly relegated the demonstrated maneuvers to being "air show tricks," which supposedly could be executed by any Western fighter aircraft. But, notes engineer Serdzhio Konilo [transliteration], the author of this article, proof for these self-confident assertions, which had been heard as far back as 1988 when the "bell" was demonstrated by the fighter aircraft MiG-29 at the Farnborough air show, never did materialize. "One gets the impression," concludes Konilo "that the maneuverable aircraft of the next generation that the West dreamed about building apparently already exists, but unfortunately, on the other side of the fence."

Moscow PVO District: 25 Percent of Personnel From Central Asia

91UM0484B Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 1, Jan 91 p 4

[M. Gorbachev report: "The PVO: An Alignment on Central Asia"]

[Text] A group of officers from the Moscow Air Defense [PVO] District has visited Uzbekistan for the purpose of establishing contacts between the military and the soviets of people's deputies in Uzbekistan, local enterprises, schools, tekhnikums, and so forth. The trip is seen as an urgent one today if we bear in mind that some 25 percent of the personnel in the capital's Air Defense District come from Central Asia. Unfortunately, many of the recruits arriving in air defense units from that region have not undergone the proper training because until recently the quality of selection and disposition in the branches of the Armed Forces left something to be desired in Uzbekistan. Proceeding from this, the parties were interested in reaching agreement that representatives of the district together with Uzbek people's deputies and workers in the military registration and enlistment offices will select young men for air defense units giving due consideration to opportunities, wishes, and state of health.

The military people emphasized that service by young men from Central Asia in PVO subunits has two positive aspects: First, the soldiers master professions in which there are shortages in their republics, and second this kind of national compactness makes it possible to organize exchanges of delegations between the troops and the republics, while the young men are able to mark their own national holidays in the army.

Commission Findings on Venice SU-27 Crash

91UM04841 Moscow SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 14 Mar 91 First Edition p 6

[N. Modestov report: "The Final Flight: Tracing the Crash of a Soviet Aircraft Near Venice"]

[Text] A terrible explosion shattered the summer fields. In full view of 40,000 onlookers an SU-27 fighter performing a classic inside loop smashed into the ground and burst into a blazing orange torch. The 46-year-old fighter pilot, Rimas Stankiyavichyus, was killed. The tragedy occurred in the fall of last year not far from the Italian city of Venice. Why did this air catastrophe happen?

The state commission has made a careful study of the details of the catastrophe. The "black box" that records the operation of all assemblies in the SU-27 fighter was found. The film that ends with the aircraft with the identification number 14 disappearing in flame and smoke has played over hundreds of times on the monitor screens. Experts representing various departments, including the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry, the Sukhoi Special Design Bureau, and the Flight Research Institute imeni M. Gromov, have determined the cause of the crash. But before talking about them, first a little about the man who will never fly again.

The fate of Rimas Stankiyavichyus cannot be called an easy one. He dreamed of flying in space and he underwent training along with other crew members and totally mastered the space transport vehicle. But During

ground structural testing of the Soyuz vehicle, an instrument compartment was compressed in such a way that it was deformed. The mission was postponed and Rimas remained on Earth. But others flew. Calm and good-natured as he was, he was always irritated and excited when he remembered that. And so his dream remained just a dream.

Nevertheless, in the history of aviation the name of Stankiyavichyus will always be associated with a breakthrough into the unknown. Together with Hero of the Soviet Union Igor Volkov he made the first flight on the unique Buran vehicle. Stankiyavichyus' personal log is impressive: more than 4,000 hours flying time and qualified on 57 types of aircraft. He was one of the leading pilots at the Moscow complex where the cosmonauts are trained. He joined the "space team" in 1973 from the Armed Forces. At that time Rimas had 25 combat missions in Egypt to his credit, for which he was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

I press the key on the recorder, and I hear the familiar speech of Rimas, with his slight accent

"Everything happened." Rimas sighed, was silent for a while, and then continued: "I even had to eject. During a spin test in a MiG-29 fighter. The aircraft did not come out of the spin despite all my efforts. I waited until 4,000 meters. It was impossible to hold on any longer. I decided to use the antispin rockets. I glanced at the altimeter and fired the rockets—and suddenly I was spinning even faster."

"It turned out that the terminals on the rockets had been set incorrectly. Instead of stabilizing the aircraft they gave it additional acceleration. The commission that investigated the accident confirmed that I had acted correctly."

"Rimas, what if there had been an emergency with the Buran? Would you have ejected?"

"First, that is technically impossible," the pilot says. "There is no ejection seat for the pilots on the Buran, they are only just getting ready to install them. Moreover, if it is possible to save oneself from the cockpit, what about those crew members on the lower deck? They have no chance. And so I would not have used an ejection seat."

The SU-27 does have an ejection seat. The instruments record that Stankiyavichyus was preparing to leave the cockpit. But he did not take advantage of that final chance. Because the fighter, now out of control, could have crashed into the crowd of spectators. Right to the end Rimas was fighting not only for the aircraft but also to avoid injury to any of the Italians. It can be seen from the video tape that even when he was almost into the ground the pilot was making an unbelievable effort to move off to the side of the airfield. And even then it was not possible to avoid casualties: One of the ground services workers was killed and several injured.

Somehow I had a conversation with the chief designer of the SU-27, A. Kolchin, about the fate of test pilots. Artem Aleksandrovich is one of the creators of that aircraft. Now he is preparing the first dirigible for flight.

"Almost all the pilots with whom I have worked," A. Kolchin said, "have died testing new aircraft. The reasons for this include equipment malfunctions, extreme flying conditions, and the impossibility of foreseeing every unexpected event. The most difficult thing is to conclude that the cause was pilot error. Then the family of the deceased receives a small pension. This conclusion can be reached only if it is absolutely certain that the pilot was to blame..."

The conclusions of the commission that investigated the death of Stankiyavichyus were recently made public. In the opinion of the experts the cause of the tragedy was inadequate preparation for the demonstration flight and pilot error. It is interesting that the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent in Rome, O. Shevtsov, went even further. He accused the pilot of being under the influence of alcohol when he boarded the aircraft! It is to the credit of the commission that this insulting statement was categorically refuted. Nevertheless, it is considered that Stankiyavichyus' blame in the catastrophe is proven.

When I was preparing this material I talked with various people and made it my business to find out their opinions. Test pilots from the Flight Research Institute and the Sukhoi Special Design Bureau, designers, scientists, engineers... Some knew Rimas well, others had never met him. I am not saying there was unanimity among them. A section chief at the special design bureau and member of the commission that investigated the causes of the air catastrophe, O. Kalibabchuk, claimed that "the main blame lies with the pilot." That is also the opinion of his colleague, the chief of another section in the Sukhoi firm, M. Shapiro. A. Kolchin was very cautious: "I think that all the same it was Stankiyavichyus' fault that the accident occurred."

But while agreeing that the pilot had made mistakes, the majority tried to understand the nature of those mistakes, rejecting any primitive-traditional explanations for such flying accidents.

Rimas was not simply a test pilot. He was in a class of his own, and he knew the SU-27 like the back of his hand. Not long before, together with his colleague S. Tresvyatskiy, he had returned from the United States from an air show in Seattle. Rimas had flown there in an SU-27 and had delighted everyone with his flying skill. Test pilot Stankiyavichyus had performed inside loops hundreds of times. Indeed, in Italy itself he had performed the maneuver perfectly the day before during training for the flight. So what happened? Why did the pilot make those fatal miscalculations during the demonstration flight?

The instruments recorded a strange incongruity: After it had taken off from the airfield Rimas' fighter was

supposed to have returned three minutes later to carry out the program. But the SU-27 appeared above the airfield 15 minutes later. Where was he flying for those 12 minutes and what was happening with the aircraft during that time? No one can answer this question. And in that kind of time a supersonic aircraft can get into any situation.

How will the investigation of the death of Rimas Stankiyavichyus end? They are saying that there is some "special opinion," and that there is hope that the conclusions of the commission will be reviewed. The staff at the Flight Research Institute is preparing a letter, demanding that their comrade be exonerated.

Be that as it may, those who knew Rimas have already had their own "commission" and reached their conclusions. For them, Rimantas Antanas-Antano Stankiyavichyus remained a top-class professional and a charming and fine person.

'Chronic' Officer Shortage in SAM Subunit

91UM05884 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Letter to the Editors from Senior Lieutenant D. Tandos from Primorskiy Kray: "The Hillock Seeks Reinforcement"]

[Text] We serve in a remote antiaircraft missile subunit on an inaccessible hillock. It is a place which commonly could be called wild. In addition to tasks of a special nature, the officers are responsible for guard duty, maintenance duty and other details. Nor is work with the personnel moved into the background as there are representatives of ten nationalities serving in our unit.

No one complains of the difficult service and the personnel is friendly and close-knit. The reason for this letter is to be found in the chronic, painful understaffing with officers of the platoon level. At present, four positions of crew chiefs are vacant. For a small subunit, you will agree, this is excessive.

With such a load factor on the officers, what sort of viable work with subordinates and what sort of service zeal can one speak of? Even the correct operation of the equipment is hard. Or what about if any of the officers is away on a mission or on leave or should fall ill?...

The unit command has seemingly done everything possible, but personnel turnover and instability in filling the positions of junior officers have remained. Since 1985 we have received only one man directly from the school bench. In all other cases the chief of the crew or the commander of a platoon is an officer awaiting posting to the Western regions of the nation, transfer to another subunit, discharge into the reserves and so forth.

Previously, we complained a little of the "two-yearers" but now even they cannot be found. It is not hard to imagine at what price we must carry out the tasks confronting the subunit.

The next graduation in the military schools is not far off but we are not certain that this time we will receive any reinforcements. How can we serve in a human manner?

On behalf of the subunit officers

Chernavin on Reduction in Service Terms

91UM06494 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 May 91
Second Edition p 6

[Interview with Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy and USSR people's deputy, by V. Izgarshev, under the rubric "Our Commentary": "Two Years—This Will Now Be the Term of Service for Sailors"]

[Text] As the reader already knows, new important amendments were made to the law "On Universal Military Service" by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Now, all of our youth who are called into the ranks of the Armed Forces will serve two years.

We asked Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy and a USSR people's deputy, to comment on the recent decision of the higher authority of the country.

[Chernavin] The problem of three-year service in the Navy has existed for a long time, for many years. Some parents, this is well-known, laid siege to the military commissariats annually, trying by fair means or foul to "arrange" a two-year term of service for their offspring—on land. Of course, there were a lot of cases when youths themselves, contrary to parental persuasion, asked to be assigned to ships. But the problem, I will repeat, existed, and now it has come to an end.

[Izgarshev] Did the proposal to reduce service come from the Navy?

[Chernavin] No. But when such a proposal arose during discussion of all aspects of military reforms being initiated, we agreed with it. Although, I admit, to a certain degree it will hurt our Navy.

[Izgarshev] In what do you see this?

[Chernavin] The Navy has very complicated combat equipment. Thus, it is much more difficult for us to train specialists. And, as a rule, we teach them in the course of

a year. And, then, for two years the seaman and the petty officer applied and polished their knowledge and skills on ships.

[Izgarshev] Now, they have only one year of naval practice, if it can be put this way?

[Chernavin] One year. We support this decision of the Supreme Soviet. It is correct, it removes many questions, and it puts all drafted youths on a par. At the same time, the switch to two-year service presents us with quite a few additional tasks.

[Izgarshev] But what can be said to those seamen and petty officers who have already served their two years? Get your "demobilization" suitcases ready?

[Chernavin] I think that it is too early to put the question this way. The fact is that we will conduct the process of switching to two-year service during the course of a year. We will not manage it in a shorter period.

[Izgarshev] And one more question. Comrade Commander in Chief. The Supreme Soviet passed a decree on the conduct of an experiment in manpower acquisition on a volunteer basis and according to contract of positions of seamen and petty officers of the Navy by servicemen who are on active military service. What do you think of this decision?

[Chernavin] I think of it in a most positive way. We will conduct this experiment in all of our four fleets. Contract service is stipulated for a term of not less than three years.

[Izgarshev] Under what kinds of conditions?

[Chernavin] Quite a few conditions and benefits are envisioned. Well, and monetary payments will increase sharply. I do not want to mention the sum of the monthly salary now. There are no final figures as yet, but I will say that the payment will exceed by several times the salaries of inducted seamen and petty officers, which, by the way, will be increased substantially in the near future. So now a salary is being recommended for "volunteers" that is several times greater by comparison with the new pay rates.

Call for Anti-Gas Training in Event of Civil Conflict

91UM0555B Tallinn VECHERNIY TALLINN
in Russian 6 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Anto Raukas: "A Tank is Not an Argument"]

[Text] The attitude in Estonia toward civil defense has been up to now one of "light humor." No one took seriously the possibility of an attack against the Soviet Union, because the occupation of such a backward country by any—even slightly—developed country would be equivalent to suicide. But conditions change, and it looks like training in civil defense is becoming extremely necessary. Bombs are exploding in the city and there are more frequent cases of crimes with the use of weapons and gas cartridges. The experience in Tbilisi, Vilnius, and Riga also indicates the possibility of armed action on the part of the army. This last item especially puts one on his guard. If the residents of Tbilisi had been informed of the type of poison gas used by the troops, their toxic effects, and antidotes, the number of injured and dead would have been significantly smaller.

I am, therefore, proposing that the government and the civil defense staff, as part of civil defense training in 1991, familiarize all residents of Estonia with the effects of poison gases used by the Soviet army and the internal troops, decontamination methods, the best methods of treatment, as well as weapons that the internal troops have and combat methods used by the "black berets." Moreover, it would not be bad if the populace had some idea of the technical-tactical indices of the armored troops stationed here, including the kinds of weapons they have. Since these military forces in Estonia do not have the latest equipment, and they would probably not use it against the people, we cannot be accused of revealing military secrets. At the same time, residents of Estonia would benefit greatly from such information, and training would be far more interesting.

Kyrgyz Presidential Decree on Civil Defense

91UM0631A Bishkek SLOVO KYRGYZSTAN
in Russian 4 Apr 91 p 4

["Kyrgyzstan Republic Presidential Ukase: On the Civil Defense Leadership of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan"]

[Text] In connection with implementation of the Kyrgyzstan Republic law "On Reorganization of the System of the Organs of State Power and Government in the Kyrgyzstan Republic and on the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Kyrgyzstan Republic" and with the need to maintain civil defense in constant readiness for action in emergency situations and ensure the accomplishment of its measures, I resolve:

1. To entrust the leadership of civil defense in the Kyrgyzstan Republic, oblasts, city of Bishkek, rayons, cities, rayons in cities, settlements, and rural population

centers, to the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyzstan Republic and appropriate soviets of people's deputies.

Exercising direct leadership of civil defense are the civil defense chiefs, who are: for the Kyrgyzstan Republic—the prime minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyzstan Republic; for oblasts, rayons, cities, rayons in cities, settlements, and rural population centers—the chairmen of appropriate soviets of people's deputies.

2. To entrust the leadership of civil defense in branches of the national economy, at enterprises, institutions, and organizations, directly to the civil defense chiefs, who are: for branches of the national economy—ministers, chairmen of state committees, heads of departments and other production organization structures; for enterprises, institutions, and organizations—their directors.

Special directive organs (civil defense staffs) are established under the civil defense chiefs.

[Signed] A. Akayev, president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan

City of Bishkek, 26 February 1991

USSR Supreme Soviet on Service at Chernobyl

91UM0555A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by Captain 1st Rank V. Urban: "Chernobyl: Five Years Later." Article is under the rubric, "From the Supreme Soviet of the USSR."]

[Text] On April 9th the All-Union parliament considered a number of problems regarding the elimination of the aftereffects of the Chernobyl catastrophe. As a procedural check, there was discussion of what progress had been made in complying with the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet of April 25, 1990, on a single program for eliminating the aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station.

I shall refrain from citing all the voluminous reference material given to the deputies to think about. I think that the residents of Chernobyl can be better judges of what the government has done in the past year.

The parliament has only just now been given a draft law on the social protection of citizens exposed to radiation. On Tuesday it was accepted on its first reading. Citizens affected by this law will also include servicemen and those called into the service at special inductions, and enlisted for work in the evacuation zone in connection with the aftereffects of the accident.

Disability pensions for servicemen will be determined by procedures and standards established for compensation for injuries, concussions, and mutilations incurred while carrying out military duties.

The draft law also includes an article which establishes procedures for undertaking military duty in the so-called Chernobyl districts. Let me cite several of its provisions:

"Military duty (duty) is forbidden in isolation and evacuation zones. In case of necessity, the carrying out of military duties in the afore-mentioned zones will be effected by assigning servicemen to these zones on a voluntary basis, except in such cases as are covered by Article 11 of the USSR Law 'On Legal Status in an Extraordinary Case.'"

"The government of the USSR determines how military duty (duty) will be carried out in the evacuation zone..."

In the course of the next two weeks this document is supposed to be revised and presented for consideration during the second reading.

Gen Army Govorov 1991 Victory Day Interview

91UM0644A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 9 May 91 p 1

[Report on interview with General of the Army V. Govorov, chief of USSR Civil Defense, by Nikolay Panyukov, military columnist for RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, on the occasion of the 9 May Victory Day celebration; place not given: "Duty to the Fatherland"]

[Text] *Everyone has a duty to the fatherland. This must not be forgotten both in days of war and in days of peace, says Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army V. Govorov.*

I intended to conduct this interview about his father, the famous marshal, and about himself, the commander of a firing platoon of a battery...

"We will not talk about heroism and heroic deeds." I was warned by my famous interlocutor, chief of USSR Civil Defense and USSR deputy minister of defense. "Because I look upon war as very dreadful work that cannot be compared with anything else. We will also not talk about our 'military dynasty.' Because my father in his time, and I afterwards, were preparing to become naval architects. My father even succeeded in completing one course at the institute. But fate placed us in the military ranks. Father—World War I in 1916. Me—World War II in 1942.

[Panyukov] Vladimir Leonidovich, interest in the Great Patriotic War is not waning. But the falsification of facts and attempts to rewrite the history of the war are disturbing...

[Govorov] This also disturbs me. Some researchers are concentrating all of their attention on mistakes, real and imaginary. The heroic struggle of our people in this is represented as a chain of continuous failures, and there is a belittling and distortion of examples of unparalleled service to the Motherland at the front and in the rear area.

But the truth is that an insidious and strong enemy, throwing mobilized armies against us that were superior in numbers and combat equipment, did not accomplish even one of its strategic tasks in 1941. Not one. Moscow

stood despite the "blitzkrieg," and Leningrad stood, and the whole country fought to the bitter end.

[Panyukov] But, after all, it is not possible to deny the failures. And there were mistakes...

[Govorov] Of course, there were mistakes also. And there were failures. But, after all, this was war. Look, in peacetime we will never learn how to avoid mistakes. And, of course, it is necessary to write about the mistakes. But you cannot engage in denigration, and you cannot distort the truth. Why, for example, try to attribute all of the successes to the Second Front and assign a secondary role to the Eastern Front. After all, this is not true. Even Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons on 28 September 1944 acknowledged that "it was the Russian Army that knocked the stuffings out of the German military machine, and at the present moment it is keeping an incomparably large part of the enemy in check on its front."

Long ago, for example, it was necessary to evaluate the contribution of our people to victory more objectively, and to return to history the names of many distinguished commanders: Lieutenant General of Aviation Ya. Smushkevich, assistant to the chief of the General Staff, twice Hero of the Soviet Union; Colonel General G. Shtern, chief of the PVO [Air Defense Troops], Hero of the Soviet Union; Colonel General A. Laktionov, deputy People's Commissar of Defense and commander of troops of the Baltic Special Military District; Major General of Aviation I. Proskurov, Hero of the Soviet Union; and many, many others.

[Panyukov] There are also attempts to represent our people during the war as a deceived and frightened community of people who followed orders and instructions blindly. What can you say about this?

[Govorov] This is nonsense. The state would not have held out, and it would not have been victorious in such a difficult war on the basis of fear and blind fanaticism. The morale of our people was such that we could not help but win. And deception and blindness have no bearing here...

In 1975, I had occasion to give the French our T-34 tank, which was set up in the Palace of Invalids in the very center of Paris as a "symbol of the participation of the Russians" in the liberation of mankind from fascism. Our contribution to victory is indisputable, and no latter-day chroniclers can erase it from history.

[Panyukov] In those days they were erecting monuments. Now, they are pulling them down from pedestals more and more often... What is the problem?

[Govorov] The problem most likely is in the political prestige of our country. During the war and after, the prestige of the Soviet Union in the world was very high. But afterwards, unfortunately, we began to lose a lot. Because of self-assurance, miscalculations, and mistakes. At one time, for example, we refused payments of

reparations to us from by Germany. It was a generous gesture. And, in general, it deserved support. But we were unable to use such a fact in our interests. Now, everyone has forgotten about our good gesture.

At present, something similar is also occurring with the withdrawal of our troops from the countries of Eastern Europe, where each plot of land is drenched with the blood of Soviet soldiers. We have promised that by 1995 none of our troops will be on foreign territory. This is good, of course. Especially since we were counting on a reciprocal step from other countries. But calculations are one thing. Reality is another. The legal bases and mutual obligations were not worked out. And what do we have? Now they are hurrying us up, and at times they are chucking us out, making it necessary for us to give up enormous material resources and compelling us to pay for "services rendered..." And this creates a nervous

situation, in which they are even trying to pin the label of "occupiers" on us, and they even make short work of monuments to our soldiers.

[Panyukov] Vladimir Leonidovich, what would you like to see in current military collectives from that with which your brothers-in-arms were strong?

[Govorov] More friendship, solidarity, and mutual understanding. It is even difficult to imagine, if war should break out, and we are disunited, do we start dividing ourselves into subunits according to national traits or group interests?

What else? A little more love for the motherland, patriotism, and devotion to our ideals. These are also components of our victory and, perhaps, they are the main ones.

Arkhipov Heads Program To Aid Chernobyl Victims

91U M06184 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Uzhegov: "In Accordance With the Laws of Charity"]

[Text] Several days ago mobile medical laboratories and other equipment purchased by the Japanese Sasakawa Fund to provide assistance for victims of the Chernobyl accident were delivered in Moscow. This philanthropic cargo was delivered to Soviet land by the Ruslan—the military transport aircraft.

Similar kinds of aid—food, clothing, medical equipment—have already been delivered to us from state and public organizations in 51 countries. The Central Commission set up by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers is coordinating the transportation, storage, and distribution of all these cargoes. A working group from the Ministry of Defense led by the deputy defense minister and chief of Rear Services, Army General V. Arkhipov, is cooperating closely with it.

Military air transport has completed more than 330 missions to 71 cities in the country and has transported more than 12,000 tons of freight. The geographical coverage of the deliveries ranges from Lvov to Anadyr, from Severomorsk to Mari. The troops are also involved in moving freight on the ground. Let me remind you that troops from the Western Group of Forces recently arrived in Moscow with 202 vehicles loaded with freight donated by the government of the FRG as a gift to the Russian Orthodox Church. And, for example, up to 300 of our troops worked in Berlin to dispatch food.

It must be said that help is also coming from abroad for servicemen, as, for example, from Syria and the FRG. It has been sent to the Transcaucasus and Baltic military districts and the Northern Fleet, and also to remote Air Defense and Air Force garrisons. The figures themselves indicate the scope of the aid. The German company Asko [as transliterated] alone has sent us 40,760 food packages. The Ministry of Defense has sent them to the Russian Fund for Invalids of the Afghan War, to a children's boarding school in Leningrad, and to public and church organizations.

"Of the total amount of freight coming into the USSR, only a small part has been allocated for servicemen, less than one percent," says Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Rear Services Lieutenant General A. Zhukov. "We have carried out the requisitions of the Central Commission promptly and efficiently. Already Special teams of 30-40 men have been set up in the Moscow Military District and Air Defense District to unload the aircraft, and vehicles have been allocated. In short, we are allowing no interruptions at the Moscow airports of Vnukovo, Sheremet'evvo, and Domodedovo. But we cannot get by without some imperfections. The executive committees in Chernigov, Kiev, Tbilisi, Leningrad,

and Sverdlovsk are refusing to pay for the shipment of cargoes as required by government decree. And they are even almost accusing us of extortion. And essentially it is only a question of paying for the cost of fuel used during the movement of freight and for servicing civil aviation aircraft."

Food, clothing, and other cargoes providing humanitarian aid continue to arrive in our country. The bustle goes on almost round the clock in the Ministry of Defense working group. Colonel V. Kostenko clarifies what remains to be done before the end of the month.

"The delivery of 390 tons of medicines and food from India by military transport aircraft will be coming to an end. This aid has been provided by Indian corporations and is being sent to Kirov, Kemerovo, Alma-Ata, Tyumen, and Omsk."

Snags in FRG Housing Construction in USSR

91U F07404 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 91 Second Edition p 6

[Unattributed article: "A Lot of Noise Over Nothing"]

[Text] Bonn—A great deal of noise has been made over nothing regarding requisitions for housing construction for Soviet servicemen. Apparently for want of more heartrending news items, certain major German newspapers have printed on their front pages headings such as: "The Soviet Union Goes Around German Firms," "Bonn Threatens Moscow With an End to Appropriations," "Dispute With Moscow Over Requisitions for Housing Construction for Servicemen."

All this has been elicited as a result of the Soviet side conveying purely business information to the appropriate Bonn authorities regarding its intention to make available contracts for construction in the USSR of the first 3,000 apartments for officers and warrant officers of units of the Western Group of Soviet Forces pulled out of East Germany to Turkish and Finnish firms.

I recall that the Soviet-German agreement signed the end of last year on this matter envisages the construction of 36,000 apartments in various regions of the Soviet Union. In this regard the Federal Republic Government obligated itself to allocate 7.8 billion marks [DM]. The German side expressed the desire that implementation of this program involve the participation of its construction firms. In the agreement itself, however, there is not a word about these firms or about any obligations whatsoever on the Soviet side with respect to them. Moreover, the competitive principle of placing requisitions is stipulated in Soviet-German understandings, and the proposals from Finnish and Turkish firms on construction of the first series of housing units for as much as DM100 million is less expensive than the applications submitted by German firms, with the same quality of course.

However you look at it, there are no grounds for reproaching our side. Why pay some "subsidy" to German firms when they themselves would hardly do so to us under similar circumstances? And commentary in Bonn that "the Soviets have quickly become familiar with the market economy" can be considered a compliment.

The initiator of this press campaign is the German construction industry association. Through the economics ministry it has roused even the Federal Republic cabinet to discussing the problem of requisitions. A government representative has announced that Bonn is insisting on the participation of German firms. At the same time they acknowledge here that legally the Soviet side is acting properly, in accordance with the letter of the agreement. References are being made only to its "spirit" being injured. But should not a businesslike spirit be paramount in this matter? In any event, it is clear that there cannot be talk of any complications in allocations as long as the Bonn authorities refrain from violating existing understandings. Judging from everything, however, this will not happen.

The story is nonetheless interesting in two aspects. First, it is curious how German firms fight over every requisition. It would be nice if we saw something similar in the operation of our own construction organizations. Second, the thought has been expressed in press commentaries and the statements of certain government representatives that the agreement was drawn up hurriedly, in last-minute fashion, and that not everything in it was designated appropriately. Nonetheless, the desire to earn, to get back these billions of marks allocated for the construction draws attention to itself. And the question naturally arises—why should we not, our own construction organizations, earn this same DM7.8 billion, which would be so beneficial to the country with its lack of currency?

Garrison Tries to Resolve Own Food Problem

*911 M06394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 May 91 First Edition p 4*

[Article by Colonel V. Streltsov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "There Is No Need to Go Begging—How the Leningrad Military District Is Solving the Food Problem"]

[Text] I recall an episode from the time when I was a young lieutenant. After hearing the attendance report on officers present at a conference, the regimental commander checked on the reasons for the absence of some of them.

"Well, where do you say your company commander is?" he turned to one of the battalion commanders. That one became confused.

"I think the reason is unimportant."

"You are wrong to think that," the regimental commander articulated. "You very likely forget that your company commander was raising rabbits, chickens..."

Everyone burst out laughing. And there was nothing surprising in the fact that within the next several days the personal subsidiary plot of the officer who was "disgraced" with the approval of public opinion ceased its existence.

This was almost 30 years ago. But a similar rejoinder by a commander today would hardly have such consequences. Accordingly, I think that the reaction to it would have been entirely different.

Now, the military cultivate vegetable gardens, and they build pigpens, rabbit hutches, and chicken coops. The imbalance in the supply of food has also hit the soldiers' table.

"The carefree times have gone," says Lieutenant General A. Abramov, deputy commander of rear services troops of the district. "The provision of food products is growing into a task that is equal to combat and organizational readiness. But with a worsening of the food crisis, it is possible that, in the near future, it will also become the most important one."

Alas, this is not an exaggeration. Almost all oblasts on whose territory the district is located continuously miss dates for delivery of food to military units, but they also refuse to give anything at all. For example, just in the first quarter of this year, the Archangel Myasomoltorg was 200 tons short in its delivery of meat to the okrug that was provided by allocated funds. Vologda was short 100 tons of this product. The Murmansk refrigeration combine did not deliver even one kilogram of the 30 tons of butter earmarked for the troops of the okrug. Even more debtors can be listed. There are many of them.

The rear services personnel are still somehow able to make ends meet inside the okrug owing to a redistribution of food and the replacement of some products with others, operating, as the saying goes, directly "from the truck" and "from the deck" (now military transport aviation has gone into action). But now it has become unbelievably difficult to make food deliveries to the Far North and the Arctic, because this task can be handled only in the summer navigation months, after establishing the necessary reserve. But how can this reserve be guaranteed under current conditions, when even here on the mainland the work is "from the truck?"

Quite a few difficulties have also arisen in the supply of potatoes and vegetables for the enlisted men's mess hall. Former suppliers have inflated prices, and, moreover, each in his own way. It becomes necessary to ask Moscow for additional resources in order to make direct contractual ties with sovkhoses [state farm] and kolkhoses [collective farm]. An already difficult situation was made worse by the issue of a ration to warrant officers—previously they were compensated with a monetary allowance.

Judging by everything, the time has come to make a decision on food supplies at the state level. Perhaps, choose the Chinese way? There, the army, there is data like this, is fed by 500 military sovkhozes. Maybe the American way? In that country food suppliers for the army are exempted from all kinds of taxes, and, therefore, there is no retreat from them. But for the time being, as a matter of fact, the army is trying to extricate itself from the food failure on its own.

Beginning this year it will be necessary to supply personnel through the production of food products in military sovkhozes and subsidiary plots: Meat—for four to five months, potatoes and vegetables—for a half year, and milk and eggs—for a year. Of course, this will require a sharp increase in swine livestock approximately by a factor of two and the purchase of cattle and poultry. There will have to be a reconstruction and construction of new farms, without involving personnel in this work, and, subsequently, animals and poultry will have to be looked after, fodder will have to be grown, and cattle-breeding complexes will have to be maintained.

"Unlike others, the command element of the Leningrad Military District did not lose its head in the developing situation," says Colonel N. Gavris, deputy chief in one of the directorates of the main food directorate. I had occasion to meet him in one of the divisions of the district where he was on duty assignment. "We began to execute the task assigned by the Ministry of Defense, to find and utilize internal reserves in the district in a maximum way, without hesitation."

I had occasion recently to be at a conference to hear Colonel Yu. Mishin, commander of a division, talk about the outlook for the development of subsidiary plots of units [chast] subordinate to him. He was accompanied by Colonel General V. Samsonov, commander of the troops of the district. A hanging map did not show the usual symbols of combat order of battle, but sovkhozes, breeding farms, and other agricultural enterprises were indicated. Alongside were charts showing contracted tonnages of food products that had to be purchased, and the number of hectares of land that personnel of the units jointly with rural workers obligated themselves to cultivate and later to harvest.

The discussion was extremely detailed. How many sows is it necessary for the division to purchase in order to fulfill the meat plan? What resources have to be allocated for this? Where will the cattle be gotten, and how is its proper feeding to be accomplished? How many families of officers and warrant officers have been allotted vegetable gardens? Why is everyone not taking to this? How to train specialists for subsidiary plots? These and many other questions were being decided with the same kind of detail as in preparations for a major exercise.

Many commanders of formations [soyedineniye] and units [chast] have already gone through a similar hearing. And the plans of the commanding officer are to

reach every garrison on this matter. Now in the district every military unit, even if it does not have its own mess hall, is obliged to start a subsidiary plot: a hothouse, pigs, poultry, other animals, and a vegetable garden. A specially published directive of the commanding officer charges the commanders to do this. Thought is also being given here to cooperation with other military districts. A special motor vehicle battalion has been set up for use within the boundaries of the district during harvest time. But, after all, battalions like this were sent all over for harvesting, but not to their "own" oblasts. Naturally, the output from them for district granaries was minimal.

Important work is planned to be conducted in the district in order to raise the production of food products in military sovkhozes to a qualitatively new level... An intensive development is now going on in the fodder base, for which meadow reclamation work is being conducted, order is being brought to natural hayfields and pastures, and dairy farms are being rebuilt. Briefly, fully realizing the responsibility placed on them, commanders and managers have deployed properly. And they are not the only ones.

I drop into the farmyard of a unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel B. Potybenko. Work is in full swing on the reconstruction and expansion of a pigpen.

"We plan to undertake swine replenishment, 20 sows," said the commander. "Therefore, there is enough work for everyone: for the privates, for the warrant officers, and for the captains..."

With a trowel in his hand, accurately placing one brick on another, together with the soldiers, their commander, Captain V. Korotun, worked.

"It is turning out well here."

"It will succeed, if you do not want to go begging," answered Korotun, wiping the sweat from his forehead and straightening up.

There was no sadness in his voice or offense over the fact that he was not engaged in his profession. Indeed, who is one to take offense against—it is difficult for everyone today.

Troop Housing Contract Selection Process Explained

91UF0762A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 May 91 Union Edition p 7

[Interview with Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Oleg Dmitriyevich Davydov by I. Zhagel: "Will The Strongest Triumph or Will 7.8 Billion Marks Be Distributed from Above?"]

[Text] A report from Germany that was broadcast on the Vremya program on May 12 stated that German firms are dissatisfied with the distribution of orders associated with the construction of housing for Soviet servicemen who are leaving the territory of the former GDR

[German Democratic Republic]. As we all know, the German government has provided 7.8 billion marks to do this. In order to clarify the position of the Soviet side on this issue, an IZVESTIYA correspondent met with Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations O. Davydov.

[Zhagel] Oleg Dmitriyevich, in general, what preconditions were placed upon the distribution of the billions allocated to us?

[Davydov] Article three of the agreement between the governments states that the procedures to account for the assets and the procedures for their use will be determined in a separate protocol. And on December 13, 1990 this protocol was signed between the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, on the one hand, and the FRG Federal Ministry for Economics, on the other hand. I stress that it is the German side that proposed including this paragraph in the protocol in accordance with which it was intended that the use of resources be carried out through open international bidding.

Previously, we did not conduct such bidding but we selected several firms who then competed among themselves. Naturally, we needed to enlist a very experienced consulting company that is well-known throughout the world so that the open bidding took place at the highest level. The German firm Deutsch Consult is that firm. Incidentally, its services on the concluded contract will cost us more than 150 million marks.

Deutsch Consult together with Soviet Soyuzvneshstroyimport and Tekhnoeksport VVO's [All Union Foreign Trade Association] and USSR Ministry of Defense and Gosstroy organizations created a consulting consortium. Its task includes preparation of the required documentation, the advisory selection of firms, and other issues. This consortium also conducted open international bidding for distribution of the orders for the construction of the first four of 33 communities which will be located at Krivoy Rog, Vladikavkaz, and Shaykovka (UkSSR), and Borisov (RSFSR).

A total of 102 firms took part in the bidding. I will point out that not one Soviet construction organization passed the pre-qualification selection. In many ways, this is associated with the fact that the first four communities must be constructed in extremely compressed periods of time—by the end of the current year. However, we assume that they will participate in this work as subcontractors and materials suppliers.

[Zhagel] As you know the firms that compete on the world market very strictly control the procedures for conducting any competitions to receive contracts. Can you provide a guarantee that there will not be complaints against your bidding?

[Davydov] I am certain that there will be no complaints. All of the firms submitted their terms in wax-sealed envelopes which were opened in the presence of all interested parties,

including representatives of the companies, the FRG Ministry for Economics, and the bank financing the project. So, none of the competitors knew the prices or other commercial terms proposed by their rivals beforehand.

The analysis that was conducted after the opening of the envelopes showed that the German firms, and they were a majority of the firms represented, did not offer, so to speak, the best commercial terms. And if we awarded the contracts to them today, we would receive much less housing than the housing offered to us, say, by the Turkish or Finnish firms.

[Zhagel] But maybe our old disease is manifesting itself in this case—are we pursuing quantity to the detriment of quality?

[Davydov] Nothing of the kind. Only reliable firms who have excellent reputations and a great deal of experience operating work in our country and who are capable of satisfying the demands of the most exacting customer passed the pre-qualification selection. Besides, their preliminary selection was also carried out with the participation of the German side and right now, after the fact, it would simply be dishonorable to cast a shadow on the firms that are leading the competition—this is a prohibited method.

[Zhagel] Today we already know that the German firms that are disappointed with the results of the bidding are ready to join their government in tilting the balance in their favor. A number of German publications have even reported that H. Kohl intends to discuss this issue with M. Gorbachev over the telephone. Can this influence the final results of the competition?

[Davydov] We are not ruling out the fact that German firms will attempt to exert definite pressure on their government. But if we resolve this conflict while proceeding not from economic but from political considerations, it will cause even greater problems. First, faith will be undermined in the competition itself and then it will already be impossible to consider it open. In so doing, the interests of our state as a reliable partner will suffer. Second, many firms spent enormous assets while preparing for the competition. And naturally they will demand compensation for losses from us.

[Zhagel] Do you see a way out of the situation?

[Davydov] The competition for the four facilities has actually already been completed. Everything is ready for us to sign a contract with the winners. And we need to do that as soon as possible since we are already exceeding the time limits.

Meanwhile, preparations are underway for the bidding for ten more small towns which will be located primarily in Belorussia and Ukraine. Incidentally, right now more than 100 firms have already expressed a desire to receive contracts. A significant number of them are German. I think that they must take into account the results of the first bids.

I would like to add that we are also interested in cooperation with German firms. And all things being equal, preference will be assigned precisely to them. It will also be beneficial for us both from the financial and technical standpoint to work on the same side. And I think that we have sufficiently good prospects for doing this.

Dyakin Criticizes Lopatin on Supposed Professionalization Dividend

91UM0477B Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN*
in Russian No 4, Jan 91 pp 20-21

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences Vladimir Dyakin, scientific associate at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the rubric "A Rejoinder": "The Military Reform: Is Everything That Simple?"]

[Text] V. Lopatin's article on the military reform plan, published in the 13 November issue of *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*, was devoted in great part to demonstrating the large financial gain from rapidly converting to a completely professional army. Candidate of Economic Sciences Vladimir Dyakin, scientific associate at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has great doubts, which he reports in this rejoinder.

Judge for yourself. V. Lopatin specifically refers to Great Britain as an example. He attributes the significant reduction in the specific portion of its gross national product spent on the military during the period 1954-1964 directly to the conversion of its forces to a hired basis. But is it valid to see a direct linkage here, when the same sort of reduction generally occurred also for all the NATO nations which did not alter their system of manning their armed forces? Based on official data the military outlays of other members of that bloc relative to their GNP dropped by approximately one third, the same as for Great Britain, while those of Canada were almost halved.

Also unconvincing is V. Lopatin's assertion that a saving achieved by abandoning the draft produced a reduction in Great Britain's overall military outlays. In addition to the fact that a competent comparison, based on the facts, of British military outlays and those of other nations does not confirm V. Lopatin's thinking, in this particular case it is invalid in general to use the indicator of overall military outlays. After all, the total amount depends upon many items in the military budget, including purchases of military equipment, the construction of military installations, and so forth. It would be far more logical to use as the key to this discussion the difference not in the overall amount of military expenditures but only those which are directly related to monetary payments to personnel of the armed forces. The conclusions are the direct opposite in this case.

When the United States went over to a volunteer army in July 1973, for example, these outlays increased drastically. We find the following in the federal budget for 1976: "Increased wages and other payments and benefits involved in the equalization of pay and the decision to switch entirely to hired manning have resulted in a considerable increase in outlays on personnel.... The proportion of outlays for maintaining them in the Defense Department's budget increased from 22.0 billion dollars (43.3%) in 1964 to 46.7 billion (54.3%) in

1975." This was despite a reduction in the numerical strength of the American armed forces during that period from 2.69 to 2.13 million men. More specifically, outlays per American serviceman, already fairly high, increased 2.7-fold during those years, while overall U.S. military outlays grew 1.8-fold.

Even more indicative is the example of Great Britain, which has had a hired military since 1957. Its military expenditures increased 1.7-fold during the period 1955-1970 (at current prices), while monetary payments per serviceman, considering the drastic reduction in the numerical strength of the armed forces (from 800,000 to 377,000 men), climbed to a level 5.9 times as high. Overall outlays for personnel increased 2.3-fold.

This is not the only interesting thing. Commenting on the consequences of the switch to a professional army and underscoring the difficulty of recruitment, the well-known British weekly *NEW STATESMAN* stated in 1962: "There has been no convincing proof either before or since 1957 that compulsory military duty was politically unpopular in Great Britain. The matter of retaining it has never been an issue in election campaigns. It is precisely the possibility of playing some trump, and not a desire to adhere to the reality which determined government policy.... After five years of this reform the government has created not a new type of army but a sham army." How much it has changed since then is not important for us right now.

The main thing is that foreign experience in general clearly shows that a significant savings can be achieved by converting to a totally volunteer army if there is a multifold reduction in the numerical strength of the armed forces. We cannot consider a reduction of this magnitude at the present time, however. What is more, there will possibly even be a certain increase in our defense outlays within the next few years, about which V. Lopatin complains so greatly. But then the outlays in this case are connected with conversion and the transfer of enterprises, including military enterprises, to market-based management, which drastically increases the cost of developing and producing military equipment and the cost of its maintenance among the troops. Our own experience and the example of other nations convincingly show that one cannot expect any sort of immediate return or saving at the first stage of radical reform of the military. Furthermore, the more radical the program of economic measures and the shorter the time within which it is implemented, the greater are the costs and the higher the social price which must be paid for the reforms. Failing to see or ignoring this can have serious socioeconomic and financial consequences, ultimately even weakening the defense capability.

Today these problems are faced not just by the USSR, as we know, but also by other states which were drawn extensively into the arms race. What do they think about this in the United States, for example?

"While retaining a considerable military system in the future, we must carry out more gradual reductions of military outlays. We must thoroughly study that which is of secondary importance. We need time to implement our plans, and we need a phased approach which will not disrupt the army's functioning. If we do this too rapidly, we shall not improve the armed forces but only emasculate them."

This is a statement by General C. Powell, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was made at the National Press Club in July of last year and was directed to the U.S. Congress. His main point, well understood in Congress, was to make no drastic reductions which would force the "Defense Department to break the backbone of the armed forces." Great Britain's defense secretary also calls for approaching the matter of any reductions "with maximum caution and deliberation," a departure from which would be "a leap into the complete unknown."

Can it be otherwise for us? Particularly since the military sector makes up a very large portion of our national economy and the reforms are being started in a situation of economic crisis?

In my view, the establishment of a completely professional army must become our main reference point and long-range goal, of course, but certainly not a program of immediate, radical and extraordinary measures, as V. Lopatin proposes.

Judging from everything, we still do not adequately recognize the enormous importance of considering all these natural laws or the entire group of consequences of accelerated implementation of the measures in a very difficult situation in the economy and the society as a whole. But are our radical reformers not risking leading the nation to exactly the opposite results under the banner of alluring plans?

Moldovan Military Commissar on Ongoing Conscription Problems

91UM0477A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 29 Jan 91 p 4

[Interview with Major-General V. Nazarov, Moldovan SSR Military Commissar, by correspondent G. Kozhemyakin: "The Army Is the Backbone of the Power"]

[Text] Many of our readers have asked the editors to tell about how the fall conscription, which is now into the winter, is going and how the USSR President's Ukase on Defense Matters in the Moldovan SSR is being implemented. They have also brought up a number of other questions pertaining to the functioning of our commissariats. Our correspondent met with Maj Gen V. Nazarov, military commissar of the Moldovan SSR. Here is his interview for our readers.

[Kozhemyakin] Viktor Ivanovich, just a year or so ago the regular conscription into the Armed Forces was just

an ordinary matter. The ukase issued by the USSR minister of defense was published in the mass media, notices were issued to the young men by the military commissariats, leaders of farms and enterprises presented them with mementos, and young girls gave them flowers. Then, to the stimulating music of brass bands, they marched ahead. During those years it went without saying that the military conscription plan would be fulfilled 100% universally. The situation has changed drastically of late, however....

[Nazarov] Yes, unfortunately, that is indeed so. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the fall conscription has broken down in a number of areas. I would cite a few figures. As of 1 January of this year only 28.1% of the youth subject to conscription had been drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR in Armenia; 25.3% in Latvia; 24.5% in Estonia; 12.5% in Lithuania; even fewer, 10%, in Georgia. The situation is somewhat better, 60%, in our republic. The conscription plan has not been fulfilled in a number of oblasts of the Ukraine. The figure is less than 80% for the nation as a whole.

It is hardly necessary to explain that this situation can no longer be tolerated. After all, this places the national defense in danger. The shortage of personnel complicates the manning of the Armed Forces, and the already extremely large load on the enlisted man unavoidably increases.

Why has this abnormal situation developed? First of all, because of a failure by local agencies to meet their commitments as set forth in laws of the USSR on national defense. What is more, laws have been adopted which are contrary to provisions of the Constitution and laws of the USSR. They actually encourage refusal to serve in the military and desertion from the Armed Forces of the USSR, and do not establish liability for evasion of military service. No small role has been played also by the unprecedented campaign launched against the army in some of the mass media and the open sabotage and boycotting of the fall conscription. It is true that on 22 January of this year the newspaper TARA of the NFM [Moldovan People's Front] published an article titled "Threats, Out and Out Threats...." in which Ion Aluigafton asked: "In what way, when and where have the People's Front and other formations... exerted psychological or physical pressure upon young people not to serve in the army? I have not heard of a member of the People's Front applying even an inoffensive thump on the forehead to a young person wanting to enter the army." Unfortunately, the facts indicate the opposite. Examples are not difficult to come by.

During the fall conscription I. Borta, member of the Yalovenskiy Ispolkom of the NFM, agitated against serving in the occupying forces, as he put it, right at the doors of the rayon military commissariat, using a loud speaker mounted on Zhiguli motor vehicles. The chairman of the Yalovenskiy Rayon soviet took it upon himself to return applications from young men wishing to serve in the Soviet Army and summoned them to

report for a talk within three days. During that time representatives of the People's Front worked intensively with the volunteers. Rural soviet representatives Zymbren, Pukhoy and Kostest in the same rayon actively engaged in anti-army agitation. As a result of this processing 22 individuals withdrew their applications in Yalovenskiy Rayon.

A. Cuconescu, chairman of the Varnita rural soviet, his colleagues I. Shuyu of Belichen, A. Griner of Draganesty, D. Buburuz, chairman of the Durlesty settlement soviet, and a number of others actively agitated against serving in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

The People's Front branch in the settlement of Skumpiia, Feleshtskiy Rayon, even printed an appeal against induction into the Soviet Army in the newspaper PATRIA. Anti-army leaflets have been posted on the building housing the Feleshtskiy Rayon Military Commissariat.

The anti-army campaign is far from a random thing. Every sober-minded person knows that the army is the backbone of a power, ensuring stability and order in the society. Its very existence prevents the implementation of the arrogant plans of separatist and other destructive forces for destroying the state and undermining such key supports of popular self-awareness as patriotism and internationalism.

[Kozhemyakin] How is the present situation with respect to the induction into the Armed Forces developing?

[Nazarov] The Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR has ordered the republic government to extend the induction campaign to 1 February 1991. It has also rescinded points 1 and 2 of the decree "On the Military Service of Citizens of the Moldovan SSR," passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR on 4 September 1990, which suspended a number of articles in the Constitution of the USSR, as well as the laws "On Universal Military Duty" and "On Criminal Liability for Military Crimes," and many articles in the Constitution of the Moldovan SSR and the republic's Criminal Code.

I am confident that the sons of Moldova will be drafted in a timely manner and in adequate numbers into the Armed Forces of the USSR and that they will perform their military service with honor and dignity.

[Kozhemyakin] What can you say about the quality of the training of the group which will enter the Armed Forces in 1991?

[Nazarov] Our republic's envoys have earned a reputation as efficient, hard-working and brave soldiers. This is borne out by numerous letters from commanders and political workers to military commissariats, enterprises and organizations, and to the parents of enlisted men. I believe, however, that the government's decree "The Removal of All Types of Initial Military Training Subjects," as well as the rejection of predraft training in general, will have an extremely negative effect upon the

future fightingmen. This is why. In the first place, the youth from Moldova will be physically weaker than their peers from other regions. In the second place, they will enter the ranks without a knowledge of the basics of soldiery. This will make their already difficult military service even more difficult. I believe the government and the Ministry of Science and Education should give this some thought.

[Kozhemyakin] Viktor Ivanovich, reader Kovalchuk wants to know whether a draft-age youth may enter a VUZ.

[Nazarov] Under the Law of the USSR On Universal Military Duty, the spring induction is conducted in April, May and June. Those who will turn 18 prior to 1 July are therefore subject to induction. While the induction campaign is underway no VUZ is permitted to issue certificates for admission. This is also stated in the rules for admission to the nation's VUZs, however. The ministers have coordinated their actions.

Some young men still acquire certificates for admission to VUZs through influential acquaintances and other loopholes, however.

I take this opportunity to say that such certificates do not have legal force for the military commissariats.

We were told the following in the legal department of the USSR State Committee for Public Education: "Student registration is not conducted until after 1 July. That is, after the induction campaign has been concluded. With respect to certificates, they must be based on VUZ orders on registering the youth as students. Not each individual separately, but a single order for the new academic year. Only then do they have legal force." These youths must therefore first serve out their term in the army and only then continue their studies at a VUZ.

Draft Evasion in Kharkov Oblast

91UM06264 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 17 Apr 91 p 3

[Article by Antonina Palagnyuk: "You Should Not Become a Soldier, Vanek..."]

[Text] Kharkov—Remember this song from the time of the Civil War? But it is not said in vain that what is new is the old that has been forgotten. I am not talking about a popular song, but about the phenomenon itself. We are encountering a problem which simply did not exist previously: More and more frequently, our draft age "Vanyusha's" are ignoring the call-up notices of the military commissariats and they are evading service in the Army.

The situation is alarming throughout the republic; but last fall Kharkov Oblast established a distinctive record. It has the most "objectors"—489 persons.

Colonel Yu. A. Klynkin, the military commissar, cites some interesting data: In the fall of 1989, 523 persons

did not appear at induction centers after notification, and in the spring of 1990 it was 872 persons, but last fall—it was 1,500. What measures are being taken against them? Yuriy Andreyevich sighs:

"The military commissariat can only fine a draftee 10 rubles [R]—this is a joke—and issue him a new notification. The procuracy handles the cases of those who refuse to serve. Last year, criminal charges were brought against 291 draftees, but not one was punished.

It is no secret that there is a very difficult situation in the Army now. Indeed, how could it be otherwise, when the socio-political situation in the country is extremely tense. "Youths who are pondering life" no longer believe the slogans that service in the Army is a sacred duty. They hear this at NVP [pre-induction military training] lessons and that is enough. Especially as they do not accept the postulate "concerning the necessity for the defense of the Motherland and for service where the interests of our state require it..." After the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] decree of 10 October 1990, which allowed serving on the territory of one's republic, the mood of the draftees is understandable.

But, apparently, the Army is not an area in which republic laws will prevail now. The policy of the center is adhered to here rather strictly. Colonel Klynkin, for example, admitted that in the fall draft the district headquarters authorized only 27 percent of the draftees to remain on the territory of the republic. There had to be a violation—40 percent were left. But what about the remaining 60 percent?

"All of them signed that they agree to serve in the proposed regions."

Just try not to agree... Bear it, soldier, you will be a general... And how many cannot bear it? There are now 48 servicemen of the Soviet Army from Kharkov Oblast under investigation—they could not stand Army procedures.

Law Changes Service Terms

91UM06514 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 May 91 Union Edition p 2

"[Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Amending the USSR Law 'On Comprehensive Military Service Obligation']"

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decrees:

To amend the USSR law "On Comprehensive Military Service Obligation," dated 12 October 1967, (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA, 1967, No. 42, page 552; 1980, No. 52, page 1121; 1989, No. 15, page 108), with Article 13 and Article 15 reworded as follows,

"Article 13. A two-year term of active compulsory service is established, and for soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and senior noncommissioned officers who have higher educations, one year.

"Procedures for active compulsory service by soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and senior noncommissioned officers are set forth by the USSR minister of defense pursuant to the present law."

"Article 15. The minister of defense is hereby given the right to keep servicemen in active military service for up to two months in addition to the term set, if necessary."

[Signed] President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics M. Gorbachev

Moscow, the Kremlin, 12 May 1991

Enactment of New Service Terms

91UM0651B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 May 91 Union Edition p 2

"[Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Procedures for Enacting the USSR Law 'On Amending the USSR Law on Comprehensive Military Service Obligation']"

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To enact the USSR law "On Amending the USSR Law on Comprehensive Military Service Obligation" from the moment of publication.

2. To make a transition to two-year terms of active military service in 1991 and 1992, keeping during this period three-year terms of active military service for the sailors and petty officers of ships, vessels, and shore units of combat support of the Navy and naval units of the Border Guard Troops drafted into compulsory active military service or transferred there from another combat arm (branch of service) of the USSR Armed Forces prior to 1 January 1991.

[Signed] Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. Lukyanov

Moscow, the Kremlin, 12 May 1991

Resolution on Naval Recruitment Experiment

91UM0651C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 May 91 First Edition p 1

"[Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Conducting an Experiment in the USSR Ministry of Defense Involving the Acquisition of Sailor and Petty Officer Personnel by Voluntary Contracts With Servicemen in Active Compulsory Military Service]"

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To authorize the USSR Ministry of Defense to conduct during 1991 through 1994 an experiment in four

large Navy units involving the acquisition of sailor and petty officer personnel by voluntary contracts with servicemen drafted into active compulsory military service in 1991.

2. The contracts shall be signed for two and a half years with the sailors and petty officers of the Navy after they remain in active compulsory military service for no less than six months.

3. The sailors and petty officers of the Navy who have signed contracts under Article 2 of the present resolution, remain in active compulsory military service. They and their families enjoy the rights and preferences envisaged by the legislation in effect. The sailors and petty officers shall be given additional pay, the size and procedures for the payment of which are established by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

4. Contracts with servicemen may be repudiated if they are convicted by courts for the crimes committed, due to incompetency, or due their reluctance to be in active voluntary service under contract.

If a contract is repudiated, the duration of service under contract by sailors and petty officers does not count toward the term of active military service established by the USSR Law on Comprehensive Military Service Obligation, and they serve out the term indicated.

5. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers shall adopt within three months temporary regulations for active military service by sailors and petty officers under voluntary contracts.

[Signed] Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. Lukyanov

Moscow, the Kremlin, 12 May 1991

Chief of Kharkov Aviation School on Aviation Education Reform

91UM04854 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel V. Shevtsov, chief of the Kharkov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni Twice Hero of the Soviet Union S.I. Gritsevets, by Lieutenant Colonel V. Rudenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "The Military Reform: Problems in the Restructuring of the Higher School": "Pilots Who Never Developed: Can We Stop the Attrition of Cadets From Military Schools?"]

[Text] The military pilot's occupation makes such rigid demands of the individual's health, his physical and psychological conditioning, his ability instantaneously to get his bearings in extreme situations and make competent decisions that attrition from flight schools has long been perceived by everyone almost as a fated necessity. Indeed, a cadet must not be permitted to solo if there is no certainty that he can complete the flight.

Still, however, many professional people directly involved in the training of flight personnel believe that losses could be cut considerably if a number of reforms were effected in the system of Air Force VUZs within the framework of the restructuring. This is what Col V. Shevtsov, chief of the Kharkov Higher Aviation School imeni Twice Hero of the Soviet Union S.I. Gritsevets, thinks about the matter. He was interviewed by our correspondent.

[Rudenko] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, is the situation with respect to our pilot training really so bad that we need to change everything from the ground up?

[Shevtsov] I would not dramatize the situation that way. Today, however, when the nation and the Armed Forces are being tested by the market and we are operating in an absolutely new economic situation, we need to think not only about what kind of pilots we are preparing but also about the price. It is a known fact that almost 50% of the cadets, or one out of two, are eliminated from the schools in the training process for various reasons. This means that millions of rubles of the people's money are actually being thrown to the wind.

[Rudenko] What is the cause of such a high attrition rate?

[Shevtsov] First of all, of course, it is the decline in prestige for the military service and the career of a pilot. The influx of young people into flight schools has recently dropped drastically. In 1989 790 people entered our school, while the figure was only 312 this past year. There was practically no competition following the medical board's findings. In some cases we were even forced to reexamine those receiving "twos." That is, there were no possibilities for selection. We were sometimes not able to do any selecting at all. Graduates from the

Central Asian and Transcaucasus republics are evaluated by medical boards and take their exams locally, of course.

I am not against the so-called national cadres, but why should some people have entirely unjustified advantages over others? Are we not in this way exacerbating already difficult national relations?

[Rudenko] I happen to know that the number of expulsions for disinclination to study has recently increased. What is your situation with respect to this?

[Shevtsov] Unfortunately, it is not the best. Last year, for example, two cadets announced literally a few days before graduation that they had made a mistake in selecting a career and submitted requests for discharge into the reserve. They were discharged soon thereafter. And they bore practically no responsibility. Why should we not take advantage of the experience of armies of the Western nations? In the French Air Force, which I have had the opportunity to visit, every cadet entering an aviation school is required to sign a contract for 2 years of training and 8 years of service. If he breaks the contract through his own fault, he is required to pay a fine of 100,000 francs. When are we going to learn to consider the people's money?

[Rudenko] A dismal picture. Are any steps being taken to rectify this situation?

[Shevtsov] Steps are being taken, of course. How effective they are is another matter. A three-stage system for training flight personnel is presently being introduced, for example. In the first stage it calls for initial flight training at aviation clubs, DOSAAF training centers and special schools; in the second, basic training at flight schools; in the third, the training of graduates of those schools at centers for the advanced training of flight personnel, where they learn to operate the type of combat aircraft which they will be flying in the line unit.

Although this system has some indisputable advantages making it possible to improve the pilot training, it can still not reduce the time required for them to fit into the formation or at least minimize the attrition rate at aviation schools.

[Rudenko] But is this a realistic goal in general? After all, if an individual does not have what it takes to become a pilot, he will not become one no matter what system he is trained under.

[Shevtsov] That is true. And it means that only those who have not only the desire but also certain aptitudes should be trained to fly.

First of all, in my opinion, we should reject the existing practice whereby a young man enters flight school immediately upon graduating from secondary school. Let all of those expressing a desire for a career in the aviation train the first 2 years under a standard program at specially established schools or Air Force schools, regardless of

whether they want to become pilots or aviation engineers, or, let us say, signalmen, weather forecasters or rear service specialists. And the program should include several dual instruction flights during which experienced pilots would determine each cadet's aptitude for flight work.

Cadets selected in this way for flight training—again, regardless of whether they are to become fighter, bomber or air transport pilots—should for a certain period of time train on a single class of plane or helicopter under a single program. Not until a year or a year and a half before they graduate from the VUZ, based on their demonstrated aptitudes, should they be sent to schools specializing in the training of pilots for a specific element of the air force. Under such a system attrition for reasons of professional unsuitability, or, as we say, for incompatibility with flight work, would practically be eliminated. And those who, for whatever reasons, do not make it through the selection process or do not wish to become pilots would continue their training at schools for training ground specialists.

[Rudenko] The implementation of your proposals would require a fundamental change in the present system of Air Force VUZs, and this would entail large financial outlays...

[Shevtsov] The very fact that we would not have such a large number of pilots who do not develop and not spend the millions on their training would more than cover all the costs. Furthermore, converting to the new system would make it possible to respond more flexibly to the needs of the Air Force for flight personnel, which is particularly important today, when the Armed Forces are being reduced. If a school is turning out 200 fighter pilots, but only 100 are needed next year, it presently takes four years to restructure. Under the new system only a year would be needed.

Converting to the new system would also make it possible to reduce personnel at the flight schools considerably. They would actually only retain the instructor pilots, service personnel and a small administration. Since we are proposing that the training be conducted with a single class of aircraft, this would eliminate the need to have a large pool of various classes of aircraft at each school.

The best instructors could be selected from the schools and concentrated at the Air Force schools. This would in turn raise the level of general education and special training of the future Air Force officers.

Yet another important fact: We would finally have personal responsibility for the training of the air combatants. Can a situation be considered normal in which we ourselves select the cadets, teach them and actually give the state exams, that is, evaluate their performance ourselves?

[Rudenko] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, whether or not a cadet becomes a military pilot depends primarily upon

the cadet himself. But not him alone. Do all the instructor pilots have the necessary professional and pedagogical qualities and background to teach flight skills to the youth? After all, this requires special talent.

[Shevtsov] Your comment is valid. Not everyone has what it takes to be an instructor pilot. This obvious fact has long been universally ignored, however. An absolute majority of our instructors are recent graduates, for example, who have never served a single day in a combat unit. One has to ask where they got their general and flight experience. I have always been in favor of appointing—and ideally, selecting on a competitive basis—as flight instructors the best trained pilots from the combat units, those with at least a 2nd-class rating who have proven themselves to be skilful specialists and teachers. One has to admit that failures as cadets are sometimes due not just to the cadet, but also to the teacher.

[Rudenko] What is preventing you from selecting instructors in the combat units right now?

[Shevtsov] Legally, there would appear to be nothing. In reality there are many things, however. The fact is that the service, and moral and material situation of the instructor today is such that it is not easy to entice pilots from the combat units to these positions. We are therefore forced by necessity to retain our own graduates. Furthermore, this is frequently done contrary to their own wishes, a fact already written about in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. You tell me how we can count on highly effective flight training for the cadets in this situation.

We must increase the pay scale of instructor pilots significantly and raise their job category at least one or two levels. Is it fair for one who is the main teacher and mentor of cadets to have a service position far lower than that of an instructor in any other discipline, as in the current situation?

Another important requirement is that the instructor pilot be granted greater independence in the planning and organization of the flight training. There are so many chiefs standing over him today that he simply loses his individuality. I believe that the training squadrons do not need flight commanders, navigators or deputy air squadron commanders. The instructor pilot should be responsible for everything himself.

Some steps are already being taken in this area, and are already having a perceptible effect. Granting the instructor authority to permit a cadet to solo would significantly enhance his prestige and responsibility. And most important, the instructor would stop feeling like a cabby who has to "rack up" a certain number of flights with a cadet and ignore everything else.

[Rudenko] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, in most Western nations parallel controls, and not controls one behind the other, are used for the initial flight training. That is, the cadet and the instructor sit side by side and not one behind the other. They say that the training is more effective on this type of aircraft.

[Shevtsov] I do not share that point of view. In the beginning the cadet does indeed feel greater confidence with the instructor next to him. He rapidly grows accustomed to this, however, and can make foolish errors during his advanced training for flying a combat aircraft.

With respect to our main training aircraft, the L-39, to my knowledge purchases of it are presently being reduced, and in the near future we may find ourselves facing the problem of having nothing on which to train the cadets to fly.

In view of this, I would like to mention some aircraft with which we are well familiar, the MIG-15 and MIG-17

UTI [trainer]. With slight modifications, they could be turned into fine training aircraft, our own Soviet trainers, undemanding, easy to learn to fly and very reliable. Perhaps it is not too late to return to them.

[Rudenko] Do you believe that your ideas could be implemented right now?

[Shevtsov] I am aware that there are other proposals for restructuring the Air Force VUZs. One can only hope that they will be taken into account for working out a precisely conceived concept for improving the entire system for training flight personnel, something dictated by the demands of the times.

Former Soviet 'Advisor' Describes Experiences in Iraq

91UM0468B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Lt Col Sergey Bezlyudnyy: "I Taught Saddam's Aces to Fly"; the article was written with the aid of A. Zhuravelev]

[Text] Lt Col Sergey Ivanovich Bezlyudnyy, a Military Pilot 1st Class, prior to being sent to Iraq (1987), was the deputy commander of an air regiment for flight training. At present he is the senior assistant chief of a shift at the Air Traffic Administration of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation.

At the beginning of 1987, I was offered to leave on a tour of duty to Iraq as a military advisor. I accepted and a short time later, more accurately in April 1987, I flew to Baghdad as part of a small group of military specialists.

We knew that Iraq was still in a state of war with Iran and understandably expected to see the typical picture of a frontline town. But we were wrong. We landed in Baghdad in the evening and were amazed as there was a sea of lights, not even a hint of blackout, there were masses of people in the streets and the restaurants and movies were operating at full tilt.

I was appointed the consultant of an air wing commander. (According to the table of organization, this is somewhere midway between our regiment and division.) So I arrived at air base X several-score kilometers away from Baghdad.

I will admit that this air base literally overwhelmed my imagination. I had never seen anything like it before, although while serving in the Union I had been in scores of garrisons. The equipment, shelters and blast walls—everything was the last word of equipment and outstanding quality. As far as I know, the base was being built basically by Yugoslavs with the Italians and French providing the electronics.

For this reason, in reading announcements about the complete destruction of the enemy airfields and aviation shelters by the forces of the anti-Iraqi coalition, I must say I am skeptical of them. As far as I could see, it would have been virtually impossible to destroy this with tactical weapons, even superaccurate ones, and probably only by using nuclear warheads.

Our residential compound was located not far from the base. A total of several-score Soviet specialists were working here including instructor pilots and aviation technicians. The living conditions were outstanding. For example, I had at my complete disposal an enormous villa with three bedrooms, two bathrooms and two toilets and an installation of Japanese electronic equipment. My wife and I lived alone in this palace as our children remained in the Union with their grandmother.

The main task of the Soviet military specialists was to help the Iraqi pilots master the new equipment, the MIG-29 aircraft. At that time, the planes were just beginning to arrive from the Union.

Many Iraqi pilots had been trained in Western countries, France or England. Incidentally, these states for some reason now prefer not to mention this. Correspondingly, the establishment of the units as well as the tactics of air combat followed Western models very distinct from ours. But ours was a very narrow, specific task and we focused all our attention on instructing the Iraqis in piloting techniques, without imposing our own notions about air force tactics.

Incidentally, certain officers after completing Western military colleges, went to study in our country and had a fair knowledge of Russian. For instance, my "chief" and commander of the air wing, Brig Gen Muhammed A., completed the Soviet Military Academy imeni Frunze.

He was a very intelligent and competent commander, having great authority among the soldiers and officers. A developed sense of subordination is completely characteristic of the Iraqi Army. But this is on duty, while in their free time there are often friendly relations between the soldiers and officers which in our army is hard to find.

The Iraqi Armed Forces are manned using a combined system with induction for active regular service and a contract system. The latter is employed for a majority of the skilled specialists.

If one is to speak about the logistic support for the army, this is very high. For example, available to the air wing commander were three official Mercedes and two vehicles of a lower class. Wages also were 3-5-fold higher (in terms of purchasing power) than the pay, for example, of the Soviet military.

In terms of social composition the Iraqi officer corps is heterogeneous. Here you will find serving the relatives of millionaires, for example, the deputy commander for political affairs of one of the MIG-29 squadrons, as well as persons from the rural poor.

Incidentally, about the deputy commanders for political affairs. Basically they perform the functions of religious mentors, although naturally they are also concerned with propagandizing the ideas of the ruling Baath Party. An absolute majority of the servicemen in the Iraqi Army are believers, but real fanatics are all the same rarely encountered. Saddam Hussein himself, as far as I know, is a very religious man (whatever might be said on this matter in the press). It is no accident that in the army a majority of orthodox Moslems has been promoted to command positions.

The authority of Saddam Hussein in the army is unsailable. He is the leader of the nation who without any doubt has an enormous influence on the masses. He knows how to achieve the goals he sets for himself.

We were to help the Iraqi pilots in mastering the MIG-29. Our advisors successfully carried out this task. I feel that the Iraqi fighter pilots were trained just as well as the pilots of, for instance, France and Finland with whom we in recent years have been in contact repeatedly. In truth, I will not take it upon myself to compare their professionalism with the combat skills of American pilots but, in constantly seeing the prevalence of Negroes and mulattoes among the U.S. pilots on the TV screens, I could draw some conclusions. I feel that Saddam Hussein, in realizing that the Coalition had absolute air supremacy, would keep his aviation until the start of the land war. Here the Iraqi pilots could show their skills particularly as they had gained great experience in fighting American-produced fighters in the Iraqi-Iranian War.

But let us return to combat training. The MIG-29 is a rather difficult aircraft to pilot, and for this reason the Iraqis assigned the best trained pilots for mastering it. The fellows were intelligent and they rather quickly mastered all the basic procedures of piloting techniques. But when combat training began, completely unexpected problems arose.

As is known, in the East it is the custom to respect elders, and not only persons who are older in age but also in position or status. Take an ordinary situation: we were taking off in a two-man trainer to work on elements of combat training. In front was the aircraft of the squadron commander, and I was flying with his deputy. "Now," I said to him, "make a turn. We are going to intercept him." The deputy squadron commander, a bright fellow, soon was coming in on the tail of his commander. But I could feel that my "student" was beginning to reduce speed.

"Go on," I said, "attack the target!"

And he replied: "I cannot. That is my commander."

"What in the devil does a commander mean in combat training? Carry out the order."

Generally, the squadron commander was safely "downed." In truth, the commander for a week would not speak to me as he was insulted. But when he was put up for promotion, to wing commander (we had trained the squadron as required), he arrived after two weeks, embraced me and said, "Thank you, brother, for the science I learned." This was how the story ended.

It was worthy of note that we understood one another excellently, even without an interpreter. Although we communicated in a very complicated language of Arabic-English-Russian-mother tongue. Incidentally, the Iraqi pilots understand English which is used in radio air traffic, while communicating among themselves in Arabic.

...The date of the end of my tour of duty had arrived unnoticed. We said farewell warmly as over the 18 months spent in Iraq I had become friends with many officers.

Who knows whether they are alive now?

P.S. Certain last names and the names of certain geographic places have been omitted due to the war in the Persian Gulf.

From the Editors:

The memoirs of Air Force Lt Col Sergey Bezlyudnyy can have different interpretations. Particularly now when there is a war underway in the Persian Gulf. When we take a quite different view of our aid to the dictator. One thing seems indisputable to us that his story is the story of a soldier who honestly carried out orders. You will agree that not the army and not the military specialist should bear responsibility for the "unknown wars" about which we have learned more and more recently. Political decisions are taken by politicians. And not at the ends of the earth....

Joint Aerospatiale-MBB Attack Helicopter Noted

91UM0468A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Mar 91
First Edition p 5

[Letter to the Editor: "A 'Tiger' Against Tanks and Helicopters"; the reply was obtained from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces]

[Text] Western European countries are developing a new type of helicopter, the "Tiger." Judging from the name, is this a "flying tank"? V. Safonov, Moscow

In fact, the foreign press has announced a new combat helicopter being developed jointly by the French Aerospatiale Firm and the German Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm. Its production is being planned in two models: the RAN-2 (designation for West Germany) or NAS-3S (for France) designed to combat tanks, and the NAR (for France) designed to combat helicopters and low-flying aircraft as well as lightly armored ground targets.

In both versions the helicopter crew will consist of two men placed in the cockpit, one behind the other. Maximum lift-off weight of the RAN-2 is around 5,500 kg and for the NAR a little over 5,000 kg. The cruising speed of the former is 250 km an hour and for the latter up to 280 km per hour.

The basic armament of the RAN-2 is eight hot missiles and four air-to-air guided missiles. The NAR is to be armed with four such missiles, a 30-mm cannon and 68-mm unguided aviation missiles.

As has been announced, both versions of the helicopter will be equipped with reconnaissance and sight equipment ensuring its combat employment under instrument flying conditions at any time of the day. The basis of this

equipment is comprised of an optical sight, an infrared forward-looking radar, a television camera and a laser range finder-target designator.

Flight testing of the Tiger is planned for the current year.

Hungarian Military Attache on New Doctrine

91UM05594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Apr 91 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Colonel Sh. Nemet, Hungarian military attache to the USSR, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA columnist Captain S. Sidorov: "At the Foundation: Bilateral Relations"; place and date not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The military structures of the Warsaw Pact were disbanded at the beginning of this month. The vacuum which has been created will gradually be filled by the system of bilateral defensive agreements presently being established, which are intended to replace the reciprocal obligations of the former military allies which are no longer valid. From this time forward, relations between the Soviet Union and Hungary will be determined not through a general, bloc approach, but will be structured on the basis of national military doctrines. Our KRASNAYA ZVEZDA columnist asked Colonel Sh. Nemet, military attache at the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow, to respond to questions concerning the republic's new military doctrine.

Colonel Shaidor Nemet is 49 years old. He has occupied a variety of command and staff positions in the Hungarian People's Army. After his completion in 1984 of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, he served as Army chief of intelligence (in the city of Szekesfehervar), and then as chief of the combat training division of the Operations Directorate of Hungary's Ministry of Defense. He has served in the Hungarian Republic Embassy in Moscow since September 1990. He is married and has two children.

[Sidorov] At what stage is the process of adopting a new military doctrine for the Hungarian Republic?

[Nemet] The Hungarian Government has studied, discussed, and taken under consideration the basic principles of defense of the Hungarian Republic and the system of requirements it must fulfill. The concept of defense and the professional military missions which proceed from it should be presented by the Defense Ministry in the name of the government to the Hungarian Parliament this May.

[Sidorov] What is the orientation of the doctrine, and what are its main provisions?

[Nemet] As a result of the changes which have taken place recently in Europe, we have been presented the opportunity to develop an independent concept of defense of an autonomous and sovereign state. On the one hand, this concept reflects a system of views for

effecting security over the long term, and on the other—today's practical tasks of defending the country.

Policy in the sphere of security for the Hungarian Republic can be defined as a system of political aims, principles, and actions directed toward averting war and military conflicts, preserving peace, and establishing and maintaining the Armed Forces necessary and sufficient for defense. It can also be seen as preparation of the state administrative system, economy, and population for a possible war and for warding off other dangers. Of course, development of a position with respect to the disarmament process is also relevant here.

Our country intends to achieve these aims within the framework of the collective European security system.

We will structure contacts with all countries and groups of countries based on principles of mutual respect, equal rights, good will, and non-intervention in one another's internal affairs. Our country has no aims to be achieved through the use of military force, except for defending the independence, territorial inviolability, and sovereignty of the country from possible aggression. Our military doctrine is characterized by a clearly expressed defensive nature. There is no country we consider an enemy and we do not even see the preliminary outline of an enemy. We intend to resolve problems arising in inter-state relations through peaceful, political means in the first instance. Employment of the Armed Forces is seen as an extreme recourse for defending the country. Finally, in full consideration of the security interests of our neighbors, we will strive to avoid giving any cause for the emergence of even the slightest perception of threat.

[Sidorov] Would you please provide some specifics regarding under what circumstances employment of the Armed Forces would be envisaged? And what today is incorporated in the concept of "armed forces"?

[Nemet] The concept of our "armed forces" comprises the Hungarian Defense Forces (VOS) and border troops. The Armed Forces are planned to be used in one event only—if aggression is effected against our country from any direction. We are therefore planning to determine the stationing of our Armed Forces in such a way that there is no preponderance of force along any one sector, while at the same time enabling its swift mobilization, rapid, and flexible formation of the necessary defensive grouping of forces.

[Sidorov] At what level are military expenditures and the strength of the Armed Forces envisaged?

[Nemet] The budget and strength of the Hungarian Defense Forces are determined by the economic capabilities of the country and the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency. We are planning to use approximately three percent of the gross national product to maintain the Defense Forces. The strength of the Defense Forces in peacetime will be on the order of 0.6-0.8 percent of the country's population, i.e., about

60,000-80,000. In the event of war, we envision increasing this percentage to three percent.

[Sidorov] What changes do you expect in the system of training cadre for the Armed Forces?

[Nemet] With respect to training the military, we expect that a preference will be shown for training in defensive operations. But this is presently in the development stage. More attention will be devoted to officer training. Military academies will transition to a four-year period of instruction. Changes will also take place in the training system for officers at the highest echelons. Officer basic training will take place in Hungary, but we are planning to send a limited number of our officers to various educational institutions abroad for academic instruction.

[Sidorov] How does the new doctrine handle issues concerning the proportion of military services and branches of the Armed Forces, and outfitting them with combat equipment?

[Nemet] The proportioning of military services and branches of the Armed Forces, like their technological equipping, must conform to the demands of active defensive operations as applied to the terrain conditions of our country. The outfitting of our Defense Forces with combat equipment and technology will be planned based on a comprehensive analysis of our economic capabilities and defensive requirements. In purchasing arms we will strive for a fuller utilization of our own country's capacities, but will also expand the scope of sources for such purchases.

[Sidorov] What system will be employed for bringing the units of the Defense Forces up to strength? Will it remain the same—as it was for the Hungarian People's Army, or will it be closer to the system practiced in many European countries—a territorial system?

[Nemet] The territorial principle is taken into account today—in bringing units up to strength with servicemen serving an additional military obligation. Mobilization of trained reservists is accomplished based on the principle of territorial replacement. Administrative state and local organs participate directly in this. I believe it would be advisable to study the territorial principle of Austria and Switzerland, although I do not feel they should be copied.

[Sidorov] Having left the Warsaw Pact Organization, does Hungary intend to join NATO? What significance is attached to regional military cooperation?

[Nemet] We see the guarantee of our country's security, as I noted earlier, in the establishment of a common European security system. Therefore, our plans do not include the creation of new blocs. As far as the question of membership in NATO is concerned, as far as I am aware, we do not have any specific plans or intentions of joining the military organization of this alliance. The Hungarian Defense Minister, L. Fur, emphasized this

again not too long ago during his visit to Great Britain. Of course this does not preclude the establishment of healthy, constructive relations both with the alliance as a whole and with its individual members.

The main orientation of our military leadership's activity at present is the establishment of bilateral, friendly relations in the military sphere with the European countries, first and foremost with our neighbors. As of today we have already concluded agreements on military cooperation with Romania and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Preparation of a similar agreement with the Soviet Union has been initiated.

[Sidorov] Could you provide us with the Hungarian point of view regarding to the basic parameters of such an agreement?

[Nemet] I think we will be able to give a fairly specific answer to this question after a summit meeting takes place between the leaders of the Soviet Union and Hungary. Right now I can only say that we would like to conclude such a treaty as soon as possible, insofar as this conforms with our vital interests. It might resemble bilateral treaties already in effect in certain respects—be concluded for a five-year term, for example, with subsequent extension. At the same time, the agreement may be unique to a significant degree. After all, the Soviet Union is not only our neighbor but a major military power as well, which has been the chief supplier of arms and military equipment for our Armed Forces.

[Sidorov] Colonel Nemet, we thank you for this conversation.

[Nemet] I am grateful for your questions and for the opportunity to address KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers.

Changes in Bundeswehr Structure, Doctrine Since Unification

91UM05864 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by TASS correspondent V. Chistyakov specially for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "The Bundeswehr on the Threshold of Change"]

[Text] What will be the policy of a united Germany in the military sphere? It was expected that the answer to this question would be heard in the FRG and beyond its borders after the first general elections in the country's postwar history, which were held on 2 December last year. In the course of negotiations on the formation of a new government and the development of the basic directions of its activity, the future policy of the FRG in the sphere of security was one of the principal questions, inasmuch as its significance is distinctly understood in Bonn. It is indicative, however, that against the background of sharp and prolonged debates on many questions that are not of a priority nature, the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] and the FDP [Free Democratic Party] were able to come

to the same opinion relatively easily. At the same time, the main attention was focussed on the military-strategic concepts of activity of the Bundeswehr within the framework of NATO (in this sphere the federal government intends to follow the former policy, which, it is believed here, has justified itself) and on specific directions of the future construction of the all-German armed forces. The proposals of the military department, which were approved by the coalition partners, envisage the undertaking of a serious modernization of the Bundeswehr, which some local observers believe to be the beginning of radical military reform.

A change in the structure of the ground forces should become one of its main elements. Today, they are divided into two categories that are fundamentally different in their tasks, numerical strength, and combat readiness. Regular combat units belong to the first, and territorial troops to the second. In conformity with this, two independent organizational structures were established that operate in parallel: corps, consisting of divisions and brigades, and the territorial commands

However, the positive processes that are occurring in Europe and the world make it possible, in the opinion of German politicians, to conduct a "rationalization" of the former structure of the Bundeswehr. It was decided in the FRG that in peacetime both parts of the ground forces should constitute a single whole, and that only in the event of a military conflict would each of them return to the execution of their former specific tasks. For these purposes it is planned to establish three joint commands in the western part of the FRG, each of which will have one of the existing corps of ground forces and one of the territorial commands.

Similar changes must be carried out at the lower level as well. It is contemplated, in particular, that of the 12 divisions available here now, eight will be combined with corresponding subunits of the territorial forces. In conformity with the reform project, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense plans to cut the number of brigades sharply: instead of 48 brigades, only 28 should remain in the Bundeswehr in the future.

As the newspaper *BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL* writes, this measure will make it possible to give up 10,000 positions in staffs at various levels, filled today by servicemen, and 1,600 civilian employee positions. On the whole the renewed ground forces of Germany will consist of 255,000 soldiers and officers (on the territory of the western part of the country alone they now number about 340,000).

"We are on the right track, and the concepts and plans that we are developing are directed at creating an army that is numerically smaller but equally combat capable," Lieutenant General Henning von Ondarza, chief of staff of the Ground Forces, declared in this connection. Speaking to his colleagues, he expressed the opinion that the new Bundeswehr will be established not in the ministry or in staffs but in training classes and on training grounds. In this regard the General attaches decisive significance to two factors: an increase in the effectiveness of the combat

training of compulsory service soldiers and a qualitative improvement in the activity of noncommissioned officers and junior officers.

The concept of the development of the German ground forces also includes such an aspect as the creation of "multinational corps" on German territory. This will consist of national divisions of individual NATO member countries, and will be directed by staffs that will include officers of these states. In addition, as H. von Ondarza believes, it is necessary to deploy similar corps not only in Germany but in other allied states as well, and the Bundeswehr is ready to play a direct part in their creation. During the preparatory stage various changes will have to be initiated along a military line: from the training of cadets in officer schools of the allies to "tours of duty" of full-strength combat units of the Bundeswehr to take place in foreign armed forces.

It is contemplated that substantial changes will affect not only the ground forces but also the other services of the armed forces of Germany. In accordance with available plans, the overall strength of aviation subunits should be cut by approximately 30 percent, the numerical strength of ground units of the air defense troops will be decreased significantly, and many of them will be reduced to cadre level. As for the 620 aircraft that are in the armaments today, less than 500 should remain in the future. It is necessary to take into account the fact that now the Bundeswehr has at its disposal an additional 400 combat aircraft that it received from the air force component of the former GDR; however, a great part of them, in the opinion of military experts, will have to be dismantled or sold abroad. It is planned to limit the "ceiling" of air force personnel to 82,000 persons (there are now more than 110,000 soldiers and officers in the air force).

About 15 years have been allotted for reform of the Navy. In this time there should be a considerable (by approximately a factor of two) reduction in the number of available combat ships of various classes, of which 90 will remain, and personnel will be cut from 40,000 to 32,000 persons. Specialists plan to define concretely the program of modernization of the German naval forces in the first half of this year.

The impending reduction in the number of soldiers and officers of the Bundeswehr cannot be implemented, in the opinion of military specialists, without a corresponding change in the ratio between various groups of servicemen. The basic idea of the proposals in this sphere, approved by the government, comes down to the need to reduce the percentage of soldiers performing compulsory service in favor of professional servicemen. In this connection also the share of military discharged into the reserve from each group will not be proportional to the "weight" of this group in the composition of the armed forces. Thus, on the one hand the strength level of the professional military and of those who have already served in the army a long time under contract will be cut from 89,600 to 78,500 persons. At the same time, the number of servicemen performing compulsory service will be decreased from 174,000 to 120,000 persons. Simultaneously, the government considers it necessary to develop a series of measures to facilitate the transition to civilian life for those who voluntarily decide to discontinue service in the armed forces ahead of schedule.

Conversion Increasing Udmurt Unemployment

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[Article by A. Gorbатов, member of the press group under the Interrepublic Veteran Cooperative Association from Izhevsk—Moscow: "A Fate Engendered by Conversion"]

[Text] For some reason I recalled that the participants at a conference seminar held four months ago in Moscow for the leaders of the organizational bureau to establish the Interrepublic Veteran Cooperative Association were amazed and frightened by the enormous figure of over 200,000 unemployed! More accurately, this number of unemployed workers should be added in Udmurtia at present as a result of the conversion of the republic defense enterprises. Naturally, a large portion of them should be made up of pensioners. Who are the first to be let go if not these wretches down on their luck!...

In truth, at the same conference a certain optimistic end to the unhappy situation was sketched out. The optimists said that no, there was no bad without good and for this reason in the course of conversion the field for establishing veteran cooperatives in Udmurtia would become almost the largest in the entire Russian Federation. It is interesting just how all of this ended up in fact.

...Having scarcely crossed the threshold of the Udmurt Republic Veterans Council I learned that the information about the 200,000 unemployed, to put it mildly, was inaccurate. The Council Chairman Mikhail Yefimovich Zikov explained that such a figure had actually been mentioned among the numerous forecasts in the course of the debate over the consequences of introducing market relations in the Udmurt economy. But this was a mere echo of the extreme views. In reality everything was quite different.

The Votkinskiy Zavod Production Association is the very enterprise the operations of which are now being closely observed by American military specialists. It is here that a large group of workers who previously produced missiles is now employed in manufacturing the Feiya washing machine. Many of them have retired on pension. But virtually all have found employment in the subsidiary services of the enterprise.

The Izhmash Production Association is also endeavoring to hold onto the regular workers, engineers and technicians who have reached pension age. Here all conditions are created for the veterans so that they can continue to work successfully. This is understandable as in the association's shops, particularly on the motor vehicle conveyor, in recent years there has been a shortage of several thousand workers and these had to be sent under special contract from the Central Asian Republics where there has long been a surplus of labor resources.

Naturally, the question arises whether in Udmurtia there is no surplus manpower and unemployed pensioners. Of

course, there are. At the republic Ministry of Labor (the former Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems]) I was told the following planning numbers. During the current year, over 30,000 persons will retire on pension and of this number only 12,000 would be able to continue working without any problems and many of them could work at their usual job. Around 18,000 pensioners would be turning to the appropriate republic bodies and local ones with a request to find employment. Of this number just 4,000 persons will find employment. Thus, about 14,000 pensioners will need to have jobs found for them. Many of them would be happy to join veteran cooperatives.

Incidentally, this process has already commenced. During the last three months, the number of such cooperatives has increased by four-fold. One of the first veteran cooperatives in Udmurtia was organized by pensioners at the Sharkanskiy Knitwear Mill. We drove there together with the First Deputy Chairman of the Republic Veterans Council, Yu.K. Shibyanov. Along the 100-km route, Yuriy Kornilovich [Shibyanov] related that in October of last year 16 pensioners joined together in order to make gloves, socks, jumpers, berets and children's clothing. At present, the cooperative employs 80 veterans and each month they produce tens of thousands of products. Just through Syakton, the firm name store for knitwear articles in Izhevsk, they have sold goods valued at more than 2,000 rubles.

The Chairman of the Izhevsk City Veterans Council Aleksey Ivanovich Urban spoke with enthusiasm about the first steps of the Salang Repair-Construction Cooperative and about the successes of the veteran cooperative organized under the ZhKO [Communal Housing Department] at the Izhevsk Bumash Plant where female pensioners working at home with their own sewing machines make sets of bed linen and the veteran cooperative members at the Izhstal Production Association who quickly organized the repair of footwear, the manufacturing of various consumer goods using the stamping method as well as the sharpening of household implements. Here it is particularly pleasing that the leaders of the enterprises and associations have taken a most active part in the founding and operation of the cooperatives. In particular, we should mention the General Director of the Izhstal Association Anatoliy Ivanovich Zhuravlev. The veteran cooperative members have been provided with the necessary quarters and equipment efficiently and without red tape and have been aided in acquiring raw products and materials for their work.

Seemingly, everyone lived happily ever after. Oh, no! Unfortunately, there were also examples of a different sort. "We began to collect the scrap lumber thrown out by the Zavyalovskiy Timber Enterprise on the dump, we began to craft various household and kitchen utensils from them," related the Chairman of the Truzhenik Cooperative, Aleksey Kuzmich Direyev. "Things were organized and were working. But all of a sudden there was no scrap for a day, a second day and a third.... It

turned out that the director of the timber enterprise, having learned of the entrepreneurship of the veteran cooperative members, ordered that they use the wastes in their own enterprise shops." An analogous study was also heard at the Sharkanskiy Knitwear Mill. Here the craftswomen at the veteran cooperative began making children's skirts out of knitwear scraps. The articles were cheap, attractive and in strong demand. But then the enterprise leaders thought better of it and gave orders for the production sections to make the articles using the methods of the veterans. Now, of course, the craftswomen have less raw materials from the wastes. No matter how the cooperative members in such instances regret the loss of the "raw material sources," they at the same time are proud of the fact that they can compete successfully with workers in basic production and force them to manage better and more thriftily.

But this is only an incidental. Generally, the questions of material and technical supply for the Udmurt veteran cooperatives are the most difficult and urgent. With good reason, this question became the leading one in the course of a major discussion at a roundtable held recently at the republic veterans council. At present, in

Izhevsk they have established the Republic Association of Veteran Cooperatives for coordinating the actions of the veteran cooperative members and for resolving their numerous problems. Chosen as the coordinating leader was the excellent organizer and experienced manager Vasily Andrianovich Petukhov who for many years worked in the material-technical supply system and established the first veteran cooperative in the republic capital at the Bumash Plant. The new association is gaining work and problems day after day. Certainly a major reason for this is the conversion which is continuing to pick up its pace and the noticeable rise in the veteran ranks. For example, Izhmash is setting up a design and engineering cooperative from the engineer and technical personnel retiring on pension. In Votkinsk they have just registered a multispecialty cooperative where the veterans repair household equipment, footwear and motor vehicles.... In Sharkanskiy Rayon in the summer they will begin operating a veteran cooperative involved in procuring and processing the gifts of the forests.... In a word, in Udmurtia there are things to be done for the elderly persons retiring on pension who are thinking, working and have a managerial view.

Deputy Chief of Military Housing Interviewed

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[Interview with Major-General D. Yarmak, deputy chief of the Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by Captain Third Rank Yu. Gladkevich; place and date not given: "The Most Difficult Question"]

[Text] *Major-General D. Yarmak began his service as chief of the billeting service of a regiment, and he held other positions, including, up to 1987, the position of Chief of the Billeting and Maintenance Directorate of the Odessa Military District. At present, Dmitriy Danilovich is Deputy Chief of the Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.*

At the request of the editorial office, he talks about the difficulties that exist to this day in providing housing for servicemen, and about what is being done to overcome them.

[Yarmak] To appreciate the acuteness of the problem, think about this figure: today in the Armed Forces there are 192,000 officers and warrant officers without quarters. A whole oblast city in military uniform who do not have their own roof over their heads!

The figure grows with each day—more and more detachments of servicemen without quarters came home and are continuing to come home from the units that were in the groups of forces abroad...

This entire huge increase in those without quarters happened mainly in the past three to four years. Starting in 1987, there was a sharp worsening of the situation in the allocation of housing by the local Soviets to the Ministry of Defense. In accordance with a decree of the government, local soviets were supposed to allocate 500,000 square meters of housing space for servicemen annually. But with this year, in connection with economic difficulties, a sharp drop began to occur in the volume and rates of housing construction owing to the local organs of authority. As a result, under the five-year plan, the military failed to get about 500,000 square meters; that is, a whole year of housing apparently was not allocated at all.

However, the housing question also continues to trouble officers and warrant officers who were promised housing. There is quite a lot of housing in many cities and population centers in interior areas and at remote garrisons that is significantly worse than the generally accepted standards of the country—barracks-type buildings, temporary quarters, prefabricated quonset huts (or as the people say "prefabricated suits [building that comes with built in cracks in the walls and/or roof]"), temporary housing of various kinds... It seemed that we began to unload what passes for a housing fund two years

ago. But then, agreements drew near on the redeployment of our troops from Eastern Europe. And people began to live in the barracks began once again...

[Gladkevich] Dmitriy Danilovich, the reasons you mentioned are of an objective nature to a certain degree. But, then, there is also the subjective aspect, which creates for many categories of servicemen such impasses in the housing question that they themselves cannot overcome. We recall, in particular, the order of the Minister of Defense on housing...

[Yarmak] Really, this order, which was published in 1975, restricts certain categories of servicemen in the provision of housing. In particular, officers and warrant officers who do not have families must be provided with dormitory-style quarters, but not with separate apartments. Warrant officers who have served less than five years do not even get in line for an apartment. There are other restrictions also...

But let us proceed from realities. The system in force is conditioned by the critical situation in housing and features in the performance of service by warrant officers and service women. Is it within the power of the Ministry of Defense to provide apartments, for example, to warrant officers who, after serving five years, are discharged and "take with them" the living space they were allotted? When there were no limitations that exist now, it happened that the Ministry of Defense in this way lost up to tens of thousands of apartments per year! In addition, warrant officers who served less than five years cannot, strictly speaking, be placed in the without-quarters category. The right to living space that they occupied before entering the military service has been kept for them all of this time.

As for the servicemen who do not have families, the billeting and maintenance organs of the USSR Ministry of Defense do not at all intend to defend this restriction formally. As is known, housing in military units, establishments, and military education institutions is handled by housing commissions. These are collective organs, and the military community is broadly represented in them. And if the commission, taking into account the many years of exemplary service of an officer or of a warrant officer, who does not have a family, special conditions in the exercise of duties, and conditions of health, decides to assign him a room or a one-room apartment, the commander, undoubtedly, will approve such a decision.

[Gladkevich] But do housing commissions have such authority? Some readers write that they perform only as a cover for the willfulness of the commander and chiefs in the distribution of housing. They even say that district and fleet commanders have a certain reserve fund of apartments which they personally handle...

[Yarmak] Many who have served in the Armed Forces actually encountered such cases. But it should not be forgotten that times have changed. And do you believe that today people will observe such willfulness without a

murmur, and that they will not find justice against a high-handed chief? I do not believe it.

With respect to the reserve funds of commanders, I declare with complete seriousness: the creation of such funds is not provided for in any normative acts and orders. And if such cases come to light, the guilty parties, undoubtedly, will be severely punished.

There is only one reserve fund—that of the USSR Minister of Defense. It is established to provide housing for the families of those who perished, of dead servicemen, and only the Minister of Defense is in charge of them. If the reserve is not used during a year, the apartments are allocated to persons on the waiting list in the Ministry of Defense.

But in general, in recent years there have been considerably fewer abuses and all kinds of transgressions in the distribution of housing. In March, for example, on instructions of the minister of defense, we conducted a check on the correctness of the registration, distribution, and use of housings in all of the districts and in the fleets. There are not many cases of violations of legislation and established procedures, but they do exist. In particular, cases were disclosed of assigning housing with an increase of the norm and violation of the regular waiting list—in the Northern Fleet and in the Far East and Siberian military districts... We are preparing a report for the Minister of Defense on the findings of the inspection, and I think that those who are guilty will be made strictly answerable. And it serves them right: The apartment question has assumed a political significance, and no one will permit sowing discontent among people to please the imperious arrogance of one or another chief.

[Gladkevich] Nevertheless, there are still quite a few who are dissatisfied. Including those who think that the Ministry of Defense is inadequately actively seeking mutual understanding with local authorities. But, after all, for example, registration depends on them...

[Yarmak] A problem with registration exists only in the Baltic republics and here in Moscow. I do not wish to go into the reasons for the difficulties in the Baltics; I think that they are obvious and lie in the political plane. There are about 1,100 persons in Moscow who still have not been registered. Unfortunate wording in the document approved by the USSR Council of Ministers—to register those servicemen and members of their families who do not have housing according to where their military unit is garrisoned—formally restricted the right of those who are performing service in military establishments and military educational institutions. This is simply trouble under today's conditions: People cannot receive shopper ID's and coupons for food products, and they cannot set up wives in a job and children in day nurseries and kindergartens, and use medical services...

But agreement has been practically already achieved with the Moscow Soviet of People's Deputies regarding a uniform interpretation of this provision.

[Gladkevich] Dmitry Danilovich, many garrisons and closed military compounds, like it or not, are being settled after service by thousands of officers and army and navy warrant officers discharged into the reserve. After losing practically all ties with the army and the navy, they continue, nonetheless, to occupy apartments. And this is at a time when there is no place to settle those who are serving. Also an impasse? But, after all, back in 1980 a government decree was passed which obligated local authorities to allot housing for resettlement of those discharged into the reserve or retired...

[Yarmak] It has practically not been implemented. During the years 1986-1990, for example, for these purposes local authorities were supposed to allot living space for the settlement of 60,000 families. But they allotted only enough for 21,700 families. The figure increased, and by 1 January 1991, it came to 80,000 families...

But with this year, the procedure for providing housing for those discharged into the reserve and retired has been changed. All previous decrees have lost their force, and now the USSR Gosplan is planning settlement resources with a ceiling on contract work of the USSR Ministry of Defense, with their subsequent transfer to a process of shareholding participation by executive committees of local soviets. Of course, considering the shortage in construction capabilities of many local soviets, we are prepared to help them in this work with forces available to us.

Especially under a market economy when a merger of financial capabilities and resources can have a big effect.

[Gladkevich] The conversation about the market is quite to the point. How does the Ministry of Defense intend to enter the housing market? Will not this alternative once again hit the already poor purse of a military person?

[Yarmak] Of course, it will hit it, that is the harsh reality. But the Ministry of Defense will in the future, to the extent of its forces and capabilities, render assistance to servicemen. In particular, in the construction of cooperative housing and individual construction.

I think that we will also go for privatization—but partial—of housing. The frequent service moves of officers, and even of warrant officers, will not allow the implementation of total privatization. Our opinion is that the existing procedure for providing servicemen with state living space in the form of rent should be retained. And only when an officer or a warrant officer has already settled in one or another city, and when no more transfers are foreseen, will it be possible to grant the right to purchase an apartment, or transfer it free of charge to personal property. However, variants are possible here. Everything has to be studied carefully and a decision adopted only in coordination with reformed housing legislation.

[Gladkevich] And the last question, Dmitry Danilovich. You, very likely, heard this saying, a rather malicious one: "Possession is nine-tenths of the law." You "possess" apartments, but what do you "have?"

[Yarmak] After arriving in Moscow, I did not have an apartment for a year and a half. Then, on general grounds, of course, I received a three-room apartment for myself, my wife, and my daughter who is a senior pupil. It is an area of 42 square meters. I live, in general,

like many officers and warrant officers—without any ostentation, but neither am I living in poverty. Which I wish, at least for a beginning, for everyone who had a lot of trouble without his own apartment, in strange corners, in "communal housing," and even in barracks...

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